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Abstract  
The effectiveness of monetary policy depends importantly on the expectations of the private 
sector, as it is largely through this channel of the transmission mechanism that policy 
changes are transmitted to long-term interest rates. This has increased the emphasis on the 
role of central bank communication as a monetary policy tool. Successful communication is 
essential both to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy and to build support for the 
institutional framework within which monetary policy is implemented. While the large and 
growing literature on central bank communication over the past decade has delivered strong 
support for the important role of central bank communication, there is less agreement about 
what the optimal communication strategy is. Furthermore, research has been limited mainly 
to studies of communication between central banks and the financial markets. In an 
evaluation of progress in the literature, Blinder et al. (2008) highlight the need to examine 
the interaction between central banks and the rest of the private sector (the general public) 
as well. 
The objective of this PhD dissertation is to evaluate the South African Reserve Bank’s 
(SARB’s) use of communication as a monetary policy tool. Special focus is given to 
communication with the inattentive general public, who set prices in the labour market and 
the market for goods and services. Different aspects of the SARB’s communication were 
studied, including the consistency of the South African Reserve Bank’s communication, the 
transmission of this communication via the media to the general public, and the process by 
which the general public gathers and processes the information on inflation. 
An evaluation of the SARB’s communications (its original messages) provided some evidence 
that the SARB has succeeded in communicating consistently over the inflation targeting 
period. This was followed by an assessment of the role of the media in transmitting the 
original communications to the general public. The results suggest that South African media 
reports generally show a lack of critical assessment of monetary policy decisions and that the 
inter-meeting communication by the SARB is ineffective at influencing these. An important 
challenge is for the SARB to consider how it can participate more actively in the economic 
discussion at this level and how it can build productive strategic relationships with the 
media. The final section of this dissertation explores the process by which the general public 
forms its inflation expectations, relying on epidemiological models to describe the spread of 
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inflation information and to estimate the speed at which the general public, in aggregate, 
updates their inflation expectations. This estimate of the speed of adjustment will be valuable 
to future research that aims to build a Phillips curve in a new way for South Africa. A well-
modelled Phillips curve will both improve the monitoring of the impact of monetary policy 
and inform future policy design and implementation.   
 
JEL Classification: D82, D83, D84, E31, E37, E42, E52, E58, E65 
Keywords: South Africa, central bank communication, inflation expectations, consistent 
communication, monetary policy transmission mechanism, transparent monetary policy, 
media, inattentive general public.  
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Opsomming  
Die doeltreffendheid van die monetêre beleid is beduidend afhanklik van die verwagtinge in 
die privaat sektor, aangesien beleid hoofsaaklik deur hierdie kanaal langtermyn rentekoerse 
beïnvloed. Hierdie bewustheid het die klem op die rol van sentrale bank kommunikasie as ‘n 
monetêre instrument versterk. Suksesvolle kommunikasie is noodsaaklik om beide die 
effektiwiteit van monetêre beleid te verseker sowel as om ondersteuning vir die institusionele 
raamwerk waarbinne die monetêre beleid geïmplimenteer word, te bou. Hoewel daar ‘n 
groot en groeiende literatuur is wat die belangrikheid van sentrale bank kommunikasie oor 
die afgelope dekade beklemtoon, is daar nie eenstemmigheid oor wat die optimale 
kommunikasie strategie behels nie. Daarbenewens is meeste studies beperk tot die 
kommunikasie tussen monetêre owerhede en die finansiële sektor. In ‘n evaluering van die 
literatuur het Blinder et al. (2008) die noodsaaklikheid beklemtoon om die wisselwerking 
tussen monetêre owerhede en die res van die privaat sektor (die publiek) te bestudeer. 
Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank (SARB) se gebruik 
van hierdie kommunikasie instrument te evalueer. Spesiale aandag word geskenk aan 
kommunikasie met die onoplettende publiek wat pryse bepaal in die arbeidsmark en markte 
vir goedere en dienste. Verskillende aspekte van die SARB se kommunikasie strategie word 
bestudeer, insluitende die konsekwentheid van kommunikasie, die oordrag van hierdie 
kommunikasie via die media aan die publiek, asook die proses waarmee die publiek 
informasie rakende inflasie versamel en verwerk. 
‘n Evaluering van die SARB se kommunikasie (die oorspronklike boodskappe) lewer bewys 
dat die SARB daarin geslaag het om konsekwent te kommunikeer tydens die inflasie 
teikeningsperiode. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n evaluering van die rol van die media om 
oorspronklike informasie suskesvol aan die publiek oor te dra. Die resultate dui daarop dat 
berigte in die Suid Afrikaanse media oor die algemeen aan kritiese evaluering van die 
monetȇre beleidsbesluite ontbreek en die SARB se kommunikasie tussen monetêre 
beleidsvergaderings is ook oneffektief gevind. ‘n Belangrike uitdaging vir die SARB is dus om 
te bepaal hoe dit op hierdie vlak tot die ekonomiese debat kan toetree en hoe dit produktiewe 
strategiese verhoudings met die media kan bou. 
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Die laaste afdeling van die proefskrif bestudeer die proses waarvolgens die publiek hul 
inflasieverwagtinge formuleer deur gebruik te maak van epidemiologiese modelle wat die 
verspreiding van inflasie verwagtinge, asook die spoed waarteen die publiek oor die 
algemeen hul inflasieverwagtinge opdateer, beskryf. Die snelheid waarmee die publiek hul 
verwagtinge opdateer behoort veral van waarde te wees vir toekomstige studies wat poog om 
‘n Phillips kurwe met ‘n nuwe aanslag vir Suid Afrika te skort. ‘n Goed geformuleerde 
Phillips kurwe sal monitering van monetêre beleide se impak verbeter, en sal ook as ‘n goeie 
riglyn vir toekomstige beleidsontwerp en -implimentering dien. 
 
JEL Klassifikasie: D82, D83, D84, E31, E37, E42, E52, E58, E65 
Sleutelwoorde: Suid-Afrika, sentrale bank kommunikasie, inflasieverwagtinge, konsekwente 
kommunikasie, monetêre beleid transmissie meganisme, deursigtige monetêre beleid, media, 
onoplettende publiek. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The implementation of monetary policy in South Africa cannot be successful in the long run 
without the cooperation of the general public – the price setters and ultimate political control 
over the central bank. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has instrument 
independence, but it does not have goal independence, and its independence such as it is, 
remains conditional on its political legitimacy.   
„In the end, it is the general public that gives the central bank their legitimacy, 
and hence their independence.‟  
         (Blinder et al., 2008: 47) 
The institutional framework within which monetary policy is implemented and the goals set 
for the SARB are dependent on the democratic process, which ultimately relies on the 
support of the general public. Once the goals have been set, the SARB has constitutional 
protection to pursue its mandate without short-term political interference. However, even 
with this protection, policy makers cannot disregard the general public‟s assessment of the 
SARB when implementing monetary policy. Today, central bankers recognise that monetary 
policy is strategic in nature, that is to say, the economic decisions of the private sector in 
response to the policy choices of the central bank impact on the Bank‟s ability to achieve its 
objectives. In South Africa, the operational success of the inflation targeting SARB remains 
heavily dependent on its ability to anchor the inflation expectations of the general public. 
These modern trends in the practice of monetary policy have been greatly influenced by 
important developments in both monetary theory and historical experience since the 1970s. 
Theory and experience have helped to clarify the goals of monetary policy, highlighted the 
strategic nature of the interaction between a central bank and the public, and therefore 
emphasised the need for the central bank to communicate with the public, which is the focus 
of this dissertation.   
Research about the use of communication as a monetary policy tool, like any evaluation of 
monetary policy implementation, should logically begin by identifying its objective. Within 
academic and central bank circles, there is no longer much disagreement that price stability 
should be the primary objective of a prudent central bank, with the aim of maintaining 
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macroeconomic stability and thereby encouraging economic growth1. Friedman (1968) relied 
on the Phillips curve relationship to identify the objectives that monetary policy could 
achieve. His argument hinged on the long and variable lags with which monetary policy 
impacted on the economy. In the short run the impact of monetary policy is largely on real 
output, but in the long run it falls mostly on the price level. This implies that monetary policy 
is unable to control output in the long run and should instead focus on maintaining low and 
stable inflation in order to create a stable macroeconomic environment conducive to 
economic growth. 
The public and its representatives periodically challenge this goal of monetary policy, despite 
its strong theoretical justification and the benefit of historical experience. Domestically, 
inflation targeting has repeatedly been blamed for inhibiting economic growth over the past 
few years, and there has been increased pressure for monetary authorities to loosen monetary 
policy or to „target employment‟ rather than inflation. The short-term trade-off between 
inflation and output creates political tension that is not unique to South Africa. Arthur Burns 
(1975) blamed the central banks‟ failure to control inflation in the 1970s on philosophical and 
political factors. He argued that central banks possessed the tools and desire to avoid the 
rampant inflation, but that in practice the political environment had limited their ability to use 
them. 
The recognition that monetary policy operates with a lag also calls for a forward-looking 
approach and therefore an emphasis on expectations. The rational expectations revolution of 
the 1970s was another theoretical development that greatly influenced the practice of 
monetary policy. In this tradition, expectations in economic models are formed in a model-
consistent 2  manner so that decision makers avoid systematic errors (Klamer, 1984). 
                                                 
1 Internationally, the 2007/2008 financial crisis has called into question the role and scope of monetary policy.  Before the 
crisis, it was assumed that price stability was enough to ensure financial stability (Issing, 2009; Goodhart, 2010; White, 
2006).  However, in an evaluation of the future role for central banks, given the experience of the financial crisis, Goodhart 
(2010) concluded that additional macroprudenital regulations were required rather than new operational procedures to pursue 
price stability.  
 
2 Model-consistent expectations are formed by the same process that determines other variables at stake, combined with 
access to all information in the model. Rational expectations do not suggest that people have perfect foresight, but rather that 
the modelled individuals avoid repeating mistakes, and use the information available to them to make decisions.   
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Therefore, decision makers learn about the „character‟ of the central bank and incorporate this 
information when making their economic decisions.  
The strategic nature of monetary policy was soon recognised once rational expectations were 
incorporated into models. In this spirit, Kydland and Prescott (1977) found that a central 
bank‟s optimal monetary policy decision is dynamically inconsistent if the rational public 
recognises that the monetary authority has an incentive to renege on its promise once the 
public has acted on prior policy commitments. In such a strategic setting, policy makers have 
to recognise that the response of the public to policy decisions impacts on the likelihood of 
policy success.   
The need for the central bank to cooperate with the public in this strategic setting must be 
balanced against its responsibility to protect its independence and to make responsible policy 
decisions, informed by academic developments and the lessons of historical experience. For 
this reason, some institutional features such as central bank independence cannot be changed 
in South Africa within a short time frame. This protects monetary policy from the incentives 
created by the shorter-term objectives of government and labour. However, the SARB needs 
to continue communicating with the public and not lose sight of the fact that in the long run 
the institutions and objectives of monetary policy are determined through the democratic 
process. Continual, effective communication is necessary to protect monetary policy 
institutions, secure the SARB‟s credibility and anchor inflation expectations.  
The significance of inflation expectations in modern monetary policy emerges from the 
combined insights about the importance of forward-looking policy and the modelling 
perspective brought about by rational expectations which culminated in the strategic 
perspective on monetary policy. Today, it is widely accepted that the effectiveness of 
monetary policy depends importantly on the expectations of the private sector, as it is largely 
through the expectations channel of the transmission mechanism that policy changes are 
transmitted to longer-term interest rates (Woodford, 2005). Monetary authorities have 
embraced high levels of transparency in recognition of this fact, in what Alan Blinder (2004) 
describes as a „revolution‟ in central bank thinking.   
Subsequent to this revolution, communication demands far greater attention as a monetary 
policy tool, used to enhance the predictability of monetary policy and help manage inflation 
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expectations. While the large and growing literature on central bank communication over the 
past decade has delivered strong support for the important role of central bank 
communication, there is less agreement about what the optimal communication strategy is 
(Blinder et al., 2008).  
In practice central bank communication is heterogeneous. This is influenced by a range of 
factors, including the economic and political climate of a particular economy and the 
characteristics of the audience with which the central bank is communicating. The vast 
majority of research on central bank communication focuses on the interaction between a 
central bank and the financial markets, partly because readily available and high quality asset 
price data makes it much easier to study the response of financial markets to central bank 
communication. But Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) divide the central bank‟s audience into the 
broad public and its political representatives on the one side, and the financial markets on the 
other, a classification also adopted here. While others have studied communication with 
financial markets, this dissertation focuses on the rest of the audience.  
The general public will also be called price setters, as this larger group comprises the 
majority of the economic decision makers who set prices for goods and services across the 
economy and who also set the wage rate, with significant consequences for inflation. 
Cukierman (2007) suggested that the general public will be rationally inattentive to short-
term fluctuations of the inflation rate if the central bank has credibility, as the cost to them of 
searching for and processing information about monetary policy outweighs the potential 
benefits.   
This dissertation explores the communication of the SARB with this inattentive general 
public. The SARB‟s communication is analysed with the intention of achieving a number of 
related objectives. It will allow policy makers to manage the inflation expectations of the 
general public and increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. From a policy perspective, 
learning more about the inflation expectations channel of the transmission mechanism will 
enable the SARB to enhance its credibility in the eyes of the general public and encourage 
them to support monetary policy institutions. In addition, an improved formal description of 
the microfoundations reflecting the process by which the general public forms their inflation 
expectations is a way to test our theories about how aggregate inflation expectations are 
formed. It will also provide a new approach for estimating the Phillips curve in future work.   
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In order to analyse the use of communication by the SARB, a number of aspects of the 
communication between the SARB and the general public were considered. The research 
begins by evaluating the consistency of the SARB‟s communication in chapter 2. The focus 
is on the original message sent (the monetary policy statement) and whether this message is 
consistent with subsequent policy actions. Predictable monetary policy is essential to 
encourage coordination between the decisions of policy makers and those of the private 
sector. This helps to minimise economic volatility and is beneficial to both the SARB and its 
audience. In addition, consistent communication engenders trust which is necessary for the 
SARB to build credibility.    
A numerical index was constructed to capture the communication of the SARB about its 
likely future monetary policy actions. This research extends the literature by formally 
analysing the communication of the SARB rather than by focusing solely on its actions. 
Exploratory data analyses, formal tests and regression analyses revealed that the 
communication of the SARB has shown a high degree of consistency since the adoption of 
inflation targeting.     
However, in the case of the general public, very few ever receive the message that the SARB 
sends in its original form. It is costly in terms of time and skills for the general public to 
gather the information that generates inflation expectations. It is rational for them to be 
relatively inattentive to this information, as they have to use their limited resources to fulfil 
the demands of their own circumstances. Instead, they rely on the media, which reduces the 
cost of accessing and interpreting inflation information for people who are not financial 
specialists. Although the general public are inattentive, they are the price setters and their 
economic decisions are crucial to the success of monetary policy. Therefore, chapter 3 is 
dedicated to exploring the role of the newspaper media in conveying the SARB‟s 
communication to the general public. 
Two indices, extent of coverage and assessment were created to characterise newspaper 
reports in the week following each of the MPC meetings. This allowed a systematic analysis 
of the factors that impact on the news reports (the outcome of the communication between 
the SARB and the general public). The results reveal limited critical assessment of monetary 
policy by the South African media, although the extent of media coverage does increase when 
inflation is outside of the target band. It is revealing that inter-meeting communication by the 
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SARB appears to have little influence on the assessment of monetary policy decisions by the 
media. Improved central bank communication potentially offers the SARB a way to 
contribute to the level of economic evaluation and to build credibility.  
Turning to the ultimate recipients of central bank communication, chapter 4 investigates how 
the general public incorporates information about inflation. This helps to explain how 
information about inflation disseminates through the economy. Following Carroll (2001, 
2003), epidemiological models are used to describe the process by which the inflation 
expectations of the price setters are formed. The hypothesis is that price setters are inattentive 
and only update their inflation information periodically, causing information stickiness in the 
aggregate inflation expectations data. An attempt is made to estimate the speed at which the 
inattentive general public updates their inflation expectations on average (which is used to 
calculate information stickiness 3 ). The use of survey-based data, uncertainty about the 
stationarity of some of the data series, and the short sample period makes this estimation 
difficult. Therefore, two different time series models are used to provide a robust estimate.  
Agent-based models, which explain the complex aggregate inflation expectations of the 
general public from agent level upwards, are then used to verify these estimates of 
information stickiness and explore the microfoundations from the disaggregated level. The 
final estimate of information stickiness for South Africa is between 0.65 and 0.70. This range 
is much higher than estimates of between 0.15 and 0.30 for Germany, the UK and France, but 
only a little higher than the range of between 0.50 and 0.60 for Italy. These findings are in 
line with the hypothesis that in countries where the risks of inflation are greater, the general 
public tend to rationally pay more attention to developments in inflation, and therefore adjust 
their inflation expectations more rapidly. 
  
                                                 
3 Parameter ℷ, which lies between 0 and 1, is used in this dissertation to represent information stickiness. It captures 
the speed at which the general public update their inflation expectations or the fraction of the general public that 
update their inflation expectations each period. Therefore, a value of ℷ close to 1 represents a small degree of 
information stickiness, whereas a value close to 0 represents a large degree of information stickiness. This 
description of information stickiness is adopted in line with early papers on information stickiness (Mankiw and 
Reis, 2001b; Kahn and Zhu, 2006; Döpke et al, 2008). 
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In conclusion, this dissertation explores the role of communication in the transmission 
mechanism of South Africa. By analysing the consistency of the SARB‟s communication, 
how it is transformed into „news‟ by the media, and how the general public (price setters) 
process this information, this dissertation aims to illuminate the expectations channel of the 
transmission mechanism. A better understanding of this channel will allow the SARB to 
tailor its communication more purposefully and offer the opportunity to improve the 
modelling of the macro economy, where the Phillips curve is quintessential.   
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2. LOUD AND CLEAR? CAN WE HEAR WHEN THE SARB 
SPEAKS? 
2.1. Introduction 
Communication is increasingly recognised as an essential tool for the implementation of 
modern monetary policy. Most modern monetary policy regimes, whether inflation targeting 
regimes or not, identify price stability as their primary objective and recognise that central 
bank transparency4 and credibility are crucial to the attainment of this objective.  As a result 
of the broad move towards greater transparency, communication has become part of any 
modern monetary regime.  
In order for monetary policy to effectively influence economic decisions, it must influence 
interest rates along the entire yield curve, but modern monetary authorities only have direct 
control over the repo rate (or equivalent) at the very short end of this curve. The 
decomposition of nominal interest rates into real interest rates, inflation expectations and risk 
premia, as given by the Fisher equation, shows that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
needs to manage expectations of the future real interest rate as well as inflation expectations 
if it is to influence nominal interest rates over longer horizons. As a consequence, managing 
inflation expectations is increasingly recognised as essential for effective monetary policy. 
“For successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of effective control of 
overnight interest rates as it is of shaping market expectations of the way in 
which interest rates, inflation, and income are likely to evolve over the coming 
year and later … not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least 
under current conditions, very little else matters.”    
        (Woodford, 2005:15) 
Reid (2009) analysed the effectiveness of monetary policy in South Africa, with an emphasis 
on the communications of the central bank with the public. The results of her empirical tests 
of the sensitivity of inflation expectations (derived from market interest rates) to 
macroeconomic surprises, support inferences about the relative predictability of monetary 
policy and the degree of coordination between the central bank and financial markets. Reid 
                                                 
4 There is, however, ongoing debate about the limits of the benefits of transparency; see, for example, Cukierman (2007).   
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(2009) found that the evident coordination between the SARB and financial markets attests to 
successful strategic interaction between these parties: although both pursue their own 
interests, they optimise the interest rate outcome through strategic co-operation. This 
collaboration has been encouraged by the characteristics of modern monetary policy, such as 
transparency, accountability, credibility and a commitment to rules-based policies. This does 
not suggest any duress, but rather that the SARB and financial markets, as players in a 
strategic game, have decided that it is in their respective best interest to cooperate (Reid, 
2008).   
Even greater transparency could be achieved, as suggested by Reid (2008), if the SARB 
published a forecast of the expected path of its policy instrument. In addition to greater 
transparency, this would emphasise the forward-looking nature of monetary policy and 
thereby enhance the predictability of the SARB‟s policy decisions. Presently, only three 
central banks (the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,  the Norges Bank and the Reserve Bank of 
Sweden) have any experience with publishing such forecasts, and the impact has not yet been 
studied empirically (Blinder et al., 2008). Although the SARB does not publish its forecasted 
interest rate path, it is possible to investigate empirically the implicit forward-looking content 
of the SARB‟s communications.   
This chapter aims to assess the degree to which the South African Reserve Bank‟s (SARB) 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has, since the introduction of inflation targeting, 
successfully communicated to the public its policy analysis, and, in particular, the expected 
future policy changes.  Section 2 introduces the literature that studies the communication of 
central banks about future monetary policy.  The monetary policy inclination index, how it 
was created and a preliminary discussion of its application to study the SARB‟s 
communication about future monetary policy are described in section 3.  In section 4 the 
index is applied to evaluate the consistency of the SARB‟s communication, where 
consistency is essentially the degree to which the deeds of the SARB match its prior words.  
The information content of the inclination index is studied from a number of angles, starting 
with exploratory data analysis and econometric tests, followed by OLS and ordered probit 
regression analyses. These techniques, jointly, will provide insight into the consistency of the 
SARB communication about intended future monetary policy.   Section 5 concludes.   
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2.2. Communication about future monetary policy 
The recent paper by Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and Jansen (2008), surveys the 
theoretical and empirical literature in the field. They describe the compelling move towards 
greater transparency in central bank communication, which has the goal of improving the 
management of expectations. Additionally, the authors review the evidence on the 
contribution of central bank communication to the successful implementation of monetary 
policy.    
According to Blinder et al. (2008), central banks used better communication to increase the 
signal-to-noise ratio of their interaction with the broad public, including financial markets. 
From this perspective, literature on the success achieved with better communication can be 
divided into two strands: first, research about the extent to which the central bank “creates 
news” considers the impact of central bank communication on financial markets; and, second, 
research that considers the extent to which central bank communication “reduces noise” 
examines how these improve the predictability of its policy decisions.   
Starting with the first strand, some international research (including Kohn and Sack (2004) 
and Reeves and Sawicki (2007)) investigates whether a central bank creates news, without 
considering whether this news moves the markets in the desired direction. The second strand 
of the literature measures (quantitatively) the communication of the central bank in question, 
in order to provide an indication of the direction of the communication and to establish 
whether the markets responded in the desired manner, or whether this just increased volatility 
(Musard-Gies, 2005; De Haan and Jansen, 2005; Rosa and Verga, 2007; Ehrmann and 
Fratszcher, 2007).   
This literature has been influenced by authors such as Romer and Romer (1989), who 
adopted a narrative approach – creating indices based on the examination of policy records – 
to measure the stance of monetary policy. By translating what the central bank communicates 
about future monetary policy into an index, it becomes possible to identify the direction (and 
the magnitude, if desired) in which the central bank intends to influence the markets. 
Ultimately, then, one can judge the degree to which this communication was successful. 
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Two approaches have been adopted in the literature, each offering different advantages. Some 
researchers, for example, Heinmann and Ullrich (2005), have created an “objective index”, 
which measures the frequency of coding words, whilst avoiding the use of judgement in the 
construction of the index. Other researchers – Rosa and Verga (2007) and Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2005) – have created indices that entail some judgement or interpretation in 
codifying the communication of the central bank. Rosa and Verga (2007) argue that 
subjective indices are supported by hermeneutic theory. These indices can be used to 
investigate the information content of a central bank‟s communication, which in turn will 
enable evaluation of the consistency and effectiveness of the monetary policy communication 
of the central bank.   
In South Africa there have been few formal studies of the extent to which the SARB creates 
news or reduces noise, and these have been limited, primarily, to evaluations of the 
predictability of monetary policy (Ballim and Moolman, 2005; Aron and Muellbauer, 2006), 
or to the sensitivity of financial markets to macroeconomic surprises (Reid, 2009). All of 
these previous studies investigate the movement of market interest rates in anticipation of, or 
in response to, monetary policy action (an announcement of the monetary policy decision). 
This chapter contributes to the South African literature through the creation of an index that 
will allow for direct evaluation of the SARB‟s communication on its possible future monetary 
policy stance through its regular monetary policy statements.   
2.3. Method:  Monetary policy inclination index 
The concept of consistency is explored comprehensively in section 4, but the assumption is 
that consistency (in the sense that the central bank‟s deeds match its prior words) is essential 
for building the reputation of a central bank. This is supported by Blinder‟s (2000) finding 
that central bankers and academic economists share widespread consensus that credibility is 
exceptionally important to a central bank5. In addition, both groups agree that credibility is 
built mainly through a track record of matching words with deeds - that is, through consistent 
policy decisions that are communicated to the public.   
                                                 
5 Although the responses of academic economists reflected far greater dispersion than those of central bankers, the mean 
response was still 4.23 out of 5, where 5 signified that the respondent believed credibility to be „of the utmost importance‟.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 26 
Monetary policy requires repeated interaction which creates incentives for the bank to 
communicate in a consistent manner in order to be considered credible. The relevant 
commitment is not to any given path of policy decisions, but rather to the process by which 
policy decisions are taken. Svensson (2002) calls such a process a targeting rule, in contrast 
to an instrument rule, where a particular policy-reaction function is itself fixed6.   
This chapter evaluates the SARB‟s communication as a tool of monetary policy. To that end, 
it assesses the degree to which likely actions indicated in the SARB‟s communication was 
followed by policy action consistent with the prior communication. In other words, we 
evaluate the informational content of the SARB‟s communication, using a measure of 
consistency.   
The analytical tool used to examine the consistency of the SARB‟s communication is a 
subjective index of monetary policy inclination, supported by the hermeneutic argument7 of 
Rosa and Verga (2007). However, Rosa and Verga start by forming a glossary of words and 
phrases that they use as a guide to their index. This was viable for their study of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) as the ECB uses a “very standardised form of language” (Rosa and 
Verga, 2007: 149). On a number of occasions, the ECB president even explained his use of a 
particular term. The same approach did not deliver useful information in the South African 
case where, to the best of the authors‟ knowledge, the SARB made fewer explicit attempts to 
clarify the informational content of any particular word or phrase.   
We created an index to capture the information (in terms of the direction of change) 
contained in the official statement after each Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, 
with respect to the likely future development of the stance of monetary policy conveyed by 
the policy statement. Details about the factors the researchers considered when constructing 
                                                 
6 However, Woodford (2003) offers further theoretical complication by showing that commitment to a policy procedure is 
inconsistent within a standard New Keynesian framework, except if the policy procedure has the additional characteristic 
that he calls a “timeless perspective”. Policy with a timeless perspective is a decision rule that is optimal not only at a point 
in time, but one that would have been optimal in any earlier period, with the present knowledge of the transmission 
mechanism. From a timeless perspective the optimal policy procedure for the economy evolves with our knowledge of the 
economy and with structural changes in the economy. 
7 According to Rosa and Verga (2007), hermeneutic theory and textual analysis emphasise that communication is subjective, 
and its success depends jointly on the content of the messages sent and their interpretation by the receiver. Hermeneutic 
theory also highlights the dynamic nature of language, which seems relevant for the analysis of the SARB during a period 
where, as a young inflation targeter, it was learning to use communication as a monetary policy tool.    
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the index are presented in Appendix 2.1.  Although the SARB uses a number of other 
communication devices, including monetary policy reviews and monetary policy forums, we 
focus in this study on the monetary policy statements released at 15:00, directly after the 
monetary policy committee meetings. The wide publicity attracted by these statements and 
their higher relative frequency were the important criteria in this decision, but the research 
could be extended to analyse the other channels of communication in a similar fashion. Apart 
from the formal channels of the SARB‟s communication, it might also be instructive to study 
the information content of other, more informal, communication such as comments by the 
governor at press conferences. Jac Laubscher (2009) recently argued that the governor‟s 
comments at a press conference provided valuable information to assist understanding of the 
MPC‟s surprising decision to leave the repo rate unchanged in June 2009, but lamented the 
exclusion of such information from the formal policy statement.  
To limit the inherent subjectivity of the method used here, each MPC statement was read and 
judged independently by two researchers, each of whom assigned a numerical value between 
-2 and +2 to the statement, reflecting the monetary policy inclination communicated by the 
statement. Both researchers were asked to provide an overall index value for each statement, 
after considering the following themes in each statement: comments about headline and core 
inflation, and expected inflation (especially the SARB‟s own forecast, the BER‟s survey of 
inflation expectations and the break-even inflation rate from the bond market); comments 
about the business cycle and the output gap; comments about wages and labour-market 
pressures; comments about money supply; comments about external accounts; and finally, 
overall comments about the appropriateness of the monetary policy stance. Each researcher 
had to justify the index value assigned in terms of the aforementioned topics. Following their 
independent evaluations, the researchers discussed each report and their evaluations in detail 
to arrive at a consensus index value.  
An index value of 0 suggests that the overall message of the statement is that the stance of 
monetary policy is unlikely to change in the near future (i.e. that monetary policy at the time 
was appropriate). A value of -1 was assigned when the communication suggested that there is 
a possibility of the interest rate being lowered at the following monetary policy meeting, 
while -2 reflected communication that suggested an imminent easing. Similarly, values of +1 
or +2 respectively represented communication of the possibility of an interest rate tightening, 
and an imminent interest rate rise.   
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For example, the MPC statement of 22 April 2004 was given an index value of 0. Although 
the statement comments on rising inflation, it was still within the target band and the 
expressions “the inflation outlook over the coming months as well as over the longer term 
continues to be favourable” and “domestically, most conditions seem to endorse the 
containment of inflation”, suggest that the MPC judged inflationary pressure to be contained. 
The report‟s final section (subtitled, “Monetary Policy Stance”) concludes that “CPIX 
inflation will remain within the target range during the forecast period while the economy 
should pick up momentum”, which was interpreted as an indication that the MPC judged the 
stance of policy to be appropriate at the time.   
By contrast, a value of -2 was given to the report following the meeting of 28 May 2009. The 
MPC had reduced the repo rate at the preceding four MPC meetings, and the following 
sentences add to the impression that, in terms of inflationary pressures, there was, if anything, 
an even stronger case for a further easing of monetary policy: 
“The most recent CPI inflation forecast of the Bank shows a relatively 
unchanged outcome for the near-term as compared to that presented to the 
previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee. Over the longer term, 
there appears to be a moderate improvement [in the inflation outlook].”  
         (SARB, 2009) 
With regard to output, the statement reports that “GDP contraction was broad-based” and 
“high frequency indicators suggest that the negative trend in GDP growth is likely to continue 
during the second quarter of 2009, although at a more moderate pace of contraction” (SARB, 
2009). The following comment in the final section of the statement cements the authors‟ view 
that the SARB was communicating a continuation of its easing stance: 
“The evidence which was presented to the Monetary Policy Committee 
suggests that the output gap has widened further. This is expected to contribute 
to an improved inflation outlook, notwithstanding some current inflation 
inertia.”        (SARB, 2009) 
The monetary policy decision following this statement (25 June 2009) turned out, however, 
to be a controversial one, and will be discussed in detail in section 4.2.   
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Table 2.1 Dates on which MPC statements were released 
Year Date Horizon (months) Year Date Horizon (months) 
2000 13 Jan  2005 10 Feb 2 
 2 Mar 1.5  14 Apr 2 
 6 Apr 1  9 Jun 2 
 19 May 1.5  11 Aug 2 
 15 Jun 1  1 Oct 1.5 
 11 Aug 2  8 Dec 2.5 
 21 Sept 1.5 2006 2 Feb 2 
 16 Oct 1  13 Apr 2.5 
 16 Nov 1  8 Jun 2 
2001 19 Jan 2  3 Aug 2 
 16 Mar 2  12 Oct 2.5 
 25 Apr 1.5  7 Dec 2 
 14 Jun 2 2007 15 Feb 2.5 
 26 Jul 1.5  12 Apr 2 
 20 Sept 2  7 Jun 2 
 15 Nov 2  16 Aug 2.5 
2002 15 Jan 2  11 Oct 2 
 14 Mar 2  6 Dec 2 
 13 Jun 3 2008 31 Jan 2 
 12 Sept 3  10 Apr 2.5 
 28 Nov 2.5  12 Jun 2 
2003 20 Mar 4  14 Aug 2 
 12 Jun 3  9 Oct 2 
 14 Aug 2  11 Dec 2 
 10 Sept 1 2009 5 Feb 2 
 16 Oct 1  24 Mar 1.5 
 11 Dec 2  30 Apr 1 
2004 26 Jan 1.5  28 May 1 
 22 Apr 3  25 Jun 1 
 10 Jun 1.5  13 Aug 1.5 
 12 Aug 2  22 Sept 1.5 
 14 Oct 2    
 9 Dec 2    
Note: The horizon lengths are rounded to the nearest 0,5 of a month 
A challenge faced in the application of the inclination index is the fact that the horizons 
between meetings varies in our sample period. The dates of the MPC meetings and the 
resulting horizons between meetings are presented in table 2.1. While the intervals between 
meetings differ, they have mostly been two months apart8, with a standard deviation of 0.58, 
suggesting that the range 1.5 to 2.5 months covers the majority (48 out of 62) of the intervals.  
                                                 
8 The median interval length is two months. 
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The robustness of the regression results in section 4.2 to these changing horizons is evaluated 
by comparing the results of regressions using an “event horizon” to those using a “calendar 
horizon”.   
2.4. Consistency 
In the literature (Rosa and Verga, 2007; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005), the term consistency 
is used to describe the degree to which the actions of the central bank correspond with their 
previous communication about monetary policy (their words). According to Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2005: 7), consistency is a “necessary condition if the statements are meant to help 
markets anticipate better future decisions”, and Blinder (1998) argues that it is crucial to 
building credibility:   
“To me, that is the hallmark of credibility: matching deeds to words. … 
Credibility means that your pronouncements are believed – even though you 
are bound by no rule and may even have a short-run incentive to renege. In the 
real world, such credibility is not normally created by incentive-compatible 
compensation schemes or by rigid precommitment. Rather, it is painstakingly 
built up by a history of matching deeds to words. A central bank that 
consistently does what it says will acquire credibility by this definition almost 
regardless of the institutional structure.”     
          (Blinder, 1998: 64) 
2.4.1. Exploratory Data Analysis 
Visual inspection of the indicator variable and the policy rate at subsequent meetings (Figure 
2.1) provides the first indications of the consistency of the SARB‟s communication. The 
shaded band highlights the values between -1 and 1 (as read off the secondary axis).  
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Figure 2.1 Consistency: The indicator variable and policy rate 
 
Note: The grey line represents the repo rate at t+3, and the black line represents the index. The shaded 
area highlights the area between -1 and 1, where the communications are not suggesting an imminent 
adjustment of monetary policy.   
Source:  SARB (repo rate), Own construction (index)  
The grey line depicting the repo rate at time t+39, i.e. three months after the index value 
(measured on the primary axis), shows the actual monetary policy decisions over this period. 
For a central bank to influence market expectations about future policy adjustments, its 
communication should lead the policy adjustment.  
It is important to recognise that central bank communication that merits an index value of 1 
or -1, even if it never becomes 2 or -2, is a valuable part of the monetary policy toolkit, acting 
as a credible threat, if used consistently. Index fluctuations between 1 and 0 in 2000-2001 
could simply reflect uncertainty, or learning by a then newly constituted MPC. However, if 
this kind of communication is understood by the SARB‟s audience to be consistent, credible, 
and conditional on the state of the economy, it could be used to manage inflation 
expectations. It would thereby contribute to price stability without requiring an actual 
monetary policy change – policy change which could impose other costs on the economy.   
 
                                                 
9 The choice to illustrate the repo rate at time t+3 is ad hoc and simply shifts the repo rate line backwards by three months to 
show that the SARB‟s communication does precede the actual changes in the repo rate.  The SARB‟s communication will 
precede the actual repo rate moves by varying horizons with respect to different MPC decisions and the choice to depict the 
repo rate at t+3 does not impact materially on our interpretation of figure 2.1.   
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Table 2.2 Transition matrix (2000-2009) 
Note: *p (decline/unchanged/rise) means the sample probability of decline/unchanged/rise in the repo rate 
given the index value in each row. 
Transition matrices (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) provide a more systematic way of evaluating this 
data to investigate the consistency of the SARB‟s communication. The monetary policy 
inclination communicated by the SARB is read horizontally in rows, and the actual monetary 
policy that transpired is read vertically in columns. Table 2.2 assesses the period 2000-2009, 
whereas Table 2.3 evaluates only 2004-200910. An investigation of a period starting a few 
years after the adoption of inflation targeting (2004 in this case) allows us to compare the full 
sample with the sample excluding the first four years, and thereby to test the theory that the 
communication within the inflation targeting framework of the SARB became more 
consistent as the framework matured.   
In these tables, we interpret consistency as follows:  
1. Strong consistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting in a manner 
consistent with the index value, e.g. a +2 index value is followed by an interest rate 
rise and a -2 index value is followed by an interest rate cut.  
                                                 
10 In addition, a transition matrix was created which included only MPC decisions where the committee knew that inflation 
was outside of the target range (i.e. the date on which the CPIX data was released was considered to allow for a lag with 
regard to data availability).  In other words, all the data points where inflation was within the target range were removed 
from the full dataset.  The results do not differ materially from those in the full sample.  Communication of a 2 and 1 became 
100% consistent and -2 became 90% consistent, whereas communication of a 0 and 1 revealed slightly more hawkish 
communication than the full sample.   
Index in 
Period t 
Repo rate change 
Period t+1 
 Cut Unchanged Rise Total p(decline)* p(unchanged)* p(rise)* 
-2 3 1 0 4 75.0 25.0 0.0 
-1 2 1 0 3 66.7 33.3 0.0 
0 6 14 1 21 28.6 66.7 4.8 
1 2 12 4 18 11.1 66.7 22.2 
2 0 5 10 15 0.0 33.3 66.7 
    61    
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2. Mild inconsistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting even though the 
index value had shown only a risk of policy adjustment (e.g. +1 or -1) and not an 
imminent policy adjustment.   
3. Strong inconsistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting in a direction 
inconsistent with the present index value, e.g. cutting the repo rate following a 
meeting where the index value was +2.  
From the first row in Table 2.2 it emerges that an index value of -2 was followed by a repo 
rate cut at the subsequent MPC meeting in three-quarters of the cases, while the repo rate 
remained unchanged in a quarter of cases. The latter is a mild form of inconsistency, in that 
the repo rate remained unchanged (the rate adjustment was not imminent). Communication 
with a value of 2 likewise achieved a high degree of consistency, with a repo rate rise 
following two-thirds of the cases where such a value is recorded. There was no evidence of 
strong inconsistency for index values of +2. An index value of zero (the value most 
frequently observed) was followed by a constant repo rate in two-thirds of the cases, and it is 
notable that of the seven interest rate adjustments that did follow an index value of zero, six 
were interest rate cuts. There were only three instances of a -1 index value, and in two of 
these cases the MPC cut the repo rate at subsequent meetings, keeping the repo rate constant 
in the third case. These cases present no evidence of strong inconsistency.  
By contrast, an index value of 1 (the second most frequent index value) was followed by an 
unchanged repo rate in two-thirds of the cases, possibly capturing a baseline (or neutral) 
communication from the SARB, which warns against inflationary risks even when they are 
not imminent. This would certainly be a reasonable baseline for an inflation-targeting central 
bank, but it does mean that an index value of +1 should be interpreted as indicating a neutral 
stance with respect to the expected interest rate path. On two occasions (12 June 2003 and 12 
August 2004), a value of 1 was followed by a cut in the repo rate, which indicates strong 
inconsistency. However, the first of these two can be explained by a correction of the 
miscalculated inflation figures by Stats SA, rather than by inconsistent communication from 
the SARB. The event on the 12 August 2004 is evaluated in further detail in section 4.2.   
We can test formally whether there is any relationship between the index values in the rows 
and the subsequent interest rate decisions in the columns of Table 2.2, using the Pearson test 
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statistic. The null hypothesis in this procedure is independence, i.e. no relationship between 
the rows and columns, compared with an alternative of dependence. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis is evidence that the index value is associated in a significant manner with 
particular outcomes for subsequent interest rate decisions. The Pearson test statistic for 
Table 2.2 is 32.13, which is larger than the critical value of the appropriate chi-squared 
distribution with 8 degrees of freedom, even at significance levels as exacting as one-tenth of 
a percent. While these results suggest that there is a relationship between the index and 
subsequent interest rate decisions, it does not reveal the nature of that relationship, a question 
to which we return with appropriate techniques, below.  
Table 2.3 Transition matrix (2004-2009) 
Note: *p (decline/unchanged/rise) means the sample probability of decline/unchanged/rise in the repo rate 
given the index value in each row. 
The data in Table 2.3, representing the results for the period 2004 to 2009, is very similar to the 
full sample, with only a few exceptions. Communications awarded an index value of -2 or -1 
were a little less likely to be followed by an easing of monetary policy than for the full period, 
and communications awarded an index value of 2 or 1 were slightly more likely to be followed by 
a tightening of the repo rate. Communications awarded an index value of 0 were more likely to 
be consistent (followed by unchanged monetary policy) and never to be followed by monetary 
policy tightening. Repeating the Pearson test for independence in Table 2.3 yields a test statistic 
of 20.43, which rejects the null hypothesis of independence very comfortably at a 1% level of 
significance.  
  
Starting 
in 2004 
Repo rate change 
Period t+1 
Index in 
Period t 
 Cut Unchanged Rise Total p(decline)* p(unchanged)* p(rise)* 
-2 2 1 0 3 66.7 33.3 0.0 
-1 1 1 0 2 50.0 50.0 0.0 
0 3 8 0 11 27.3 72.7 0.0 
1 1 5 3 9 11.1 55.6 33.3 
2 0 3 7 10 0.0 30.0 70.0 
    35    
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2.4.1.1. Inflation surprises versus policy confusion 
Buliř, Šmidkovă, Kotlán and Navrátil (2008: 9) make an important distinction between 
“inflation surprises” and “policy confusion”. They recognise that a central bank‟s deeds can 
turn out differently from its prior words for two reasons: One possibility is that the central 
bank did communicate clearly, but that the macroeconomic environment subsequently 
changed in such a way that the Bank understandably had to depart from the policy direction 
communicated previously. Buliř et al. call such cases, “inflation surprises”. Another 
possibility is that inconsistency between prior communication and subsequent policy might 
reflect poor communication by the central bank, so creating what Buliř et al. (2008) call 
“policy confusion”. Careful study of the circumstances behind each apparently surprising 
decision is required to distinguish between these two cases.    
Table 2.4 identifies occasions on which analysts and financial markets were surprised. The 
first two columns show the dates and interest rate decisions that were to some extent 
controversial. In the third column (“Reuters surprise”), the difference between the median of 
the Reuters Econometer forecast11 for the repo rate and the actual subsequent monetary policy 
decision identifies when and in which direction the analysts were surprised. The fourth 
column identifies policy announcement dates on which the change in the Banker‟s 
Acceptance rate (BA rate) moved more than 0.25%. This was indicator of a market surprise, 
and the threshold change of 0.25% was calibrated to identify days on which the markets were 
substantially surprised. Using media reports together with speeches, media releases, 
Monetary Policy Reviews and Quarterly Bulletins published on the SARB‟s website to 
contextualise these surprises, potentially allows us to distinguish between inflation surprises 
and policy confusion.   
The fifth column of Table 2.4 shows the monetary policy inclination index for each of these 
decisions (the index value assigned at the previous meeting reflecting the policy inclination 
relevant to each decision). This column will help us to distinguish between “inflation 
surprises” (i.e. unanticipated changes in the economy) and potential “policy confusion” (i.e. 
policy surprises attributable to inefficient communication, as opposed to economic shocks).  
                                                 
11 A survey by Reuters of forecasts made by a panel of professional economists.   
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The final column identifies those interest rate decisions that could be classified as instances 
of potential “policy confusion” based on this method. It should be noted, however, that this 
column is likely to overstate the instance of policy confusion (it is an upper bound) as the 
index is based on the monetary policy report alone, and disregards the other mechanisms by 
which the SARB communicates with the public.  Consequently we investigated each instance 
of potential „policy confusion‟ by studying speeches, media releases, monetary policy 
reviews and Quarterly bulletins that were available on the SARB‟s website prior to each of 
these meetings, to discover any communication that might have prepared the public for the  
subsequent MPC decision. Such communication might reveal that the economic environment 
had changed, or that the SARB was evaluating it differently.  Finally, numerous media 
reports were evaluated following each case of potential policy confusion to assess whether 
the media anticipated (for example from communication not published on the SARB‟s site) 
the changed stance of the SARB.   
Of the twenty interest rate surprises shown in Table 2.4, seven were identified as instances of 
potential “policy confusion” (marked with an X), and three of these are readily explicable, as 
shown below: the unexpected reduction of the repo rate in September 2001 both surprised the 
markets and was not anticipated by the index, but should be classified as an inflation surprise 
due to a technical adjustment of the repo rate12 and the September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade centre, just prior to the policy decision. The June 2003 policy decision (which wrong-
footed the markets and the index) was also an inflation surprise, because Statistics South 
Africa (Stats SA) acknowledged on 26 May 2003 that inflation statistics had been overstated 
for some time, resulting in a clamour for immediate repo rate adjustments (Loxton, 2003).  
Finally, the surprise decision in September 2003 was made at an unscheduled meeting of the 
MPC, following the rapid change in the economic environment, which implicitly suggests 
that this was an inflation surprise13.   
                                                 
12 The technical adjustment of the repo rate on 5 September 2001 was aimed at improving the functioning of the money 
market in South Africa (SARB, 2001) and should therefore not be seen as an adjustment of the policy stance. 
13 The international context for these surprises should not be forgotten: During the period from late 2001 until 2005 the 
Federal Reserve Board in the USA kept its policy interest rate (the Federal Funds Rate) at a markedly lower level than would 
have been suggested by an application of the Taylor rule – that had hitherto correlated closely with the Fed‟s policy stance 
(Taylor, 2009). While there is no suggestion of a simple relationship between interest rates in the USA (or elsewhere) and 
the repo rate in South Africa, the SARB had to weigh up the unusually large spread between local and international interest 
rates against the concomitant effects on capital flows and the exchange rate of its policy decisions during this period. 
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Table 2.4 Inflation surprises vs. policy confusion 
Date 
Interest rate 
decision 
 Reuters 
surprise 
Change in BA 
rate 
Index Confusion 
2001/06/14 -100bp #N/A -0.82 0 X 
2001/09/20 -50bp #N/A -0.4 0 X* 
2002/01/15 +100bp #N/A 0.45 1  
2002/09/12 +100bp #N/A 0.37 2  
2003/06/12 -150bp #N/A -0.6 1 X* 
2003/09/10 -100bp #N/A -0.32 0 X* 
2003/10/16 -150bp #N/A -0.61 -2  
2003/12/11 -50bp #N/A 0.35 -1  
2004/08/12 -50bp #N/A -0.66 1 X 
2005/04/14 -50bp -0.5 -0.57 0 X 
2006/06/08 +50bp 0.5 0.38 1  
2006/10/12 +50bp -0.5 0.04 2  
2007/02/15 0 0 -0.29 2 X 
2007/10/11 +50bp 0.5 0.253 2  
2008/04/10 +50bp 0.5 0.237 1  
2008/06/12 +50bp -0.5 -0.384 1  
2009/02/05 -100bp 0 -0.412 0  
2009/03/24 -100bp -1 -0.1 -1  
2009/04/30 -100bp 1 -0.232 -2  
2009/06/25 0 0.5 0.201 -2  
Note: The Reuters panel did not forecast the repo rate at the beginning of the period; hence, the N/A values in 
the first column. In columns 3 and 4, x’s are used to identify dates on which each of the variables measured a 
surprise, and the (+) or (-) indicates the direction of the surprise.    The *’s in the final column identify the 
decisions which are readily explainable and can therefore be classified as inflation surprises rather than 
policy confusion.   
We are left with four instances of potential “policy confusion” out of 20 interest rate surprises 
and more than 60 policy meetings. The evidence for an “inflation surprise” will now be 
considered for each of these: Starting with the decision of 14 June 2001, where the MPC 
surprisingly cut the repo rate by 100bp.  The degree of surprise can be read in the associated 
82bp decline of the BA rate. The SARB released one speech by Governor Mboweni (on 14 
May 2001) and 4 press releases in the interval between this meeting and its immediate 
predecessor. The press releases contained no information regarding the inflation outlook, and 
while the Governor‟s speech, entitled “Volatility of the currency and its impact on monetary 
policy” touched on domestic economic developments it gave no indication of a change to the 
inflation outlook. In fact, the concluding comments encouraged the audience to „sit tight, grit 
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our teeth and suffer in silence‟, and „inflation is coming down slowly but surely.  Further 
evidence that the public had not been prepared for the interest rate change can be seen in the 
media‟s response, e.g. Business Day (15 June 2001) wrote that “Mboweni‟s pre-emptive 
strike caught even the most optimistic by surprise…” 
On the 12th of August 2004 the MPC cut the repo rate by 50bp, which surprised the market to 
the extent that the BA rate decline by 66bp. The monetary policy inclination index stood at 1 
following the preceding MPC meeting. Of the five media releases by the SARB in the 
interval none were relevant for the inflation outlook. Nor did the Quarterly Economic Review 
section of the SARB‟s Quarterly Bulletin (released on 24 June 2004) suggest a change in the 
inflation outlook. Governor Mboweni gave three speeches in the interval, on the 22nd and 27th 
of July and the 5th of August respectively. The former contained a general discussion of 
factors impinging on inflation (both positively and negatively) as well as suggesting that 
inflation might breach the upper bound of the target temporarily, but nothing suggested an 
improvement in the inflation outlook that would justify an easing of policy. The remaining 
two speeches did not concern domestic economic developments.  Finally, the media was 
taken completely off guard by the MPC‟s decision, for example Business Day‟s headline on 
13 August 2004 read “Markets rocked by Mboweni‟s rates shock” and they referred to the 
previous meeting where the Governor had “…signalled at the time that the rate-cutting cycle 
had ended, saying „the party was over‟”.  SARB Press releases, speeches or other 
communications accessible to the media did not therefore prepare the public for the policy 
decision of 12 August 2004.  
The circumstances surrounding the policy decision of 12 August 2004 were further clouded 
by the arrival of a delegation of trade union representatives and management from the 
Chamber of Mines at the SARB on the final day of the MP meeting. Their purpose was to 
hand a memorandum to the Governor “demanding immediate steps to weaken the currency‟s 
value” (Phasiwe, 2004). Interrupting an MPC meeting to meet with a delegation intending to 
pressurise the committee was, with the benefit of hindsight, probably an error of judgment. It 
was doubly regrettable since the MPC surprised the markets by lowering the repo rate at that 
meeting (Laubscher, 2009). The confluence of a surprising repo rate reduction with an 
inappropriate accommodation of interest groups pressurising for just such a decision might 
have undermined the perceived independence of the SARB.   
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On the 14th of April 2005 the MPC cut the repo rate by 50bp, which caused a market surprise 
that pushed the BA rate down by 57bp and was 50bp below the expectations summarised in 
the Reuters Econometer. While the December 2004 SARB Quarterly Bulletin referred to 
moderating inflation it also mentioned firm economic growth, giving no clear indication of an 
change in the assessment on the domestic outlook. Certainly, the media did not anticipate the 
policy adjustment, with the Business Day observing that “… last week‟s statement has had 
analysts reading between and beneath the lines in an attempt to puzzle out what really 
motivated the committee.” 
On the 15th of February 2007 the MPC kept the repo rate constant, in line with the 
expectations summarised by the Reuters Econometer, but not in line market expectations 
where the surprise could be read in the associated 29bp BA rate decline. The monetary policy 
inclination index stood at plus 2, suggesting an imminent rate rise. In the interval between 
this meeting and it‟s predecessor the SARB released a Quarterly Bulletin which referred to a 
„robust economy‟ where „domestic expenditure continued on its robust expansion path‟, 
wages were edging higher and CPIX that had „picked up significantly‟ although it „remained 
well within the target area‟.  While this description of the economy does not itself suggest an 
imminent rate rise, it does not contradict the preceding monetary policy statement where that 
intention was more clearly flagged. In this instance the press was not as sharply critical of the 
MPC‟s decision, though they did not report any prior information that suggested 
circumstances or their analysis thereof had changed since the previous meeting.   
In summary, the evidence suggests that on four occasions (June 2001, August 2004, April 
2005 and October 2007) the MPC‟s decisions were surprising for reasons not easily 
attributable to changing economic circumstances 14 , at least not as communicated by the 
SARB to the public in any of the platforms analysed here.  Given that the method used in this 
chapter is likely to overstate the number of interest rate surprises, the evidence suggests that 
the SARB has communicated its intentions about the future direction of policy with 
considerable success over the period studied.  
                                                 
14 Mention should also be made of the case of June 2006: although our method does not identify it as potential policy 
confusion.  The media lamented the lack of transparency surrounding the monetary policy decision, claiming that despite 
warnings of a possible rate hike by the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, the available data and the Reserve 
Bank‟s communication had not convinced the market that the threat was credible (Business Day, 2006b).  Although our 
index did reflect that the SARB had communicated the possibility of a rise in the future (an index value of 1), the Reuters 
Econometer was surprised by 0.5 and the BA rate by 0.38, reflecting that they had not believed the rise was imminent. 
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2.4.1.2.  Turning points  
Some of the most challenging policy decisions which the MPC has had to communicate were 
the turning points of the policy cycles - 14 June 2001, 15 January 2002, 12 June 2003, 8 June 
2006 and 11 December 2008. The second and third turning points (15 January 2002 and 12 
June 2003) coincided with inflation surprises discussed in the previous section, so it is 
inappropriate to assign these to poor communication. However, the first turning point (14 
June 2001) was clearly a substantial surprise to financial markets and was not predicted by 
the index (see Table 2.4). The fourth (8 June 2006) surprised the Reuters panel, financial 
markets, and elicited media criticism (Business Day, 2006b). In this case, the index 
corresponding to this policy decision was 1, also indicating mild inconsistency. The final 
turning point (11 December 2008) is interesting in that it did not surprise the Reuters panel or 
financial markets much (it is therefore not identified in Table 2.4), but the index did not 
predict the turning point at all (the index value was 0). In summary, the SARB has found it 
much more difficult to communicate likely turning points in the interest rate cycle, an 
unsurprising result given the inherent difficulty of the decisions involved.   
2.4.2. Regression analysis 
In this section, the approach of Rosa and Verga (2007) is adopted to begin a process of 
describing the information content of the index. Firstly, the change in the SARB‟s instrument 
rate (the repo rate) is regressed on the index variable, while controlling for the technical 
adjustment of September 2001 with a dummy variable.  
 
(Repot+m – Repot) = α + β1Index + β2Tech_adjt +ɛt  ... (2.1) 
            
The results of the regressions for m=1 to m = 6 (i.e. the change in the repo rate between time 
t and the repo rates one, two, three, four, five and six months later) are presented in Table 2.5. 
The estimates for the coefficient on the variable “index” should provide an indication of the 
relationship between the change in the actual repo rate and the index value, or the amount of 
information provided by the index on future monetary policy decisions.   
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Table 2.5 OLS regression results 
 m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 
Constant -0.021 -0.257*** -0.458*** -0.604*** -0.743*** -0.819*** 
Index 0.010 0.271*** 0.444*** 0.570*** 0.723*** 0.814*** 
Tech_adj 0.010 -0.014 0.015 1.034*** 1.020*** 2.005*** 
R-squared 0.006 0.351 0.330 0.351 0.348 0.328 
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Note: OLS regressions at various horizons, using the index and a dummy variable for the technical adjustment 
as explanatory variables. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify 
that a variable is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
The weak results for m=1 can be explained by the fact that most of the MPC meetings took 
place every second month, so there is very little movement in the dependent variable at t+1 
(one month after the statement). From m=2 to m=6, the coefficient estimates of the index are 
positive and significant (increasing in size as the horizon lengthens), and the R-squared is 
between 0.328 and 0.351, which suggests that the index does indeed have informational 
content15.   
The coefficient on the index suggests that a statement which signalled an imminent monetary 
policy tightening (an index value of 2) was on average followed by 50 and 100 basis point 
increases in the repo rate within the following two and four months respectively. These 
coefficients are larger in magnitude than those estimated by Rosa and Verga (2007) for the 
ECB, which is unsurprising as the monetary policy adjustments by the SARB (in the context 
of an emerging market economy) are usually greater than those of the ECB. In line with the 
results of Rosa and Verga (2007), the constant was negative and significant at all horizons, 
which could reflect that the communication tended to emphasise greater inflation risk 
(tendency toward monetary policy tightening) than what usually materialised.   
As a robustness check, the regressions were estimated with alternative index values 
independently scored by Reid prior to consultation with Du Plessis. These results (shown in 
Table A2.2 in Appendix 2.2) do not differ substantially from the combined index16.   
                                                 
15 The regressions were estimated with alternative index values independently scored by the first author prior to consultation 
with the second author.  These results (shown in appendix 2.2) do not differ substantially from the combined index, which 
suggests that the results are robust despite the subjective nature of the index.   
16 As with the transition matrix, this regression was re-run including only points where inflation was outside the target range.  
The results were similar, but a little stronger.   
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Secondly, OLS regressions using dummy variables for each of the five possible index values, 
rather than a continuous variable “index”, were estimated to determine whether the values of 
the index displayed a cardinal or ordinal relationship. This will provide insight into how this 
index can be used appropriately in further studies.  Again, the technical adjustment of 
September 2001 was controlled for by including a dummy variable.   
 
(Repot+m – Repot) = β1D-2 + β2D-1 + β3D0 + β4D1 + β5D2 + β6Tech_adjt + ɛt 
           ... (2.2) 
Table 2.6 OLS regression results (using dummy variables) 
 m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 
D -2,t 0 -1.50***(NA) -1.50***(NA) -2.00***(NA) -2.00***(NA) -2.00***(NA) 
D -1,t 0 -0.50** -0.83 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 
D 0,t -0.04 -0.20* -0.45*** -0.62** -0.86*** -0.95*** 
D 1,t 0 0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.03 
D 2,t 0 0.23*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.70*** 0.90*** 
Tech_adj 0 -0.03 0.03 0.94*** 0.94*** 2.03*** 
R-squared 0.02 0.41 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.34 
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Note: OLS regressions at various horizons, using dummy variables for each of the index values and a dummy 
variable for the technical adjustment, as explanatory variables. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors were used. ***, ** and * indicate that a variable is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Again, m=1 is uninformative due to the fact that most of the MPC meetings are two months 
apart. The regression outputs show that the coefficients on three of the index values (-2, 0, 2) 
are significant, suggesting that these values of the index contain fairly reliable information. 
The signs of the coefficients on the dummy variable for index values -2 and 2 are as 
expected, but the coefficient for the index value 0 is negative and significant (although much 
smaller than the coefficients for -1 and -2). This supports the interpretation following the 
regression using the continuous variable “index”, that communications have a slight bias 
towards overstating the inflation risk.   
Wald tests were used to determine whether the index was ordinal or cardinal in nature 
(whether a 2 (-2) reflects double the upward (downward) inflation risk that a 1 (-1) does).   
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 43 
The Wald test null hypothesis that  β1-β2=β2-β3,  
β2-β3=β3-β4,  
β3-β4=β4-β5     ... (2.3) 
was firmly rejected at all horizons, suggesting that the relationship between the coefficients 
(different values of the index) is ordinal, but not cardinal.   
This outcome and the fact that the index comprises discrete outcomes motivated the use of an 
ordered probit model to further test the robustness of the results. Due to the previous 
conclusion that the index values have an ordinal rather than cardinal relationship, this ordered 
probit contained the dummy variables for each index value, and the technical adjustment, as 
regressors.  
The dependent variable in the OLS regression was the interest rate change over fixed 
calendar periods (2 months, 3 months, etc,). In contrast, the dependent variable in the ordered 
probit model is interest rate change between successive meetings, with these meetings spaced 
irregularly over the calendar. The consistent results for the two models show, however, that 
our inference does not depend on either of the two expressions for changes to the interest rate 
path.   
The ordered probit results were then used to investigate the number of type I and II errors that 
arose from the regression model.   
Table 2.7 Predictive ability of the ordered probit model 
Index prediction True positives False positives True negatives False negatives 
Interest rate 
decline 
5 
(71.4%) 
2 
(28.6%) 
46 
(83.6%) 
9 
(16.4%) 
Unchanged 
26 
(65%) 
14 
(35%) 
15 
(68.2%) 
7 
(31.8%) 
Interest rate rise 
10 
(66.7%) 
5 
(33.3%) 
42 
(89.4%) 
5 
(10.6%) 
Table 2.7 summarises the predictive ability of the ordered probit model based on the index 
values described above. There are three rows in the table, each of which considers potential 
type I and II errors by the model with respect to the following predictions: an interest rate 
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decline (in row 1), an unchanged interest rate (row 2) and an interest rate rise (row 3). The 
first two data columns show the proportion of true and false positives, e.g. in 71.4% of the 
cases where the model predicted an interest rate cut, an actual interest rate cut followed at the 
subsequent meeting. In two-thirds of the cases where the model predicted an interest rate rise, 
the MPC raised the repo rate at the subsequent meeting. The second column provides an 
empirical estimate of the model‟s type I forecasting error, and the highest type I error is 35% 
for the “unchanged” signal.  
The final two data columns show the proportion of true and false negatives, e.g. in 83% of the 
cases where the model suggested there would not be an interest rate cut, the MPC did not 
reduce the repo rate at their next meeting, and in 89.4% of the cases where the model 
suggested there would not be an interest rate rise, the MPC followed suit. The final column 
is, therefore, an empirical estimate of the model‟s type II prediction error for the three 
relevant categories. It is encouraging that the type II error never rises above 32%.   
Finally, it is notable that the type I and II errors are both highest for the model‟s ability to 
predict no change in the repo rate. An index value of zero should therefore be interpreted as 
indicating (i) that the MPC did not communicate a likely future change in the policy stance 
and (ii) uncertainty about the likely future policy direction. Positive signals, whether 
indicating a likely rise or decline in the repo rate, seem to have been communicated with 
greater accuracy. 
2.5.  Conclusion 
Communication is widely recognised as a valuable tool for the implementation of modern 
monetary policy, but research has tended to focus more on the effects of the actions of central 
banks, rather than their communication. A numerical index was constructed to reflect the 
monetary policy inclination communicated by the SARB‟s MPC statements. This index was 
applied in a number of ways to investigate the nature and success of the communication of 
the SARB. Exploratory data analysis and formal econometric tests revealed commendable 
consistency in the communication contained in the MPC statements, which was supported by 
more formal regression analyses. Our evidence suggests that the MPC has succeeded in 
signalling its likely future policy decisions with admirable consistency over this period.     
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Appendix 2.1: Monetary policy inclination index 
Hermeneutic theory and textual analysis emphasise that communication is subjective, 
language is dynamic in nature, and the success of communication depends jointly on the 
content of the message sent and its interpretation by the receiver (Rosa and Verga, 2007). 
Following this argument, the researchers in this study examined what was said in the 
monetary policy statements, how it was said, as well as its context. A scorecard such as that 
illustrated by Table A2.1 was used to evaluate each monetary policy statement 
systematically. For example, a phrase such as „the inflation outlook has deteriorated further‟ 
would have been viewed by the researchers as informative and would therefore have been 
noted in the final column of the table. This phrase may have indicated that the MPC was 
concerned about the inflation trend, but it revealed little about the degree of the concern or 
whether an adjustment of the repo rate was imminent. In order to interpret this statement it 
was useful to consider other factors such as previous warnings about the level of inflation, its 
level relative to the inflation target, past experience of the SARB‟s inflation aversion and the 
state of the economy at the time. Similarly, the conspicuous absence of reference to a factor 
that had previously been emphasised could have contained information that the risk posed by 
the variable had decreased.   
It was also important to recognise that the communication of the SARB developed over time 
as the inflation targeting regime matured. The introduction of terms or phrases (such as 
„balance of risks‟ in December 2006), which have accepted meanings in the communication 
of the Federal Reserve Bank or the European Central Bank, deserved special attention.  
In addition to individual elements of the statement such as these described above, the final 
section of the monetary policy statement, titled the monetary policy stance, was viewed as 
crucial. This section acted as a summary and conclusion of the monetary policy statement and 
often provided insight into the relative weights given to competing considerations raised in 
the body of the statement.   
Table A2.1 is an example of the scorecard used to evaluate each monetary policy statement 
before assigning it an index value. Statements were identified by the date of the MPC 
statement, as recorded in the first column.  In the final column notes were made by the 
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researcher while reading the statement. These notes could then be reconsidered at the end 
before assigning a score in the second column. The third column contains the final score 
agreed upon by the two researchers after comparison of their separate evaluations. 
Table A2.1: Scorecard, 20 March 2003 
Date Score 
Final 
score 
MPC Reasons 
20-Mar-03 1 1 0 Inflation outlook has improved further 
This is confirmed by slowdown in the prices of production goods, 
recent recovery of the rand and lower rate of increase in food prices. 
Other factors pointing to an improvement: 
      -  recovery of the exchange rate 
      -  slowdown in food price increases 
      -  slower momentum in the growth of money supply 
      -  continued moderate growth in bank credit extension 
      -  excess production capacity 
      -  surplus on the current account 
      -  continued fiscal discipline 
CPIX retraced only moderately, but are still at high levels and leave 
little room for complacency. 
Considerable risks still exist: 
-  high rate of increase in the avg nominal remuneration per worker 
-  slowdown in labour productivity growth 
-  few signs that administered prices are tapering off 
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Appendix 2.2: OLS regression results (Reid) 
Table A2.2: OLS regression results (Reid) 
 M=1 M=2 M=3 M=4 M=5 M=6 
Const -0.020 -0.225** -0.398*** -0.523*** -0.632*** -0.684*** 
Index 0.010 0.259*** 0.410*** 0.522*** 0.649*** 0.717*** 
Tech_adj 0.020 0.225** 0.398*** 0.152*** 1.632*** 2.684*** 
R-squared 0.007 0.427 0.378 0.391 0.374 0.338 
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Note: OLS regressions at various horizons, using Reid’s index and a dummy variable for the Tech_adj(technical 
adjustment), as regressors. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * 
represent that a variable is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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3. TALKING TO THE INATTENTIVE PUBLIC: HOW THE MEDIA 
TRANSLATES THE RESERVE BANK’S COMMUNICATIONS 
3.1. Introduction 
Private sector inflation expectations are critical to successful monetary policy. Developments 
discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation have placed the expectations channel of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism and communication as a monetary policy tool, 
at the centre of mainstream monetary economics theory and practice. The academic literature 
concerning central bank communication has flourished over the past two decades (Blinder et 
al., 2008). However, most of this research has focused solely on the central banks‟ 
communication with financial markets.  
In practice, central banks‟ audiences are heterogeneous and are not all equally attentive to 
central bank policies, a fact that central banks should bear in mind when designing 
communication strategies. It is impractical to incorporate the full range of this heterogeneity 
within a single economic model, but it is possible to identify broad groups with similar 
characteristics. Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) divide the central bank‟s audience into two 
groups: the broad public and its political representatives (general public) on the one side, and 
the financial markets on the other. Cukierman (2007) proposes that the general public will be 
rationally inattentive to short-term fluctuations of inflation if the central bank is credible. The 
concept of rational inattention is more common in the fields of behavioural economics and 
the economics of information, from which this chapter will draw. However, recent 
application of rational inattention to the modelling of the Phillips curve has offered valuable 
insights (including Mankiw and Reis, 2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2007; Carroll, 2001, 2003; Sims, 
2003, 2005, 2010). 
The communication tools used by the SARB to promote transparency about monetary policy 
include the monetary policy statements, monetary policy forums, the publication of monetary 
policy reviews and quarterly bulletins, occasional press releases, speeches by the governor, 
and the presentation of a report at least three times a year to the parliamentary portfolio 
committee on finance (SARB, 2006). However, very few members of the general public are 
ever exposed to these forms of communication directly. Most monetary policy 
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communication with the general public is transmitted via the media, and this chapter will 
focus on evaluating the role the South African media plays as part of the expectations channel 
of the transmission mechanism.  The chapter‟s policy relevance lies in identifying factors that 
affect the manner in which the original communication of the SARB is transformed into news 
(as James Hamilton (2004) describes it) and demonstrating how the SARB can influence 
these to improve the effectiveness of its communication with the rationally inattentive public. 
This study will focus on communication via a particular segment of the printed press 
(newspapers), and draws on existing research in the fields of political science, 
communications and economics.  
The results reveal notable shortcomings in the evaluation and reporting of monetary policy by 
the South African media. They are not adequately fulfilling their role of digesting monetary 
policy information and thereby promoting transparency or holding the SARB accountable to 
the public. This in turn inhibits the successful use of the expectations channel of the 
transmission mechanism, which inflation targeting is designed to employ.  
3.2. Monetary policy communication via the media with the rationally 
inattentive public 
In the broadest practical sense, the objective of central bank communication should be, 
firstly, for the message to reach its audience and, secondly, for its message to be perceived as 
trustworthy. If central bank communication is successful in reaching its audience, it has 
created the opportunity to earn a reputation for credibility through its decisions and behaviour 
and to manage inflation expectations in the interests of improving the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. The challenge is that the extent of the media‟s coverage of monetary policy 
and the manner in which the message of the central bank is interpreted and conveyed to the 
public are the result of a number of interacting influences and are only very loosely 
influenced by the central bank.  
In order for a central bank to communicate effectively with the rationally inattentive public, it 
needs to understand the characteristics and incentives of the media that transmit the central 
bank communication to the general public, the professional economists quoted in the media, 
as well as the characteristics of the rationally inattentive audience itself. The recognition that 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
the success of the central bank‟s communication depends at least partially on the actions of 
the media, professional economists and the rationally inattentive audience highlights the 
strategic nature of the interaction between the central bank and its audience (Schotter, 2001; 
Shelling, 1960).  
An understanding of the incentives facing each of the participants is essential to influence the 
outcome of these interactions (the news reports). We begin this study with the „news‟, which 
is the outcome of this strategic interaction, our objective being to improve our understanding 
of the process that produces it. 
3.2.1. The sender’s (SARB’s) incentives 
Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2009:4) define persuasive communication as “a message 
provided by one agent (a sender) with at least a potential interest in changing the behaviour of 
another agent (a receiver).” They argue that the supply of persuasive information is 
endogenous and is determined by both senders‟ incentives to distort the information and their 
offsetting incentives to provide accurate information in order to build a reputation. For 
example, the editor of a newspaper may favour a certain political bias in his or her newspaper 
in order to earn political favour (he or she may have an incentive to distort the information). 
Alternatively, the editor may be targeting a group of receivers that place great value on the 
accuracy of the reporting, providing an incentive for the editor to build a reputation for 
accurate and impartial reporting.   
Similarly, the use of central bank communication in modern monetary policy implementation 
is precisely aimed at persuading the public to behave in a manner that promotes the central 
bank‟s objectives. Central banks face incentives to build a reputation of being credible.  
According to Blinder (2000), both central bankers and academic economists report that they 
view credibility as very important to a central bank. Blinder conducted a survey of academic 
economists and central bankers, in which he explored why these two groups believed 
credibility was important to a central bank and how they believed it could be built 17 . 
                                                 
17 Regarding reasons why credibility is important, respondents were provided with seven potential reasons, which they had 
to rate along a scale of 1-5, where 1 is „unimportant‟ and 5 is „of the utmost importance‟. Six of the reasons Blinder listed 
related to how greater credibility would make the goals of the central bank easier to achieve. The 7th reason suggested was 
that it was the „duty of a central bank to be truthful‟.   
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Although the academic economists and central bankers did not exactly agree on the relative 
importance of the seven potential reasons provided to explain why they viewed credibility as 
important for a central bank, they did rate all of them as important (above neutral, 3). 
Interestingly, both groups of respondents regarded “it is the duty for a central bank to be 
truthful” as one of the least important reasons for pursuing credibility, although it was still 
regarded as important (rated above neutral, 3). This suggests that the pursuit of credibility is 
endogenous and is strongly influenced by strategic incentives.   
Both central bankers and academic economists believe that a „history of living up to its 
word‟, „central bank independence‟ and a „history of inflation fighting‟ are the most 
important ways to build credibility18. Based on these findings, it appears that central banks 
have a strong incentive to communicate with their audiences in order to build a reputation. 
They need to demonstrate, over time, that the central bank is independent and trustworthy. 
In this chapter, the focus is on the central bank‟s communication with a particular segment of 
its audience – the rationally inattentive general public. The following section explores the 
characteristics of the general public in order to better understand the incentives they face and 
to communicate effectively with them. 
3.2.2. Rationally inattentive general public 
The interaction between central banks and financial markets has been extensively explored in 
the literature, largely due to the increased focus on the management of private sector inflation 
expectations and the relative abundance of high frequency, accurate financial market data. 
However, the financial markets comprise only part (albeit an important part) of a central 
bank‟s audience. In addition, the interaction of the financial market with the central bank will 
necessarily differ from the rest of the central bank‟s audience, owing to the role and nature of 
its business. It is rational for market participants to pay close attention to the communication 
of the central bank, making their own judgements about the central bank‟s policy primarily 
from official communication (first-hand versus second-hand communication).   
                                                 
18 Both central bankers and academic economists ranked the potential methods of building credibility, provided by Blinder in 
the survey, in precisely the same order.   
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In contrast, most of the general public are rationally inattentive to monetary policy, as they 
have other priorities with regard to their available time and attention. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
inflation expectations survey data collected by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) 
between the third quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2010. The BER surveys four groups 
of the SARB‟s audience separately, which provides important information by revealing 
discrepancies between these groups. For example, between the beginning of 2006 and mid- to 
late-2007, the inflation expectations of the four groups were very similar. CPIX (the index 
targeted by the SARB) was within the target range the majority of the time between mid-
2003 and mid-2007, and economic theories and models that considered only the inflation 
expectations of the financial analysts during this period would have been a fair reflection of 
the actual inflationary pressures. In contrast, there were large differences between the 
inflation expectations of the four groups in 2008 and 2009. During these periods of higher 
inflation, effective communication with the non-financial market part of the SARB‟s 
audience became increasingly valuable in order to contain inflationary pressures. In addition, 
economic models that do not consider this divergence in inflation expectations between the 
different groups potentially compromise the quality of the model, which in turn will influence 
policy decisions.   
Figure 3.1: Inflation and inflation expectations
 
Source: Bureau for Economic Research, inflation expectations surveys, 2000-2010 
Both the acquisition and processing of the information concerning monetary policy is costly, 
and the public will rationally limit the amount of attention they dedicate to the task (Birchler 
and Bütler, 2007; Della Vigna, 2007). In Della Vigna‟s (2007) review of the empirical 
evidence on psychology and economics (a.k.a. behavioural economics), he offers „limited 
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attention‟ as a possible reason for non-standard decision making. He decomposes the actual 
value of the good, , (in this case information communicated by the central bank) into a 
visible component, v, and an opaque component, :   
          … (3.1) 
However, the perceived value of the information, , varies depending on the degree of 
inattention, Ɵ, chosen by the general public: 
      -     … (3.2) 
Ɵ is a function of the salience of the information (s) and the number of competing stimuli 
, which are both influenced by the agenda-setting role of the media 
(elaborated on in the following section).     
Media articles on monetary policy, which also typically report the views of professional 
economists, simplify both the acquisition and processing of the relevant information. 
According to Morris and Shin (2002), when decision makers have no private information and 
are making strategic decisions, even though public information is uncertain or imperfect, 
more precise information is welfare enhancing. It is reasonable to assume that the general 
public has very limited private information and that they turn to the media as a source of 
public information (interpretation of central bank policy and comments from economists). A 
substantial portion of the adult population of South Africa reports that they read newspapers, 
so they are likely to be exposed to the communication of the SARB as presented by these 
newspapers. According to the South African Advertising Research Foundation‟s All Media 
and Products Surveys (SAARF AMPS, 2007, 2008, 2009), about 26.5% – 31.5% of South 
Africa‟s adult population report reading any AMPS daily newspaper, and about 33% – 35.5% 
report reading any AMPS weekly newspaper. Given the above description of the rationally 
inattentive public‟s media consumption patterns, comprehensive management of a central 
bank‟s communication strategy should involve an understanding of the media‟s role in 
transmitting and interpreting the central bank‟s original message.   
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3.2.3. The role of the media in monetary policy communication 
News is a commodity, the production of which depends on supply and demand (Hamilton, 
2004). Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2009) suggest that incentives facing the media depend on 
both consumer demand and supply-side incentives. Profitable media firms obviously react to 
consumer demand by aiming to produce a product that consumers will choose to purchase. 
This could result in media reports with varying levels of objectivity, depending on the target 
market‟s demand for accuracy versus entertainment or affiliation. In addition, the firm will 
face supply-side incentives to distort reporting, such as the personal views of the editor or 
pressure exerted by politicians and advertisers. The news report is the product of the 
interaction between these forces of demand and supply. Understanding that the press is not a 
passive conduit of central bank communication complicates the challenge of communicating 
with the public. Influenced by various incentives, the media can either aide the central bank 
by interpreting the central bank‟s message in such a way that the public understands it, or it 
can hinder the communication, for example, by pursuing provocative, newsworthy headlines 
(Filardo and Guinigundo, 2008).  
For the central bank‟s communication to be successful, it must be judged by the media as 
interesting or important enough to be included as news (it must reach the public), and the 
message must be accepted by the public as appropriate. In order to reach the public, the 
central bank‟s communication would need to dominate other news and communication 
competing for the public‟s attention (N and s from equation 3.2, above). Filardo and 
Guinigundo (2008) identify the potential for an information paradox to exist in this situation, 
where the public rationally judges it to be unnecessary to use resources to monitor the 
decisions and behaviour of a central bank that is credible – especially if this central bank is 
operating in an economic environment with low and stable inflation. If the public believes 
that the central bank has both the ability and incentive to control inflation in the medium- to 
long-term, the inflation expectations of the public are anchored to the inflation target. Under 
these circumstances, the central bank should experience greater flexibility and require less 
aggressive adjustments of the monetary policy stance to achieve their goals.  
Between the 1930s and 1970s, the prevailing consensus was that the effects of mass 
communication on the attitudes of those that receive the messages were minimal (Roger, Hart 
and Dearing, 1997; Scheufele and Tweksbury, 2007). However, when McCombs and Shaw 
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(1972) changed the research question slightly, from whether media had a direct effect on the 
audience‟s attitudes, to whether the media‟s coverage of an issue influenced how important 
(or salient) the issue was considered by the audience, their results challenged the mainstream 
view. This agenda-setting research has expanded and deepened substantially since then, 
adopting a number of different approaches to answer the question – „Does the media matter?‟  
This avenue of research has been productively applied to the question of whether the mass 
media has political influence. In 2007, two influential empirical studies were published to 
address this issue, one focusing on television and the other on newspaper reports. Della Vigna 
and Kaplan (2007) used the fact that, for technical reasons, the conservative FOX Media 
Channel was introduced to only some channel systems in the US before the 2000 presidential 
elections to set up a natural experiment. Changes in support for the Republican Party could 
then be compared across areas that had access to Fox News and those that did not. They 
found that exposure to the conservative news coverage had a significant and sizeable impact, 
estimating that it persuaded between 3 - 8 percent of its non-Republican voters to vote for the 
Republican Party. In the other study, Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2007) set up a field 
experiment in Washington, three weeks before the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial elections in 
the USA to measure the effect of newspapers on voting behaviour. They contacted 1800 
people and randomly offered 25% of them a free subscription to the Washington Post (biased 
toward the Democratic presidential candidate) and another 25% of them a subscription to the 
Washington Times (biased towards the Republican candidate). Using surveys, they were able 
to investigate how the political opinions of the respondents of the control group and the two 
treatment groups compared over the three weeks. They found that even exposure of only 
three weeks to either newspaper increased the chances that the reader would vote (it increased 
the salience of the election), but that regardless of which paper the people in the treatment 
groups received, they were more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate, suggesting that 
the actual information content rather than the slant of the newspapers had a greater influence 
on readers. Although the results of the two experiments differed slightly regarding the impact 
of media bias on the political opinions of the public, they both showed that exposure to the 
mass media did have some influence on the political behaviour of the public. 
In conclusion, agenda-setting research suggests that „the media does matter‟ and that it 
responds to incentives in the production of „news‟ (it is not a passive conduit of 
communication). A central bank (the senders) should therefore monitor the role of the media 
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in transmitting its communication to the general public (the receiver) in order to improve the 
effectiveness of its monetary policy. Given the technical skills required to understand and 
evaluate monetary policy, the media are also influenced by the analyses of professional 
economists. The incentives faced by these professional economists and their influence on the 
„news‟ reports are explored in the following section.   
3.2.4. Professional economists 
Professional economists are extensively quoted in these kinds of media reports. The 
economists are viewed as specialists, who are able to interpret and evaluate the SARB‟s 
policies. They are also viewed as independent of the SARB, and therefore, their opinion is 
regarded as a more trustworthy reflection of how these policies influence the private sector.  
As third parties in the communication process, professional economists face interesting 
incentives. Using the inflation expectations surveys of Reuters and the Bureau for Economic 
Research (BER), Ehlers and Steinbach (2010) recently provided empirical evidence 
indicating that although the inflation expectations of financial analysts in South Africa cannot 
be classified as naïve, and they are comparatively more accurate than those of the trade 
unions and the business sector, they are not formed in a fully rational manner either. Ehlers 
performed empirical tests that evaluated the extent to which the inflation expectations of the 
financial analysts were weakly rational (unbiased and efficient), sufficiently rational 
(outperform the forecasts of other naïve models) and strictly rational (outperform the 
forecasts of a suite of models). She concluded that on average the inflation expectations of 
South African financial analysts do not satisfy the conditions for weak rationality (they are 
unbiased, but inefficient), and tests results for the extent to which they are sufficiently 
rational are mixed, so they can consequently not be classified as strictly rational either. Since 
the 1990s, a branch of the literature has investigated the possibility that professional 
economists could have „strategic‟ reasons for making forecasts that are not rational, rather 
than that they are myopic or lack the skill to forecast more accurately (Ashiya, 2009). These 
studies suggest that economists face two incentives that are potentially in conflict – an 
incentive to forecast as accurately as possible and some strategic incentive to bias their 
forecasts (to pursue their own self-interest).  
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Some reasons have been proposed to explain this strategic or rational bias. Ito (1990) found 
that forecasters in the survey he evaluated, which differentiated between forecasters from 
different industries, were slightly biased towards forecasting movements in the exchange rate 
that would please their employer most (wishful thinking hypothesis), but did not resolve 
whether this bias was unintentional or a strategic reaction on the part of the forecasters to 
incentives they faced. Laster et al. (1999) proposed that forecasters are remunerated or 
rewarded based on both the accuracy of their forecasts (which will facilitate better internal 
decision making within the company they work for) as well as the publicity they command 
for the company. These two objectives could be in conflict, and the weight placed on one 
goal relative to the other is likely to vary across industries. Despite findings that consensus 
forecasts are more accurate than almost any individual and the fact that they are readily 
available to forecasters, many forecasters still regularly provide forecasts relatively far from 
the consensus. The results of the empirical study by Laster et al. (1999) suggest that industry 
members, such as banks, which are likely to value accuracy highly, tend to make forecasts in 
line with the consensus forecast, whereas independent forecasters who are likely to benefit 
substantially from publicity tended to forecast the outliers. Another potential explanation of 
rational bias in the forecasts of professional economists is the signalling hypothesis by 
Ashiya and Doi (2001), which proposes that forecasters who make forecasts that are different 
to the consensus may be signalling confidence, and conversely, forecasters who are weak are 
likely to remain close to the consensus to avoid being identified as particularly weak. Ashiya 
(2009) argues that there is little empirical evaluation of the validity of these hypotheses. He 
used a 26-year panel of annual GDP growth forecasts to rigorously test which of these 
hypotheses is supported empirically for GDP growth forecasts, and found that the data 
supported only the publicity hypothesis.  
In conclusion, given the characteristics and incentives facing the rationally inattentive general 
public, the media is likely to be the main source through which these people receive the 
communications of the central bank. Effective communication of a central bank with the 
general public should be designed with an understanding of the incentives of the media and 
professional economists who influence the message that the general public ultimately 
receives. In the remaining part of the chapter, the South African news (the outcome of a 
strategic interaction between the SARB and the South African media, economists and the 
general public) will be analysed empirically. This analysis aims to determine the role that the 
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South African media has played in transmitting the communications of the SARB to the 
general public since 2000.  
3.3. Empirical method 
Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) evaluate central bank communication according to 
two criteria – the extent of the media coverage, and its favourableness (how well the decision 
is understood rather than how popular it is). Using similar indices to evaluate the 
communication of the SARB will offer insight into the degree to which the SARB has 
succeeded in reaching the public and whether its communication succeeds in convincing the 
media that the policy decision was the correct one, given the economic environment.  
The creation of the two indices for South Africa will be discussed in section 3.1, followed by 
exploratory data analysis in section 3.2. Section 3.3 proposes some factors that potentially 
correlate with the indices COV and ASMT, and section 3.4 tests the relevance of these factors 
with more formal ordered probit regression analyses.  
3.3.1. Construction of the indices 
3.3.1.1. Qualitative index 
Following Berger et al. (2006), two index variables were constructed to describe the extent of 
coverage and assessment of the SARB‟s monetary policy decisions by South African 
newspapers. Relevant newspaper reports were collected from the week following each MPC 
(monetary policy committee) meeting. Media reports for the entire sample period of January 
2000 to September 2009 were collected via an electronic archive of media clippings 
(University of the Free State, 2000-2009), compiled at the University of the Free State. 
Careful attention was paid to ensure that the leading South African newspapers (by 
circulation numbers)19 were represented in the media clippings collected, and cartoons were 
also included, recognising their role in opinion formation. The Daily Sun (the country‟s 
leading daily newspaper by circulation numbers) and the Sunday Sun (a weekly newspaper 
with substantial readership) were not represented in the SAMedia archive, so these were 
                                                 
19 The SAARF AMPS (2000-2009) surveys were used to identify the leading newspapers by readership numbers.   
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sourced directly from the compact storage archives of the Media24 central library at the 
company‟s head office20. Table A3.1 in Appendix 3.1 records a few details of each of the 
main newspapers21 included in the study.  
Each article or cartoon was read and evaluated independently by two researchers to allow the 
construction of the two indices. A qualitative index was created to capture the assessment of 
each monetary policy decision (ASMT). This measures the degree to which the media regards 
the SARB‟s monetary policy decision as appropriate, given the economic environment (it 
does not indicate the popularity of the decision). The index ranges from -2 (reflecting a 
strongly negative response of the publication to the policy decision) to 2 (reflecting strong 
approval of the decision). Greater detail about the qualitative index (ASMT) is provided in 
Appendix 3.2.  
The creation of this qualitative index is inherently subjective. Both objective and subjective 
approaches to creating indices have been proposed in the literature, but in line with the 
arguments in Reid and Du Plessis (2010), the subjective approach was preferred. To limit the 
bias introduced by this subjectivity as far as possible, two researchers independently read 
each media article and assigned an index value for the assessment of each article. They then 
discussed each article and its score, and where their scores differed they agreed on a 
consensus index value for each.  
The two researchers made some preliminary observations after reading the media articles. It 
was noted that generally the economic content of the articles was of a low quality. There 
were many mistakes in economic reasoning and a misunderstanding of the inflation targeting 
system. Although this understanding did improve over time, even years after the introduction 
of the inflation targeting framework, misunderstandings of the fundamental issues were not 
uncommon. For example, in June 2006, the editorial of the Business Day displayed a 
misunderstanding of the forward-looking nature of monetary policy and the flexibility with 
which the SARB conducts inflation targeting.  
                                                 
20 Gratitude is expressed to Leonie Klootwyk at the Media24 library for her assistance.   
21 Articles from other newspapers were also occasionally represented in the sample, as they were identified as relevant in the 
searches of the SAMedia archive. However, the newspapers in Table I were identified as having sizable readership numbers, 
and therefore, special attention was given to ensure that these were represented in the sample. 
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“The Bank‟s inflation-targeting mandate now doesn‟t permit it to let inflation 
go above the 6% ceiling of the target range for even a single month.” 
       (Business Day, 9 June 2006a: 10) 
Similarly, the following extract from the editorial of the City Press in 2008 claims that the 
SARB is employing strict inflation targeting, where the Bank places no weight at all on 
economic growth.  
“Calls to have the bank‟s mandate expanded to include job creation appear to 
be justified. The exclusive focus on fighting inflation has meant that borrowing 
money is expensive and the credit squeeze has compounded the problem.”  
      (City Press, 14 December 2008: 26) 
Fortunately, Mervyn King‟s (1997) „inflation nutter‟ (who places no weight on any objective 
but inflation) is a hypothetical character, an extreme case scenario, and there is no evidence 
that the SARB deserves such a title. A reading of the SARB‟s constitutional mandate makes 
it clear that even the pursuance of price stability as the primary (not exclusive) objective of 
the Bank is done with the intention of improving the prospects for economic growth in South 
Africa.  
“… to protect the value of the currency of the Republic in the interest of 
balanced and sustainable growth in the Republic.”    
           (South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989, amended: 3) 
Some newspapers made more effort to grapple with the system than others, which was 
probably influenced by the perceived demands of their audiences (as discussed in 
section 2.3). For example, the Business Day devoted notably more valuable newspaper space 
and journalistic effort to reporting on monetary policy decisions than the Daily Sun did. 
However, many of the media reports consisted of undigested patch writing, which reflected 
little effort to evaluate the policy decisions. They often relied extensively on quoting market 
economists and were internally inconsistent (especially if the economists quoted did not 
agree).   
There appeared to be a general bias indicating that repo rate cuts were welcomed and rises 
were met with criticism. Cartoons were often amazingly extreme and mostly negative 
(although their satirical nature is acknowledged). They often attributed to Governor Mboweni 
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intent and power that seems misplaced. The two examples reproduced below were hardly 
exceptional in this regard.   
3.3.1.2. Quantitative index 
The second index is a quantitative index that was created to measure the extent of the media 
coverage (COV) given. This index ranges from 1, representing poor media coverage, to 5, 
representing very extensive media coverage. The criteria used to allocate values for the 
quantitative index are the size of the article, its position in the newspaper, and its authorship.   
In line with media industry practice (VMS, 2006), the standard advertising unit (SAU) or 
column inch was used to compare the size of each article. Using a ruler to measure the length 
and width and then multiplying the two (see Appendix 3.3 for further details), the column 
inch measure (a single number) was calculated for each article. The result is a continuous 
series of numbers, which was divided into 5 groups (percentiles) distinguishing articles 
according to size. The extent of the coverage also accounts for the position of the article in 
the newspaper, recognising, for example, that an article on the front page represents better 
coverage of the SARB‟s communication than an article on page 5. Finally, the authorship of 
each article is considered, specifically whether the article was written by one of the 
newspaper‟s own staff, reflecting that greater importance was placed on the issue reported on, 
or whether the article was a Sapa or Reuters article.  
In order to account for all of these factors, a protocol was designed to categorise the extent of 
the coverage of each article (see Table 3.1). The size of the article is captured by the rows. 
The smallest articles are in the top row (article size 1) and the largest are in the bottom row 
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(article size 5). The location and authorship of the articles are captured in the columns, which 
are ranked from those that are allocated the prime positions and attention of the newspaper‟s 
staff, in the left-most column, to those allocated the lowest ranked locations and little 
attention from the staff, in the right-most column. For example, the first column from the left 
represents front page articles written by the newspaper‟s own staff. Note that the protocol 
illustrated by Table 3.1 is not necessarily symmetrical. In addition, as discussed earlier, 
cartoons were also included in the sample. All cartoons were allocated a quantitative index 
value of 4 (irrespective of their size and location). Refer to Appendix 3.2 for further details 
about the construction of the quantitative index, COV. 
Table 3.1: Protocol for quantitative index, COV 
Article 
Size 
Front pg; 
Staff 
 
 
6 
Editor’s page 
or editorial; 
Staff 
 
5 
Pg 2, 3 or the 
business 
report; 
Staff 
4 
Pg 2, 3 or the 
business 
report; 
SAPA, etc. 
3 
Not pg 1-3 or 
the business 
report; 
Staff 
2 
Not pg 1-3 or 
the business 
report; 
SAPA, etc. 
1 
1 3 2 1 1 0 0 
2 3 3 2 1 1 0 
3 3 3 2 1 1 0 
4 4 3 3 1 1 1 
5 4 4 3 2 2 1 
Source: Own construction 
3.3.2. Exploratory data analysis 
Firstly, the index data created was evaluated using frequency tables. The rows of frequency 
table (Table 3.2) reflect whether the repo rate was cut, held constant or raised at each MPC 
meeting, and the columns represent the values (between -2 and 2) of the assessment index 
allocated to media reports in the week following each MPC meeting. The first 5 columns of 
numbers reflect the frequency with which each case occurred in the sample period. For 
example, the top left-hand cell shows that on 12 occasions a cut in the repo rate was followed 
by media reports with an index value of -2. The last 5 columns reflect the same information 
as a proportion of the row total. For example, 7% of the time a repo rate cut was followed by 
media reports with an assessment index of -2.  
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Table 3.2: Frequency table for qualitative index, ASMT 
Change in 
the repo 
rate at 
each MPC 
meeting 
Assessment of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 Total p(-2) p(-1) p(0) p(1) p(2) 
Cut 12 30 47 46 26 161 0.07 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.16 
Constant 13 20 72 48 10 163 0.08 0.12 0.44 0.29 0.06 
Rise 48 52 40 30 5 175 0.27 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.03 
  499  
Due to the imprecise nature of the data itself, it is useful to consider broader categorisations, 
which highlight clearer trends. When the repo rate was cut (top row), 45% of the media 
reports received favourable assessments (either p(1) or p(2)) and 29% of the media reports 
received neutral assessments. This suggests that the vast majority of the time a repo rate cut 
was not judged to have been inappropriate, given the economic environment. Almost half 
(45%) of the media reports following decisions to keep the repo rate constant (second row) 
were neutral and a large proportion (29%) were only slightly positive. The strongest result 
occurred in cases where the repo rate was raised (third row); 57% of the media reports were 
given an unfavourable assessment (either p(-2) or p(-1)).  
If we assume that neither the MPC nor the media is biased and we assume that there is no 
uncertainty about the economic environment, then we would expect the SARB and the media 
to agree on the appropriate monetary policy stance. In reality, there is uncertainty about the 
economic environment, and the data analysis reveals a pattern of systematic, negative 
assessments by the media when the repo rate is raised. The uncertain economic environment 
cannot be responsible for this systematic pattern, so it must be the result of bias, by either the 
MPC or the media.   
A range of statistics and empirical evaluations of the SARB‟s track record are available to 
evaluate the claim that this observed pattern is the result of an overly „hawkish‟ SARB. If the 
SARB displayed a bias towards tightening, inflation would consistently have been either 
within or below the inflating targeting band over the sample period. Instead, the targeted 
inflation rate was above the upper band for approximately 60% of the sample period. In 
addition, empirical analyses by Woglom (2003) and Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) of the 
SARB‟s reaction find that the SARB places a substantial weight on output. Woglom (2003) 
finds that the SARB placed more weight on output during the inflation targeting period than 
in the period immediately prior to the adoption of inflation targeting, and Ortiz and 
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Stuzenegger (2007) argue that the weight devoted to output in the reaction function of the 
SARB is relatively high compared with other emerging market economies. The 18 – 24 
month target horizon of the SARB also bares testament to the flexible manner in which the 
SARB has implemented monetary policy, because it allows the SARB discretion and 
flexibility in pursuing the inflation target (Du Plessis, 2009). Short-term breaches of the 
inflation target will be tolerated by the SARB as long as inflation is expected to move back 
within the range before the end of the target horizon. In addition, the fact that the inflation 
targeting regime has lasted almost a decade is impressive by modern standards and again 
reflects the flexibility the framework allows in handling different situations (Du Plessis, 
2009). In conclusion, there is no evidence of bias by the SARB towards tightening monetary 
policy. By deduction, the assessment index seems to simply reflect that the media is pleased 
when the repo rate is decreased, reducing the cost of credit, and unhappy when the opposite 
occurs (reflecting the popularity of the decision). On average, these results reflect little 
attempt by journalists to judge the appropriateness of each decision, based on an 
understanding of the institutional framework and economic circumstances. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are the frequency tables for the two subcomponents (size and location) of 
the composite index, COV, and Table 3.5 reflects the frequency tables for the composite 
index, COV. Table 3.3 reflect little variation in the size of the articles across categories (they 
are all around 0.20), although using the broader categorisations does reveal some weak 
associations. When the repo rate was cut, 0.46 of the articles were small (size 1 or 2); when it 
was kept constant, 0.41 of the articles were small; and when it was raised, 0.36 were small. In 
contrast, the proportion of the articles that were large was 0.36 when the rate was cut, 0.38 
when it was held constant, and 0.43 when it was raised. In summary, rate cuts were 
associated with the smallest media articles, and rises in the repo rate resulted in larger 
articles. The article size varied based on the direction of the monetary policy decision, rather 
than on an evaluation of the appropriateness thereof.  
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Table 3.3: Frequency table for quantitative index, size 
Change in 
the repo 
rate at each 
MPC 
meeting 
Size of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4) p(5) 
Cut 35 29 24 20 30 138 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.22 
Constant 27 31 30 32 21 141 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.15 
Rise 26 26 30 32 28 142 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.20 
  421  
According to Table 3.4, very few media reports are in location 1, which represents articles 
that are not on pages 1-3 or the Business Report and are not written by the newspaper‟s own 
staff. There are also very few reports in category 3, which represents articles on pages 2, 3 or 
the in the Business Report, but which are not written by the newspaper‟s own staff. The 
clearest result is that articles are more likely to appear in the prime locations and to be 
reported by the newspaper‟s own staff (categories 4 or 5) when the repo rate is cut (0.42) or 
raised (0.43) than when the rate is held constant (0.29). The location of the articles appears to 
depend on whether the repo rate was adjusted, rather than on the level of disagreement with 
the decision.   
Table 3.4: Frequency table for quantitative index, location 
Change in 
the repo 
rate at each 
MPC 
meeting 
Location of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4) p(5) p(6) 
Cut 4 43 4 28 35 24 138 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.20 0.25 0.17 
Constant 6 58 0 35 26 16 141 0.04 0.41 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.11 
Rise 11 58 0 12 40 21 142 0.08 0.41 0.00 0.08 0.28 0.15 
  
 
421 
 
The composite index, extent of coverage (COV) (Table 3.5), finds that few reports fall into 
category 0 (the weakest coverage) and there is little variation across categories 1 - 4. The 
clearest results are that again articles are more likely (0.50 and 0.51 of the time) to fall into 
categories 3 and 4 (greatest extent of coverage) when the repo rate is changed than when it is 
held constant (0.43 of the time) 
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Table 3.5: Frequency table for composite quantitative index, COV 
Change in 
the repo 
rate at 
each MPC 
meeting 
Extent of coverage of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
 0 1 2 3 4 Total p(0) p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4) 
Cut 11 33 35 45 37 161 0.07 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.23 
Constant 15 46 32 38 32 163 0.09 0.28 0.20 0.23 0.20 
Rise 11 43 34 40 47 175 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.27 
  
 
499 
 
Formal regression techniques are adopted in the following section, which offers some insight 
into the robustness of the results from the four frequency tables above.  
3.3.3. Factors that correlate with the extent of media coverage and assessment of 
monetary policy by the media 
A list of factors that are likely to influence COV and ASMT are listed below. Berger et al. 
(2006) included determinants related to the ECB‟s policy decisions and communication, the 
economic environment, and because they were using panel data for a number of EU 
countries, country-specific conditions were considered. Similar factors related to the SARB‟s 
policy decisions and communication, and its economic environment were identified in this 
chapter, but the country-specific variables were irrelevant, as only South Africa was 
investigated.  
Monetary policy surprise: 
Two dummy variables were created, surprise up and surprise down, to indicate 
whether the particular monetary policy decision was a surprise in either direction. 
For the surprise up variable, a value of 1 was allocated if the Banker‟s Acceptance 
rate (BA) rate changed by 0.25 or more on the day of the MPC‟s monetary policy 
announcement, reflecting that either monetary authorities increased the repo rate 
when the financial markets did not expect them to, or they increased the repo rate 
more than the markets had predicted. Otherwise, the variable was allocated a value 
of 0. The surprise down variable received a 1 if the BA rate changed by -0.25 or 
more, and 0 otherwise. Berger et al. (2006) did not make the distinction between a 
surprise up and a surprise down, but the frequency tables in the previous section 
suggested that the distinction would be valuable for analysing the South African 
media.   
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Adjustment of the repo rate: 
Four dummy variables (100 decrease, 50 decrease, 50 rise, 100 rise) were 
constructed to capture adjustments made to the repo rate. The dummy variables were 
used to differentiate between upward adjustments of 0 - 50 basis points (bp) (50 
rise), upward adjustments of 51 - 100 bp (100 rise), downward adjustments of 0 - 50 
bp (50 decrease) and downward adjustments of 51 - 100 bp (100 decrease). It was 
deemed appropriate to investigate the potentially asymmetrical reactions to upward 
and downward adjustments of the repo rate that were suggested by the frequency 
tables. 
GDP growth relative to the sample average: 
By subtracting the average GDP growth for the sample period from the actual GDP 
growth for each period, the variable GDP:Avg was constructed to reflect where GDP 
growth was situated relative to the trend over the sample period. A positive 
(negative) value indicates that the economy is growing faster (slower) than the 
average for the sample period. This variable was constructed using real-time data22 
from the original statistical releases archived on the STATS SA website.  
Inflation outside the inflation targeting range: 
A variable outside range was used to measure inflation relative to the target band. A 
value of 0 was assigned to the index when inflation was within the target range of 3-
6% and 6% (3%) was subtracted from the actual inflation figure in each period when 
inflation was above (below) the upper (lower) limit of the target band, in order to 
capture the distance of inflation from the target. In line with the discussion for the 
preceding variable, real-time data 23  from the STATS SA website was used to 
construct this inflation variable.  
                                                 
22 GDP data usually undergoes numerous revisions after the first release of the data to the public, so if the final historical 
time series is downloaded and used for empirical work, it is ignoring the fact that that was often not the information 
available to decision makers at the time the decision was made. The figures used in these regressions are the first releases of 
GDP data for that quarter.   
23 The inflation index used was the one officially targeted by the SARB. Therefore, CPIX was used until the end of 2008, 
and CPI thereafter.   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 68 
Adjustments of FED policy rates:  
Two dummy variables were created to capture whether the SARB‟s adjustments of 
the repo rate were in line with the direction of the most recent change in the Fed 
Funds rate. A value of 1 was allocated to the variable F&S increase when the most 
recent change in the Fed Funds rate was upward and was followed by the SARB 
increasing its policy rate, and a value of 0 otherwise. Conversely, a value of 1 was 
allocated to the variable F&S decrease when the SARB‟s reduction of the repo rate 
is preceded by a downward movement of the Fed Funds rate. This variable is 
designed to capture the degree to which the SARB‟s decision is judged against that 
of the Fed. This variable was constructed using data that was sourced from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York‟s and the South African Reserve Bank‟s 
websites.  
Inconsistency:  
In Reid and Du Plessis (2010), on four occasions the SARB‟s monetary policy 
actions were judged to be inconsistent with its communication at the previous 
meeting. A dummy variable was constructed for this chapter in which these four 
instances are allocated a 1 and the rest of the MPC decisions in the sample 
period a 0.  
Inter-meeting communication:  
A number of dummy variables were constructed to investigate whether they had any 
impact on the assessment and extent of coverage with which the media reported on 
the following decisions. The inter-meeting communications considered were the 
monetary policy forums (MPF), monetary policy reviews (MPR), quarterly bulletins 
(QB), parliamentary briefings (PB), speeches by the governor (SP), annual general 
meetings (AGM) and the annual reports. All of these are occasions on which the 
bank comments on monetary policy. Only speeches by the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank that were relevant to South African monetary policy were included. It was also 
recognised that the MPR is released on the evening of the first MPF, so it is not 
possible to distinguish between the impacts of the two, and therefore, only the 
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variable MPR was used to capture the impact of the two. Similarly, the annual report 
is released officially on the evening of the AGM, so only the variable AGM was used 
in the regression analysis.  
3.3.4. Regression analysis 
Following the approach of Berger et al. (2006), ordered probit models were used to identify 
factors that correlate with the extent of media coverage. Berger et al. use panel data to 
evaluate the role of the media in the constituent countries of the European Union, whereas 
this study focuses on South African time series data alone. The panel data has the advantage 
of allowing the use of fixed effects to limit the impact of the subjectivity of the experts who 
created the indices.  
Table 3.6: The relationship between COV and ASMT in media reports 
Dependent variable: COV Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Assessment  -0.085** -- -0.050 -- 
Absolute assessment  -- 0.438*** 0.427*** 0.388*** 
Negative assessment  -- -- -- 
0.153 
(0.185) 
     
Number of observations  500 500 500 500 
Note: Models 1 - 4 are ordered probit regressions, and the regression coefficients are represented in the cells. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and numbers in brackets appear below coefficients where the p-value 
is between 10 and 25%. 
Models 1 - 4 (Table 3.6) investigate whether there is a relationship between COV and ASMT 
in the media reports. The dependent variable is COV. Model 1 (column 1) tested whether 
there is a linear relationship between COV and ASMT, and model 2 whether there is a 
relationship between COV and absolute assessment. The coefficients on assessment in Model 
1 and absolute assessment in Model 2 were both significant. Furthermore, when both 
assessment and absolute assessment were included in the same regression in Model 3, 
absolute assessment dominated, so there does not appear to be a robust linear relationship 
between COV and ASMT. Model 4 included absolute assessment and negative assessment to 
test whether the relationship between COV and ASMT is non-linear. The coefficient on 
negative assessment was insignificant at the standard 1%, 5% and 10% levels, but given the 
imprecise nature of the data, its p-value of 18.5% does not convincingly rule out the 
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possibility of a non-linear relationship. These results are in line with the main findings from 
the frequency tables for COV, indicating that changes in the repo rate are more likely to 
receive a greater extent of coverage than a decision to keep the repo rate constant. The 
significantly negative coefficient on assessment in Model 1 and the marginally significant 
coefficient on negative assessment in Model 4 also indicate that COV possibly increases 
slightly when ASMT is negative.  However, this result is less conclusive.  
Regressions 5 - 10 in Table 3.7 aim to identify factors in our list that correlate with ASMT. 
Model 5 is the most parsimonious of the models and includes the variables identified as most 
likely to influence the assessment in media reports. The regression results indicate that a large 
decrease in the repo rate (a 100bp decrease) has a significantly positive effect on the 
assessment, and any increase of the repo rate (either 50 or 100 basis points) has a 
significantly negative effect. This regression reinforces the results of the frequency tables. 
The two variables outside range and GDP:Avg are designed to capture the monitoring role of 
the media, based on the economic circumstances. Although the coefficient on outside range 
is only significant at the 12,8% level of significance, as before, the imprecise nature of this 
data means that this positive coefficient cannot convincingly be judged to be insignificant. 
However, ASMT is most strongly affected by a rise in the repo rate, which elicits a 
significantly negative report.  
In Model 6, the variables surprise up and surprise down were included instead of the four 
dummy variables representing adjustments of the repo rate. The reason that these surprise 
variables are not included with the repo rate adjustment variables is that they have a 
substantial degree of collinearlity24. However, both groups of variables were expected to 
exert an influence on assessment, so Model 6 was estimated to check whether there was any 
important change in the regression results when the first set of variables were replaced with 
the second. The results reflect a similar pattern to those of Model 5. A surprise adjustment of 
the repo rate upward had a significantly negative effect and a surprise adjustment downward, 
a significantly positive effect on assessment. In addition, GDP:Avg had a significantly 
negative coefficient, which is interpreted as an indication that an increase in the repo rate is 
generally given an unfavourable assessment when it is viewed as potentially harming robust 
                                                 
24 This was confirmed using auxiliary regressions, regressing the repo rate changes on surprise up and surprise down.  
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economic growth. However, this finding is not robust, as it is not significant in the other 
specifications of the model.  
Table 3.7: Factors that correlate with ASMT 
Dependent 
variable: ASMT 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Surprise up -- -0.598*** -- -- -- -- 
Surprise down -- 0.359** -- -- -- -- 
100 decrease 0.245* -- 0.030* 0.341** 0.394** 0.355* 
50 decrease 0.061 -- -0.086 -0.037 -0.008 -0.107 
50 rise -0.713*** -- -0.861*** -0.819*** -0.847*** -0.949*** 
100 rise -0.742*** -- -0.741*** -0.522** 
-0.283 
(0.155) 
-0.305 
(0.158) 
Outside range 
-0.053 
(0.128) 
-0.040 
-0.041 
 
0.044 
(0.192) 
0.021 0.022 
GDP:Avg -0.019 -0.042** 0.016 0.016 -0.020 0.019 
Inconsistency  -- -- 0.078 -0.076 0.060 0.046 
F&S increase -- -- 
0.338 
(0.108) 
0.291 
(0.179) 
0.336 
(0.133) 
0.428* 
F&S decrease -- 
 
-0.137 -0.095 -0.002 -0.023 
MPR -- -- -- -0.064 0.094 -0.009 
Q. Bulletin -- -- -- 0.267** 0.206* 0.137 
Parliamentary 
briefings 
-- -- -- 
-0.135 
(0.161) 
-0.108 -0.091 
Speeches -- -- -- 0.062 0.033 0.062 
AGM -- -- -- -0.535*** -0.227 -0.228 
D_AGM(02&03) 
   
 -0.769*** -0.955*** 
    
   
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Note: Models 1 - 4 are ordered probit regressions and the regression coefficients are represented in the cells. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and numbers in brackets appear below coefficients where the p-value 
is between 10 and 20%. 
Model 7 is an expansion of Model 5, where the variables inconsistency, F&S increase, and 
F&S decrease are added to the model. The positive coefficient on the large decrease in the 
repo rate and the negative coefficients on the variables that capture the increases in the repo 
rate remain significant, confirming the robustness of these results, but the slightly significant 
negative coefficient on the variable capturing whether inflation is outside the target band is 
no longer significant. In addition, the variable that captures when the Fed and the SARB are 
both increasing their policy rates is also slightly significant and positive. This suggests that 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 72 
increases in the South African repo rate are more readily accepted when the policy rate of the 
Fed is also being increased at that time. It is interesting that the response is asymmetrical in 
that there is no significant impact on assessment when both central banks are reducing rates.  
The inter-meeting communication variables are introduced in Model 8. This is done in order 
to investigate whether inter-meeting communication by the SARB is effective at influencing 
evaluation of the policy decisions by the media. The negative coefficient on the AGM 
variable is highly significant, the positive coefficient on the Quarterly Bulletin is significant 
at the 5% level, and the negative coefficient on parliamentary briefings is marginally 
significant. The robustness of the impacts of the inter-meeting communication variables was 
tested using slightly different specifications of Model 8. The impact of the AGM on 
assessment remained highly significant and negative, and the QB variable was consistently 
positive and significant as the model was adjusted. The persistently significant, negative 
impact of the AGM was surprising and warranted further investigation. On closer inspection, 
it was confirmed that this result was being driven by only two points (the AGMs of 2002 and 
2003)25. Once a dummy variable was created to control for these two occasions (Model 9), 
the impact of the AGMs became insignificant. The findings reflect little influence of inter-
meeting communication on the evaluation of monetary policy by the media – only the QB 
variable has a significant influence on assessment.  
A range of „goodness of fit‟ measures have been proposed in the literature, and a few of these 
will be considered here to assess the adequacy of the proposed models. This range of 
measures is used due to the comparative difficulty in assessing the quality of a model with 
limited dependent variable. According to Wooldridge (2002:465), for logit and probit models 
“goodness of fit is not as important as the statistical and economic significance of the 
explanatory variables”. In addition, various Pseudo-R squareds commonly used to evaluate 
the fit of a model with a limited dependent variable have fewer intuitive interpretations.  
                                                 
25 The SARB AGMs of 2002 and 2003 were uncharacteristically newsworthy. Media reports following the AGM of 2003 
focused strikingly on Governor Mboweni‟s salary increase, which was far above the inflation target, and on shareholder 
activism at the SARB‟s AGM. In turn, media reports following the 2002 AGM were dominated by disagreement between 
the SARB Governor and the Minister of Finance regarding who should be responsible for banking regulation. Dramatic 
language used in these report such as “Mboweni and Manuel lock horns”, “clash on bank supervision out in the open” and 
“low intensity war” captures the negative mood created by their disagreement. 
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Firstly, contingency tables were considered for each of the regressions, allowing type 1 and 2 
errors to be identified. Table 3.8 presents the contingency table for Model 9, where the 
frequency of each index value between -2 and 2 as per the actual index are presented 
horizontally in row, and the frequency of each level of assessment predicted by the model is 
presented in the columns.  
It is immediately evident that the variables included in the model lead to a skewed 
distribution of predictions. Although the total values of the actual index (final column) are 
relatively normally distributed across the index values, the model never predicts the 
assessment of -1 or 2. Most of the variables included in the models are dummy variables, so 
to test that it was not their discrete nature that made it more difficult for the model to increase 
from one index value to the next, a number of the variables were changed to continuous 
regressors. Changes in the repo rate were represented by one variable, policy change; one 
variable was constructed to capture the magnitude and direction of the surprise experienced 
in reaction to policy changes, and continuous variables were created to capture the difference 
between the policy changes of the Federal Reserve Bank and the SARB. These changes did 
not improve the ability of the model to predict -1 and 2 index values and diminished the 
quality of the model. Most importantly, the four dummy variables were preferable in order to 
capture the different responses to the specific direction and magnitude of the policy changes. 
Therefore, the regressors in question were returned to their original forms.  
The skew predictions of the models suggest that the variables included in the models are 
more sensitive to MPC decisions that elicit a strongly negative reaction. This is consistent 
with the robust finding that the coefficient on the variable F&S increase is marginally 
significant, but that on F&S decrease is insignificant. This suggests that assessments in media 
reports are more favourable towards increases of the SARB‟s repo rate that are preceded by 
an increase in the Fed Funds rate, whereas a decrease in the SARB‟s repo rate that is 
preceded by a decrease in the Fed‟s policy rate has no significant impact. The media is more 
sensitive when the SARB is tightening monetary policy than when it is loosening it, and they 
are more likely to accept the SARB‟s decision if it is not out of step with the Fed‟s monetary 
policy.   
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Table 3.8: Contingency table for Model 9 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 A
S
S
E
S
S
M
E
N
T
 ASSESSMENT PREDICTED BY THE MODEL 
 -2 0 1 Total 
-2 30 39 4 73 
-1 28 56 18 102 
0 17 103 39 159 
1 7 77 41 125 
2 1 20 20 41 
Total 83 295 122 500 
 
To improve the model‟s ability to predict, the index was reduced to a coarser grid, where all 
negative index values are represented as -1 and all positive index values by 1 (Model 10 in 
Table 3.7). The results are very similar to those of Model 9, except that now none of the 
inter-meeting communication variables seem to influence assessment.  
Table 3.9 presents the contingency table for Model 10, and these results are used to identify 
the true (false) positives and true (false) negatives in Table 3.10. When ASMT is simplified in 
this way, the model is able to predict all three index values. The true positives represent the 
proportion of the time that the model correctly predicted that a specific index value would 
occur. For example, according to the top left cell, 58% of the time the model correctly 
predicted a negative index value. The false positives capture the proportion of the time that 
the model incorrectly predicted that specific index value, which is the type 1 error). Similarly, 
the false negatives represent the type 2 errors, where the model incorrectly predicts that 
assessment will not be a specific index value. For example, the top right-hand cell reports that 
22% of the time when the model predicted that assessment would not be 1, it was indeed 1.  
According to Table 3.10, the model is far more susceptible to type 1 errors than type 2 errors. 
In addition, the type 1 errors deteriorate as we move down the rows from -1 - 1, which is a 
result of the skewed distribution of the model predictions, given the independent variables of 
the model. To gauge how far wrong the model predicts when it does predict incorrectly, the 
percentage of predictions that were more than one cell away from the correct predictions 
were considered. When the true value of the assessment index was -1, 29% of the time the 
model mistakenly predicted a 1, and when the true index value was 1, 20% of the time the 
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model mistakenly predicted -1. The type 1 and 2 errors identified for Models 5 - 9 are similar 
to those of Model 10 and are available from the authors on request.   
Table 3.9: Contingency table for Model 10 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
A
S
S
E
S
S
M
E
N
T
 ASSESSMENT PREDICTED BY THE MODEL 
 -1 0 1 Total 
-1 106 17 52 175 
0 44 34 81 159 
1 34 27 105 166 
Total 184 78 238 500 
Table 3.10: Type 1 and 2 errors for Model 10 
 True positives False positives True negatives False negatives 
-1 58% 42% 78% 22% 
0 44% 56% 70% 30% 
1 44% 56% 77% 23% 
To further evaluate the adequacy of this model, various other measures of fit were considered 
(Greene and Hensher, 2010 and UCLA: Academic Technology Services, 2010). Due to the 
nature of these models, the measures of fit can either compare the ability of competing 
models to fit the data, or compare the model to the null hypothesis of „no model‟(in the sense 
of a model with only a constant as a regressor) (Greene and Hensher, 2010). For example, 
McFadden‟s pseudo R-squared considers the likelihood ratios to assess the degree to which 
the full model improves on the intercept model. McFadden‟s pseudo R-squared for Model 10 
is 0.077.  
More revealing, and related to the analysis in the tables above, are the Count R-squared and 
adjusted count R-squared goodness of fit measures. The count R-squared provides a scalar 
that represents the percentage correctly predicted by the model. The count R-squared for 
Model 10 is 0.478. The adjusted count R-squared adjusts this measure to control for the 
modeller‟s „best guess‟. In a bivariate model where one outcome is obviously more likely 
than the other, by simply guessing the more likely outcome all the time, the modeller would 
be correct most of the time (UCLA: Academic Technology Services, 2010). To apply this to 
our multivariate case, we adjusted the count R-squared by 0.333 (assuming that each of the 
three categories has an equal probability of being chosen): 
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R2 = (No. correctly predicted – count of the most frequent outcome) /  
(Total obs – count of the most frequent outcome)   ... (3.3) 
The adjusted count R-squared for Model 10 is 0.215, so the model is 21,5% better than a 
reasonable guess that each category of the index is equally likely.  
Table 3.11: Factors that correlate with COV 
Dependent variable: COV Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Absolute assessment 0.443*** 0.435*** 0.448*** 
Surprise up -- 0.109 -- 
Surprise down -- -0.056 -- 
100 decrease 0.124 -- 0.149 
50 decrease -0.018 -- -0.007 
50 rise -0.045 -- -0.027 
100 rise 0.140 -- 0.225 
Outside range 0.238** 0.262** 0.215* 
GDP > avg 0.135 0.111 0.128 
Inconsistency  -- -- -0.143 
F&S increase -- -- -0.050 
F&S decrease -- -- -0.062 
    
Number of observations 500 500 500 
Note: Models 10 - 13 are ordered probit regressions and the regression coefficients are represented in the cells. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and numbers in brackets appear below coefficients where the p-value 
is between 10 and 25%. 
Models 11 - 13 investigate some factors that potentially correlate with the extent of coverage 
(COV). The coefficient on absolute coverage is consistently positive and significant, 
indicating that the more extreme the assessment the greater the extent of coverage. All the 
other coefficients are clearly insignificant, except Outside π range, which is consistently 
positive and significant. This is an indication that the media does play some monitoring role 
in that they increase media coverage of monetary policy when the SARB is not achieving the 
goal of keeping inflation within the target range, which it communicated to the public. This is 
the easiest measure against which to gauge the performance of the SARB, and by increasing 
media coverage during these periods, the media has „placed monetary policy on the agenda‟. 
Monetary policy officials should recognise that the general public, via the agenda-setting 
behaviour of the media, are sensitised during these periods.  
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The contingency table for Model 13 reflected a similar pattern as Models 5 - 10. The model 
does not predict any COV index values of 0 or 2, which can be explained by the fact that the 
index values of 0 and 2 were the least frequent in the actual data (as is clear from the 
exploratory data analysis). McFadden‟s pseudo R-squared for Model 13 is 0.0363, the count 
R-squared is 0.348 and the adjusted count R-squared is 0.185. The results for Models 11 and 
12 are similar to those for Model 1326.  
By comparing the results above of Models 5-13 with those of Berger et al. (2006) for the 
European media, we can potentially gain more insight into the role of the South African 
media in the expectations transmission mechanism of monetary policy in South Africa.  
3.4. Comparison with ECB results 
Berger et al. (2006) find that in practice the European media positions itself to play a 
monitoring role, and it tends to report critical views more extensively than positive views. 
The results show that the tone of the reporting is more negative when the markets are 
surprised by a monetary policy decision, and when the latest inflation figure is above 2% (the 
ECB‟s definition of price stability). More crucially, the findings suggest that more inter-
meeting communication, and ECB press conferences on the day of the monetary policy 
decisions that provide more information lead to media coverage that is both more extensive 
and favourable. Although they find that reporting is always more negative when inflation is 
high, the surprising decisions appear to be better accepted when they are accompanied by 
extensive explanations and supported with information.  
In contrast, the results of this study indicate that the South African media plays far less of a 
monitoring role in that the economic variables, GDP:Avg and outside band, seemed to have a 
limited impact on assessment, although being outside the inflation target band did increase 
the extent of coverage. These economic variables were far outweighed by what appeared to 
be an uncritical response to adjustments of the repo rate (particularly increases in the repo 
rate). Finally, inter-meeting communication does not seem to have had much impact, 
suggesting that the SARB is not making effective use of inter-meeting communication to 
influence the perceptions of the Bank by the media and public. A more deliberate attempt to 
                                                 
26 The results for models 10 – 12 are available from the corresponding author on request.  
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understand its audience would potentially allow the SARB to improve its use of this channel 
of communication. 
3.5. Conclusion 
The monetary policy framework adopted by the SARB, inflation targeting, relies greatly on 
the expectations channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The strategic 
interaction between central banks and financial markets has been extensively studied, 
enabling much more informed policy actions and communication. Comparatively little focus 
has been dedicated to understanding the communication of central banks with the general 
public. This chapter explored the role of the South African newspaper media in the 
expectations channel of the transmission mechanism of the SARB. The objective was to 
systematically investigate the process by which the SARB‟s communication is transformed 
into news, which will impact on the inflation expectations of the general public (potentially 
the source of much of South Africa‟s wage and price pressures). The results reflect a relative 
lack of critical assessment of monetary policy by the media, which limits the degree to which 
the SARB is held accountable to the public against its stated objectives. The media does 
increase the extent of coverage when the SARB is outside of the target range, but inter-
meeting communication appears to be ineffective at influencing the assessment of monetary 
policy decisions by the media. The challenge is for the SARB to use communication to 
provide an opportunity for the Bank to contribute to the level of economic evaluation 
undertaken by stakeholders and to build credibility through purposeful engagement with the 
media.  
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Appendix 3.1: Newspaper characteristics and readership 
Table A3.1: Newspaper characteristics and readership 
Newspaper title Characteristics AMPS  
(% of adult population that read these newspapers) 
Business Day National; Daily 0.3% 
City Press Weekly 6.5% 
Daily Sun Daily 14% 
Rapport Weekly 4.5% 
Sowetan Daily 4.7% 
Sunday Sun Weekly 8.3% 
Sunday Times National; Weekly 12.6% 
Source: (AMPS, 2009A)  
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Appendix 3.2: Additional details about the construction of the qualitative 
and quantitative indices 
 
Assessment (Qualitative Index) 
Table A3.2a presents an example of the information collected by the researchers for each 
media report in order to assign a value for the qualitative index, assessment. Each news 
article was identified by the date on which it was published and the newspaper in which it 
appeared (shown in the first two columns).  Then a number of characteristics of the articles 
were considered and the views of the researchers were recorded in columns 8 to 11. Values 
between -2 and 2 were used to indicate whether the headline and tone of an article was 
strongly positive (2), slightly positive (1), neutral (0), slightly negative (-1) or strongly 
negative (-2). The researchers also investigated whether the article was contextualised and 
whether there was an explicit judgement of the MPC decision. Provision was made to record 
any other observations in the final column. These criteria were not employed mechanically 
fashion, but were used to organise the evaluation of each article in a systematic fashion. 
Given this evaluation, index values of between -2 and 2 were assigned in columns 3 to 7.   
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Table A3.2a: Scorecard for qualitative index, ASMT 
Date Newspaper Very 
Neg 
(-2) 
Neg                          
(-1) 
Neutral
(0) 
Pos 
(1) 
Very 
Pos 
(2) 
 Head-
line 
Context-
ualised 
Explicit 
Judgement 
Tone  Comments / Notes 
2000/03/03 Business Day   X    0 Fair None 0  Lots of general comments about the  
monetary policy framework and almost no 
comment about the reception of the decision 
by the financial market or public 
2000/03/05 Sunday Times    X   0 Little None 1  Suggestions were made that the data showed 
inflation pressures and that economists were 
also a little worried about the rising inflation.  
However plenty debate about the inflation 
target was still reported.  None of this was 
critical of the latest actual decision 
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Extent of coverage (Quantitative Index) 
Extent of coverage is a composite index, comprising 2 sub-indices, size and location.  The 
size of the news report was decided objectively, using Standard Advertising Unit Column 
Inches (see Appendix 3.3 for more details). Once all the articles were measured in column 
inches, they were divided into percentiles to identify 5 groups according to size. Articles in 
the smallest group were assigned a value of 1 and those in the largest group a value of 5. 
Table A3.2b presents an example of how the column size data for each article was recorded.  
The criteria set to differentiate between the favourability of different positions in a newspaper 
are represented in Table 3.1 in the main text. Notice that the Business Report, which usually 
appears later in the newspaper was treated more favourably than other later pages. The 
Business Report appears in a range of the newspapers, including the Cape Times, Pretoria 
News, Mercury, Star, Cape Argus, Daily News, Sunday Independent and Sunday Tribune. 
The author of the news report was considered together with the evalution of the location of 
the article in the newspaper. If one of the journalists from the newspaper was assigned to 
write the report it gave the impression that greater priority was being given to the report than 
if the source was Reuters or Sapa, which would have required fewer resources. 
The size and location of each article was combined as shown in Table 3.1 in the text to select 
the composite index, COV.  Table A3.2c provides an example of how data for this index was 
collected and organised.  
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Table A3.2b Scorecard for quantitative index, size 
Note:  Refer to Appendix 3.3 to convert width (cm) to width (columns) 
 
Table A3.2c Scorecard for quantitative index, COV 
 
 
 
Date Newspaper 
Width         
(cm) 
Width    
(columns) 
Length        
(cm) 
Length  
(inches) 
Extra    
(column inches) 
Total          
(column inches) 
Size 
2000/01/14 Business Day 16 3 17 6.693 4.429 24.5 5 
2000/01/16 City Press 26 5 11.5 4.528 - 22.6 5 
Date Newspaper 
Size         
(column inches) 
Size             
(index) 
Position Author 
Location 
(index) 
COV      
(composite index) 
2005/10/14 Business Day 23.6 5 1 Kevin O‟Grady 6 4 
2005/10/14 The Star 9.1 2 1            
(Business Report) 
Andile Ntingi 4 2 
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Appendix 3.3: Standard column inches 
 „Standard Advertising Unit Column Inches‟ are typically used to sell or compare space in a 
newspaper. If, as was the case for this study, the media material is paper-based (rather than 
electronic), the SAU column inches are calculated using a ruler (VMS, 2006). Measuring 
horizontally, the width of the article is represented as number of SAU columns, using the list 
below: 
 1 SAU COLUMN = 2 1/16” 
 2 SAU COLUMN = 4 1/4” 
 3 SAU COLUMN = 6 7/16” 
 4 SAU COLUMN = 8 5/8” 
 5 SAU COLUMN = 10 13/16” 
 6 SAU COLUMN = 13” 
Then the length of the articles is measured in inches, and the two measurements are 
multiplied to represent the size of the article in column inches (one number).  
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4. INFLATION EXPECTATIONS OF THE INATTENTIVE 
GENERAL PUBLIC  
4.1. Introduction 
Central banks recognise that they are engaged in strategic interactions with the citizens of 
their countries (their audiences). Central bank communication is crucial to the 
implementation of monetary policy, as it is used to build credibility, manage citizens‟ 
inflation expectations and improve coordination between the actions of the central bank and 
the citizens, which is mutually beneficial. However, the central bank‟s audience has almost 
always been treated as a single group, and empirical research in South Africa has focused 
solely on the interaction of the SARB with the financial markets. In line with chapter 3, this 
chapter divides the central bank‟s audience into the broad public and its political 
representatives on one side, and the financial markets on the other. It turns to the ultimate 
recipients of the SARB‟s communication, the general public, and studies the process by 
which the inattentive general public form their inflation expectations in South Africa. 
This chapter extends the literature by conducting a formal, comprehensive analysis of the 
characteristics of the South African general public as an audience distinct from the financial 
markets. No attention has previously been devoted in the literature to understanding the non-
financial market segment of the SARB‟s audience. This does not suggest that researchers 
believe that the general public‟s behaviour is very similar to that of the financial markets, or 
that the impact of their behaviour is negligible and not worth studying. Instead, it reflects 
challenges such as the lack of relevant, high-frequency asset prices that incorporate the 
inflation expectations of the general public. 
 It is impractical to attempt to incorporate the full range of inflation expectations within a 
single economic model. However, it does seem beneficial to identify the main characteristics 
of broad groups of the central bank‟s audience that are likely to affect the way the central 
bank‟s communication is received and interpreted, and to tailor communication to these 
distinct groups. This chapter focuses on the process by which the general public forms their 
inflation expectations. Insight into this process will offer two important benefits – it will 
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enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, and provide microfoundations to improve the 
modelling of the Phillips curve and enrich monetary policy analysis. 
Firstly, a better understanding of the process by which the inattentive general public, who are 
responsible for the majority of the price setting behaviour in South Africa, form their 
expectations will improve the SARB‟s ability to communicate effectively with them and to 
influence their inflation expectations. Successful communication is essential both to enhance 
the effectiveness of monetary policy and to build public support for the institutional 
framework within which monetary policy is implemented.  
Secondly, an improved understanding of the microfoundations of aggregate inflation 
expectations will enable better-quality modelling of the South African Phillips curve and 
advance policy analyses. For monetary policymakers, the benefits of improved modelling of 
the Phillips curve and insight into the microeconomic foundations of its dynamics are 
unquestionable. These would improve their ability to explain the time-varying effects of 
monetary policy on inflation and output, and thereby assist the implementation of monetary 
policy. The “inexorable and mysterious trade-off between inflation and unemployment” 
(Mankiw, 2001: 45) is fundamental to our understanding of monetary policy. It is impossible 
to explain the business cycle without it, and there is broad consensus that there is a trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment in the short run, but not in the long run, so any 
reasonable model of the economy should strive to capture these features.  
4.2. The inattentive general public 
Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and Jansen (2008) review the literature on the 
contribution of central bank communication to the successful implementation of monetary 
policy and suggest some areas where further research is required. In the closing paragraph, 
they identify the need to research the role of the general public as a separate audience with 
whom a central bank is communicating.  
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“Finally, virtually all the research to date has focused on central bank 
communication with the financial markets. It may be time to pay some attention to 
communication with the general public. Admittedly, studying communication with 
the general public will pose new challenges to researchers – not least because the 
financial market prices will be less relevant. But the issues are at least as important. 
In the end, it is the general public that gives the central bank its legitimacy, and 
hence their independence.” 
         (Blinder et al., 2008: 47) 
Blinder et al. (2008) stress the importance of studying the communication of the central bank 
with the general public, despite the difficulty of doing so. The inflation expectations of this 
group have a substantial effect on the ability of monetary policymakers to achieve low and 
stable inflation. Literature from the field of behavioural economics is used in this section to 
improve our understanding of the incentives facing the inattentive general public and their 
behaviour under these conditions. Next, we begin to explore the implications for modelling 
inflation expectations.  
4.2.1. Rational inattention 
Proponents of behavioural economics have long contested the use of the standard utility 
maximising agent model adopted by mainstream economics. They argue that the amount and 
quality of information that rational economic man is assumed to possess, and the clear and 
stable set of preferences used to describe his utility are unrealistic. In addition, they question 
the ability of rational economic man to evaluate the range of options available to him and 
calculate which will enable him to optimise his utility, given his preferences and budget 
constraint (Simon, 1955, 1956). In essence, behavioural economists criticise mainstream 
economists for ignoring the limits to economic man‟s knowledge and computational ability.  
Proponents of the standard model respond by arguing that the assumption of rationality does 
not suggest that people are fully able to perform optimisation calculations for every decision 
they make. People do not know the future with certainty. Rather, they propose that people‟s 
expectations and behaviour will be guided by their best guesses, based on all the information 
they have available to them. They will also avoid systematic errors, which are predictable and 
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costly (Klamer, 1984). Rational expectations can be viewed as an analytical condition that 
excludes these systematic errors, rather than an assumption that economic man has perfect 
knowledge and computational ability. However, the debate surrounding the validity of 
rational expectations and its implications has not been settled yet.  
The reality is that monetary economists require a pragmatic approach to making policy 
recommendations while the theoretical debate continues. Monetary policy makers need to 
make important policy decisions now, despite the lack of consensus. Whatever one‟s 
ideological view, it is difficult to deny that sensible monetary policy must account for the 
formation of expectations, 27  and it is, by definition, not possible to model „irrational 
expectations‟. Rational expectations models do not fully explain the complexity of individual 
decisions, but the assumption does provide a way to incorporate expectations into the model 
when decisions are made in a dynamic setting. A compromise such as using the standard 
rational models, modified or extended to account for the limitations of human ability that 
behavioural economics has highlighted, seems like a reasonable way to address the pressing 
questions asked by applied macroeconomic research. 
It is argued here that an examination of Simon‟s concept of bounded rationality shows that 
this compromise does not require a substantial concession on the part of the behavioural 
economists. Among the critics of the standard view, Herbert Simon takes a prominent place. 
He did not try to replace „rational‟ economic man with an „irrational‟ economic man. His aim 
was instead to redefine economic man as an agent that is still essentially rational, but who is 
limited in some way, such as having limited information or computational ability (Simon, 
1955, 1956).  
Behavioural economists have offered numerous examples of deviations from the standard 
model, which Della Vigna (2007) divides into three broad groups: non-standard preferences, 
non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-making. The concept of rational inattention 
falls into the third group – non-standard decision-making. Rationally inattentive agents 
recognise that gathering and processing information is costly, so they make rational decisions 
to limit the amount of time and money they allocate to the task (Della Vigna, 2007; Birchler 
and Bϋtler, 2007).  
                                                 
27 There is broad consensus that monetary policy affects the economy with long and variable lags, so monetary policy must 
be forward-looking.   
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Monetary models are continually being extended to improve their explanation of monetary 
policy‟s impact on the economy. These extensions have especially tried to grapple with 
uncertainty and learning. A great deal of research is going into explaining deviations from 
instantaneous market clearing and the assumption of perfect rationality. The Keynesian 
explanation for temporary deviations from market clearing, used extensively to estimate New 
Keynesian Phillips curves (NKPCs), is that prices are sticky as it is costly to adjust them 
(Calvo, 1983). Other leading explanations include Lucas‟s (1972) signal extraction problem 
and the learning literature (Sargent, 1993; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001; and others).  
In this chapter, the behavioural economics concept of rational inattention is used to modify 
the standard models, with the objective of modelling the actual data more accurately. The aim 
of adopting a different model is to improve our description of the process by which inflation 
expectations are formed, in order to overcome some of the troubling weaknesses of current 
macroeconomics models, which will be explored further on.  
At this point, it is important to distinguish the connotations of the term „rational inattention‟ 
as used by the behavioural economists from that used in the monetary literature. In the 
behavioural economics literature, rational inattention refers to a deviation from the standard 
rational expectations model, and it acknowledges that due to the costs involved in accessing 
and processing information, it is rational for economic agents to limit the time and resources 
devoted to the task.  
In the monetary literature, two new forms of incomplete information have been developed to 
introduce rigidity into the monetary models. Christopher Sims (2005, 2007) has adopted ideas 
from engineering communications theory to model his suggestion that people have limited 
capacity to process and transmit information. In his models, economic agents have partial 
information (they receive noisy information), and he calls this „rational inattention‟. Although 
Sims‟ rational inattention is intuitively appealing, the technical challenge of incorporating it 
into macroeconomic and financial models is substantial. Sims himself describes its progress 
as „modest‟ (Sims, 2010: 38), although he remains positive about its future potential. 
In contrast, Reis (2004) adopted the term „inattentiveness‟ to describe his modelling of 
economic agents who have delayed information because they have many competing needs 
that they devote their time and resources to, and who optimally choose to update their 
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information only sporadically. This form of incomplete information was used by Mankiw and 
Reis (2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2007) in their „sticky information Phillips curve‟ (SIPC) models, 
which were developed as an alternative to sticky price models. Far more progress has been 
made in incorporating „inattentiveness‟ into macroeconomic models than Sims‟s „rational 
inattention‟. Mankiw and Reis (2007) had already offered a DSGE model in 2007, in which 
information about prices, wages and consumption are all sticky (pervasive stickiness) rather 
than only price information. Following the earlier argument that policy decisions cannot wait 
for perfect theory or models, and given the applied nature of this study, Mankiw and Reis‟s 
„inattentiveness‟ will be adopted in this chapter. The aim is to provide microfoundations for 
the estimation of the South African SIPC.  
Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2001b) claim that sticky information is more consistent than 
rational expectations with mainstream views about the actual dynamics of the 
macroeconomic variables inflation and unemployment. The idea of inattentiveness also has 
intuitive appeal in the South African context. Ehlers and Steinbach (2010) investigated the 
expectation formation processes of different economic groups in South Africa. They found 
that the groups neither employed fully rational nor fully adaptive behaviour. Rather, the 
different groups appeared to adopt different combinations of rational and adaptive behaviour, 
which Ehlers and Steinbach (2010: abstract) describe as „non-homogenous learning‟. The 
characteristics of South Africa‟s inattentive general public are explored further in section 2.2 
before the theory is formalised in section 3. This chapter focuses on using inattentiveness as 
an alternative explanation for the non-homogenous formation of inflation expectations by 
different groups in the South African economy, in an attempt to address the concerns raised 
by Mankiw (as discussed in section 3).  
4.2.2. South Africa’s inattentive general public  
A comparison of the inflation expectations of the financial markets with those of the general 
public presented in section 4.1 and represented visually in Figure 4.1 (in section 4.4) in that 
section shows that the inflation expectations of these two groups converged under stable 
economic conditions and were particularly highly correlated between 2005 and mid-2008. It 
can be argued that under these conditions the inattentive public considers the costs of actively 
searching for and processing information greater than the benefits, as Cukierman (2007) 
suggested. However, the economic and political contexts within which monetary policy is 
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implemented in South Africa (and indeed worldwide) has become more volatile in recent 
years, and the inflation expectations of the two groups diverged after mid-2008. It is even less 
appropriate now to focus exclusively on the financial market‟s perceptions of the central 
bank‟s communications.  
Over the past few years, the South African economic environment has exerted pressure on the 
inattentive public. Rising interest rates between mid-2006 and mid-2008, rapid increases in 
food and energy prices, and the impact of the global financial crisis are some of the main 
sources of this pressure. An implication of the heightened uncertainty and economic burden 
on the inattentive public is that the benefits of actively participating in the monetary policy 
debate are rising relative to the costs.  
Concurrent political power struggles within the African National Congress (ANC), beginning 
with the dramatic resignation28 of former South African president Thabo Mbeki, and an 
apparent shift in power within the ruling ANC toward the left have added to the uncertainty 
in the economic environment. These political shifts have led to substantial lobbying to change 
the monetary policy framework. The New Growth Plan, which was announced on 26 October 
2010, gives credence to these concerns, as it explicitly calls for looser monetary policy. 
Debate around monetary policy is in itself something that should be encouraged, but 
statements by the opponents of inflation targeting often reflect a misunderstanding of 
monetary policy. In order for the proponents of the current monetary policy framework to 
present their case convincingly amid the increasing political pressure against the system, they 
need to learn to communicate with this audience more effectively. If the case for inflation 
targeting (and prudent monetary policy in general) is going to be made successfully, and 
monetary policy is going to be effective in a climate of increased public awareness, policy 
makers need to understand the inattentive general public. It would be useful to explore how 
this audience assimilates information about monetary policy and how the SARB can improve 
its communication with them.  
This issue should be viewed within the context of a wider and older concern, which Arthur 
Burns in 1979 dubbed „the anguish of central banking‟. Burns lamented the failure of central 
banks to control inflation in the 1970s, despite the fact they had both the tools and the desire 
                                                 
28 Pressure was put on Thabo Mbeki from within the ANC to resign as president of South Africa before the end of his term.  
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to do so. He argued that “worldwide philosophic and political trends” (Burns, 1979: 15) since 
the Great Depression had limited the „practical capacity‟ for the central banks to limit 
inflation. Similarly, in research considering whether a strict policy rule could ensure the 
credibility of monetary policy, Ferguson and Schularick (2008) concluded that „economic and 
political instability‟ in poor economies undermined the credibility of the countries‟ 
commitment to the strict policy rule. Using the gold standard as a natural experiment, they 
created a large new dataset to investigate the extent to which industrial and developing 
countries had been able to build credibility under the strict monetary rule. They found that 
industrialised countries were much more successful in this regard because they were less 
vulnerable to political and economic shocks, and the markets had less reason to be concerned 
that the monetary policy rule would be abandoned.  
In both the case of the inflation of the 1970s and the gold standard, it appears that the 
unfavourable political environment limited the freedom of policy makers to use the tools at 
their disposal. This highlights an even broader scope for communication as a modern 
monetary policy tool. If a central bank can build credibility in the minds of the electorate, it 
will face less opposition.  
The intuition presented in section 4.2 will be formalised in the following section by 
presenting a theoretical model to capture these ideas.  
4.3. Modelling the inflation expectations of the inattentive general public 
Mankiw (2001: 52) laments that the NKPC “cannot come even close to explaining the 
dynamic effects of monetary policy on inflation and output”. He identifies three empirical 
findings that he believes highlight its failure. The NKPC predicts that when monetary policy 
is fully credible, a disinflation can cause an economic boom, which is at odds with 
experience; and it does not generate the inflation persistence that we observe in reality. But 
Mankiw argues that it is the implausible impulse response functions that illustrate the 
weakness of the NKPC most clearly. They are not able to simultaneously capture two things 
on which there is wide consensus within monetary economics – that monetary policy has a 
temporary effect on employment and a delayed and gradual effect on inflation. Mankiw and 
Reis‟s (2001) proposal to model economic agents as „inattentive‟ stems from their frustration 
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with the inability of the NKPC to adequately represent the monetary transmission 
mechanism. 
Although a substantial amount of research has been dedicated to modelling a Phillips curve 
that explains the observed data well, most of this effort has been focused on modifying or 
extending the NKPC. Mankiw (2001) argues that these modifications do not solve the 
underlying deficiencies of the model in a satisfactory manner. For example, to introduce 
inflation persistence, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) added some backward-looking expectations, 
which are not grounded in solid theoretical foundations.  
Instead, Mankiw and Reis (2001) proposed that the Phillips curve be modelled using sticky 
information rather than sticky prices. They proposed that sticky information was the result of 
the fact that the general public are inattentive to short-term changes in inflation and that they 
only update their inflation expectations periodically. However, they did not formalise their 
proposed microfoundations.  
Research by Roberts (1997) did focus some attention on the microeconomic reasons for the 
failure of the NKPC to explain observations of the economy. He argues that there are two 
deviations from the standard New Keynesian model, either of which provides a way to 
address the problematic „disinflationary boom‟ prediction. Roberts refers to past studies 
(Phelps, 1978; Taylor, 1983; Ball‟ 1991; Fuhrer and Moore, 1992, 1995) which show that a 
sticky price model does not guarantee sticky inflation. As discussed earlier, it is possible in a 
New Keynsian model for an increase in inflation to have no impact on output, if the central 
bank is credible. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) showed that the assumption of sticky inflation was 
able to explain the observed data better than that of sticky prices (conditional on rational 
expectations). However, Roberts (1997) argues that similar results can be achieved by 
assuming sticky prices and imperfectly rational expectations. He evaluates these two 
hypotheses and concludes that it is preferable to adjust the assumption of rational exceptions 
(1997), because survey evidence shows that inflation is not sticky and supports the hypothesis 
that inflation expectations are less than perfectly rational.  
Building on this survey-based evidence of Roberts that expectations are less than rational 
(1997, 1998) and the claims of Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2001b) that the sticky information 
models better explain some of the macroeconomic dynamics, Carroll (2001, 2003) proposed a 
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way to represent the microfoundations of the aggregate behaviour that the SIPC models are 
producing. He adopted epidemiological models, particularly for their approach to studying 
the spread of contagious diseases, to represent the dissemination of information about 
inflation throughout a population of economic agents.  
According to Carroll (2001, 2003), of the entire audience with which the central bank 
communicates, only the professional forecasters (which constitute a small fraction of the 
public) form their own expectations. The rest of the public form their expectations based on 
the media‟s explanation of the professional forecasts. In effect, Carroll proposes that the 
manner in which the inattentive general public collect information about monetary policy can 
be modelled in the same probabilistic manner as people in a population contract a contagious 
disease. An epidemiological model is employed in this chapter to capture the actual 
behaviour of the inflation expectations of the inattentive general public in South Africa. 
4.3.1. Theoretical model 
In line with Carroll (2001, 2003), a „common source‟ epidemiological model was adopted, 
which relies on the following assumptions. A person has a fixed probability of contracting a 
disease if exposed to it for a given period, and once infected, he or she never recovers. In 
addition, the „common source‟ assumption implies that the disease is caught from a common 
source (such as a central air conditioner in a building), so the people in contact with this 
source have a constant probability of catching the disease. Carroll assumes that the inattentive 
public update their inflation and unemployment expectations periodically based on exposure 
to newspapers which report the expectations of the professional forecasters. The common 
source of information is the professional forecast reported in the newspapers, and information 
is transmitted though the economy in a sluggish fashion, based on the probability that people 
adjust their inflation expectations to align with the professional forecasts.  
We assume that in each period t, each member of the general public (called a price setter in 
the model29) i, has a probability ℷ, of being exposed to the relatively more rational inflation 
                                                 
29 In the model, members of the general public are referred to as the price setters, to reflect that this group consists of the 
majority of the public (it excludes only the financial market), including the business sector that sets the prices of goods and 
services, and labour that influences the price of wages. 
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expectations of the financial analysts30, via a media report. Conversely, each price setter faces 
a probability (1-ℷ) of not being exposed to this information and therefore retaining his or her 
inflation expectations from period (t-1). The mean inflation expectations of the price setters 
as a group in time t are determined by the mean inflation expectations of the financial 
analysts in time t and the weighted average of past inflation expectations of the price setters, 
as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( ){ }...+λ λ-1+λ λ-1+λ= ππππ e.PS2-te.PS1-te.FAte.PSt    … (4.1) 
π
e.PS
t  and π
e.FA
t  represent the mean inflation expectations of price setters and of financial 
market participants respectively, for the following year, beginning at time t. Intuitively, 
equation 4.1 states that the current mean of the expected inflation of price setters for the 
following year is equal to the mean current newspaper forecast for that period and the 
weighted average forecasts of the price setters for the same period, as forecast in previous 
periods. The probability that price setters in time t will update their inflation expectations to 
that of the financial analysts for the same period is captured by coefficient ℷ. In this simple 
model, all price setters who update their inflation expectations to those of the financial 
analysts keep them constant at the level they expected at the start of the period, so there is a 
probability (1-ℷ) that price setters maintain their expectations from the previous period.  
This model could be extended to capture other sources of inflation information, such as 
media reports of past inflation figures or social interaction between price setters. The 
empirical results presented further on in this chapter support the view that past inflation does 
play a significant role in the formation of inflation expectations of the general public in South 
Africa (OECD, 2010). When past inflation is added to equation 4.1, there is a probability, ℷ, 
that the price setters will align (update) their inflation expectations to those of the financial 
analysts. If not, there is a probability, δ, that they will be exposed to information about past 
inflation and will align their inflation expectations to this figure and a probability, (1-δ), that 
that they will retain their inflation expectations from period t-1.   
                                                 
30 Ehlers and Steinbach (2010) found that the inflation expectations of the financial analysts are more rational than those of 
the business sector or the trade unions.  
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Given this description of the process by which price setters update their inflation expectations 
with information from the financial analysts (via newspapers) and past inflation figures, it is 
possible to estimate the speed at which they update their expectations. Rearranging the 
equations into the error correction form is a natural way to isolate information stickiness from 
the speed of adjustment coefficient, which is employed for the empirical estimation in section 
6. The speed of adjustment parameter, ℷ, which lies between 0 and 1, is used throughout this 
chapter to represent information stickiness. It captures the speed at which the price setters 
update their inflation expectations or the proportion of price setters who update their inflation 
expectations each period. Therefore, a value of ℷ close to 1 represents a small degree of 
information stickiness, whereas a value close to 0 represents a large degree of information 
stickiness. 
4.4. The data 
The dataset comprises four series: inflation, past inflation, the inflation expectations of 
financial analysts and the inflation expectations of price setters. The data is at a quarterly 
frequency and the small sample size of 40 observations (2000Q3 – 2010Q2) is limited by the 
availability of inflation expectations data. The Bureau for Economic Research (BER) began 
conducting inflation expectations surveys for the SARB from September 2000, with the 
objective of providing information for the implementation of inflation targeting, and there is 
no comparable inflation expectations data for the general public obtained before this survey.  
Following an announcement by the Minister of Finance in October 2008, the SARB began, in 
January 2009, to use the CPI rather than the CPIX as its official proxy for inflation31 . 
Between 2005 and 2008 steps had been taken to improve the CPI basket, and by 2009 it was 
deemed to be the most comprehensive measure of the cost of living in South Africa and a 
more appropriate official proxy of inflation (Statistics South Africa, 2009a; Statistics South 
Africa, 2009b). The changes made to the CPI included routine adjustments to reflect changes 
with respect to expenditure patterns, technology and tastes, but they also reflected a change in 
the way in which the costs of accommodation were recorded. In its previous form, the CPI 
                                                 
31 Various measures of the cost of living are calculated each month (for example CPI, CPIX and PPI). These are used as 
proxies for inflation, but the SARB recognises that inflation is not perfectly captured by any one price index and considers a 
number of them when making policy decisions (Mohr, 2008).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
included interest rates on mortgage bonds, whereas in its new form, it adopts „owners‟ 
equivalent rent‟, which accounts for the rent foregone when a person lives in the house he or 
she owns. In this study, the focus is on inflation itself, and the series used as a proxy consists 
of the CPIX up to the end of 2008 and the CPI thereafter, which can be viewed as the 
„targeted price index‟.  
As a consequence of this change, the BER surveyed the expectations of the CPIX up to the 
end of 2008 and the CPI thereafter. However, it is argued here that both actual inflation and 
the inflation expectations series can be treated as continuous variables (expectations of the 
targeted price index), and this need not be treated as a structural break. This proposition was 
tested by visual inspection of the series (Figure 4.1), stability tests (CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
tests) conducted on the models used later in the chapter, as well as by comparisons of the 
results of regressions that include only the sample up to the change of target variable32. This 
assumption does not appear to bias the results of this study.  
The model variables are constructed so that each has a constant horizon of one year. Using a 
combination of the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletins and the Statistics South 
Africa CPI series, a real-time33 inflation series with a horizon of one year was constructed. 
Each observation of the inflation series represents targeted inflation from time t to t+4. 
Similarly, the past inflation series is a series of real-time observations of past inflation from 
periods t-1 to t-5.  
The inflation expectations series had to be manipulated to have a constant horizon of 1 year. 
The BER administers the inflation expectations surveys of three economic groups – financial 
analysts, business representatives and trade unions. Each quarter, members of each of these 
groups are asked to predict what they expect annual inflation to be in the current year, the 
following year, and the year after that. Therefore, the horizons of the predictions change from 
quarter to quarter, and the inflation expectations with a 1-year horizon had to be constructed 
                                                 
32 These results are available in Table A4.2 in appendix 4.2. 
33 To provide a more accurate representation of the economic decisions at the time, the data actually available in each period 
was collected. Final series for inflation, for example, those available on the SARB‟s website, have often been revised as 
more information became available. To ensure that the real-time data was considered, the series were constructed by 
referring to the original CPI and CPIX data releases by STATSA, rather than to a final series.  
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from the original survey data 34 . These constant, 1-year horizon series are illustrated in 
Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: Inflation and inflation expectations
 
 
From Figure 4.1, it is clear that inflation leads the two inflation expectations series. It is 
interesting to note that the two inflation expectations series differ at the beginning of the 
sample (when inflation targeting was adopted) and slowly converge thereafter until they meet 
in mid-2005. They moved in concert between mid-2005 and mid-2008, and diverged again as 
economic pressures built domestically and the impact of the global financial crisis was felt. 
During times of uncertainty and economic instability, reliance on the inflation expectations of 
the financial analysts alone is a poor description of the inflation expectations of the broad 
South African public.  
4.4.1. Stationarity of the series 
Before conducting any regression analyses the stationarity of the data series was investigated. 
Unfortunately, the small sample size available made it difficult to reach conclusions about the 
stationarity of the series. The augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP) tests 
were used first, but the results were mixed (Table 4.1a). The ADF test is known to have low 
power, and the PP does not perform well in small samples (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). 
                                                 
34 Crucially, in Q1 respondents are asked to forecast a larger proportion of the current year than in Q3 – the horizons of the 
forecasts change over the year. In order to construct a series with a constant one-year horizon, each quarter, a fraction of the 
current year is added to a fraction of the following year, depending on the quarter in which the survey is being conducted. 
For example, the one-year forecast in Q3 (for which the field work is conducted in August) consists of 25% of the current 
year‟s forecast and 75% of the following year‟s forecast. 
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Therefore Dickey Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF GLS) and Ng-Perron tests were 
selected as they perform relatively better in small samples. These tests delivered robust 
results, suggesting that all the data series are stationary (Table 4.1b).  
Table 4.1a: Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips Perron tests for data stationarity 
Variables 
ADF PP 
Levels 
First 
difference 
Levels 
First 
difference 
Second 
difference 
 -2.531 -4.278*** -1.758 -4.103 ***  
 -1.883 -3.930 *** -1.637 -3.930 ***  
 -3.133 **  -1.830 -3.771 ***  
 -3.577 ***  -1.744 -2.197 -3.795 *** 
Note: Intercept, no trend. ***, ** and * indicate that the statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The first column for each test shows the results of the test in levels. When this first statistic is insignificant, the 
result of the test in first differences is shown in the second column, and in second differences in the third 
column.  
Table 4.1b: Dickey Fuller GLS and Ng-Perron tests for data stationarity 
 DF-GLS 
Ng-Perron 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
Inflation -2.444** Reject Reject Reject Reject 
FA -1.884* Reject Reject Reject Reject 
PS -2.796 *** Reject(5-10%) Reject(5-10%) Reject(5-10%) Reject(5-10%) 
Past infl -2.668 *** Reject Reject Reject Reject 
Note: Intercept, no trend. ***, ** and * indicate that the statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The first column for each test shows the results of the test in levels. When this first statistic is insignificant, the 
result of the test in first differences is shown in the second column. 
These stationarity test results should be considered in the context of a long debate in the 
literature about whether inflation is stationary. Juselius (2006) warns against treating 
stationarity as a property of a variable, but as a sample property instead. She suggests 
modelling inflation as an I(1) variable to allow the persistent and less persistent components 
of the variables to be identified by the technique. These conflicting results for the unit root 
tests are taken into account when selecting the modelling techniques in for the formal 
analysis that follows in sections 5 and 6.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100 
4.5. The dissemination of inflation information 
Before attempting to estimate information stickiness, it is sensible to establish whether 
inflation information disseminates from the economy to the financial analysts to the price 
setters as hypothesised. This is necessary to justify the adoption of epidemiological models to 
represent the spread of inflation information. Visual inspection of the inflation and inflation 
expectations series in Figure 4.1 shows that adjustments in the inflation series are followed 
by similar but lagged adjustments to the inflation expectations of the financial analysts, 
followed by those of the price setters.  
A simple contemporaneous pairwise correlation matrix also offers insight into the degree to 
which these different data series „share information‟. Two features stand out. Firstly, the 
results in the top row of Table 4.2 reveal that the contemporaneous inflation expectations of 
financial analysts correlate with actual inflation to a much greater extent (0.684) than the 
inflation expectations of price setters do (0.400). Secondly, the contemporaneous correlation 
between the inflation expectations of financial analysts and price setters is strong (0.774).  
Table 4.2: Contemporaneous pairwise correlation matrix 
 Inflation Price Setters Financial Analysts 
Inflation 1.000 0.400 0.684 
Price Setters 0.400 1.000 0.774 
Financial Analysts 0.684 0.774 1.000 
Granger causality tests (Table 4.3) were used to investigate whether adjustments in one of the 
variables was informative about the likely future movements in the other variable. Although 
Granger causality does not prove that movements in the first variable induced particular 
movements in the second, it does show that they happened prior to and helped to forecast 
changes in the second. The hypothesis that the inflation expectations of price setters do not 
Granger cause the inflation expectations of financial analysts cannot be rejected for either 2 
or 3 lags, and it is marginal for 1 lag. In contrast, the hypothesis that the inflation 
expectations of financial analysts do not Granger cause the inflation expectations of price 
setters is rejected at the 5% level of significance for lag lengths 1 to 3.  
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Table 4.3: Granger causality tests 
Hypothesis  Probability 
(1 lag) 
Probability 
(2 lags) 
Probability 
(3 lags) 
 does not Granger cause  0.088 0.724 0.584 
 does not Granger cause   0.000 0.011 0.025 
Therefore, exploratory data analysis provides preliminary evidence that there is „shared 
information‟ between the three series and that changes in inflation tend to occur first, 
followed by similar adjustments in the inflation expectations of the financial analysts, 
followed by those of the price setters; hence, changes in the inflation expectations of financial 
analysts do help to predict changes in those of the price setters. 
Finally, an examination of the forecasting accuracy of the two inflation expectations series 
can provide insight into which group is better able to use successfully the information they 
have at their disposal. The aim is not to test the rationality of the inflation expectations series, 
but rather to determine which is relatively more rational.  
One way of evaluating the precision of the forecasts is by minimising the root mean squared 
error (RMSE) (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). This criterion compares the forecasted series 
with the actual series and allows the researcher to compare the ability of the two inflation 
expectations series to predict inflation. The RMSE is lower for the inflation expectations of 
the financial analysts than for the price setters, suggesting that financial analysts forecast with 
greater precision (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: RMSE 
 RMSE 
 1.70 
 2.16 
In conclusion, financial analysts not only adjust their inflation expectations quicker, but more 
accurately than price setters. None of the exploratory data analyses discredit the proposed 
hypothesis about the spread of inflation information through the economy.  
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4.6. Information stickiness 
In this section, South African survey data is applied to an epidemiological model, to estimate 
how quickly South African price setters update their inflation expectations. This provides an 
estimate of information stickiness.  
A correlation matrix (Table 4.5) is again adopted to examine the extent to which the inflation 
expectations of financial analysts, the inflation expectations of price setters and past inflation 
share information. We established in the previous section that there is a strong correlation 
between the inflation expectations of the financial analysts and the price setters, so what is 
interesting in this matrix is the exploration of the relationship between past inflation (average 
realised inflation over the past year) and each inflation expectations series (inflation 
expectations for the following year). This provides a first indication of the extent to which the 
inflation expectations of the group is backward-looking versus the degree to which the group 
looks to other (unspecified) sources of information to form its views.  
Table 4.5: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 Financial Analysts Price Setters Past Inflation 
Financial Analysts 1.000 0.772 0.585 
Price Setters 0.772 1.000 0.927 
Past Inflation 0.585 0.927 1.000 
The correlation between past inflation and the financial analysts is 0.585 and that between 
past inflation and the price setters is 0.927, which indicates that price setters rely to a much 
greater extent on past inflation than financial analysts do. By deduction, financial analysts use 
sources of information other than past inflation to a greater extent in the formation of their 
expectations. These correlations also suggest that it is important to include past inflation in a 
regression that attempts to explain the inflation expectations of the price setters, as will be 
done in the following section.  
4.6.1. Regression analysis 
Carrol (2002, 2003) estimated information stickiness for the US as approximately 0.27, using 
single equation models of the form implied by the epidemiological models he had proposed. 
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This allowed him to test restrictions using Wald tests such as  + -  =1, in order to 
examine the ability of the model to explain the actual data. His results were supportive of the 
model. Table 4.6, below, offers a brief summary of Carroll‟s (2001, 2003) results, based on 
the following equation: 
t1-t3
e.PS
1-t2
e.FA
t10
e.PS
t ε+πβ+πβ+β+β= ππ      … (4.2) 
Table 4.6: Carroll‟s (2001) estimation of information stickiness for the US 
Equation β0 β 1 β 2 β 3  
Durbin 
Watson 
Std Err 
Test 
p-value 
1  0.36*** 0.66***  0.76 1.97 0.43 
β 1+ β 2=1 
0.178 
2  0.27*** 0.73***  0.76 2.12 0.43 
β 1=0.25 
0.724 
3 1.26*** 0.50*** 0.25** 0.01 0.84 1.72 0.35 
β 3=0 
0.814 
NOTE: The results in this table correspond to equation 4.2 in the text above. Columns 2-5 report the coefficient 
values for different versions of the equation, and *** and ** indicate that these coefficients are significant at the 
1% and 5% levels. Columns 6-8 report some diagnostics for each model, and column 9 the results of Wald tests 
(with the relevant p-values in brackets). 
Starting with model 1 (row 1 of Table 4.6), Carroll estimated the proportion of the inflation 
expectations of price setters in period t that could be explained by the inflation expectations 
of the financial analysts in period t, and the proportion explained by their own inflation 
expectations in the previous period. The sum of coefficients β1 and β2 is close to 1, and the 
Wald test conducted to test this formally (reported in the final column) cannot be rejected. 
Given these promising results, Carroll restricted the sum of the 2 coefficients to 1 and re-
estimated the equation, which yielded an estimate of 0.27 for information stickiness. He also 
tested whether the inclusion of a constant and past inflation improved the fit of the model and 
found that only the constant had important explanatory power. He interpreted this as a sign 
that social interaction between price setters was important in the formation of their inflation 
expectations, while past inflation was not.  
However, Carroll did not report any tests of weak exogeneity or comprehensive model 
diagnostics to support the appropriateness of his choice to use a single-equation model. In 
addition, the speed of adjustment (information stickiness) is easy to interpret when there are 
only two regressors (the inflation expectations of financial analysts and those of the price 
setters), but when the model is extended to include past inflation, for example, the speed of 
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adjustment is better estimated directly using a model in the error-correction form. Models of 
the kind used by Carroll were estimated for South Africa and are available in Table A4.1 in 
Appendix 4.1, but there was concern that the model variables were nonstationary, which 
would have undermined the results.  
Peraran et al. (1999) suggested that the error-correction form of the ARDL model offers a 
number of advantages when modelling series that are potentially nonstationary. The ARDL 
method avoids uncertainty surrounding the order of integration of data series, as the variables 
included in the model can be I(0), I(1), or cointegrated (Pesaran et al., 1999), and the method 
allows long-run and short-run components of the data to be estimated simultaneously. 
Peraran et al. (1999) developed the bounds test as a means to test for cointegration within the 
ARDL model, and Narayan (2004) went on to use Pesaran et al.‟s (1999) programming code 
to estimate critical F-statistics for sample sizes between 30 and 80 observations, improving 
the accuracy of the results when using small samples.  
A weakness of the ARDL method is that it assumes by construction that only one variable is 
not weakly exogenous. Therefore, it is vulnerable to the incredible restrictions of which Sims 
(1980) warned. In this regard, the VECM approach is favourable, although relies on 
pretesting. There remains uncertainty about whether the regression variables are I(1) or I(0), 
but it is likely that they are integrated of the same order, given the very similar patterns of the 
series (Figure 4.1), which enable the use of the VECM. In addition, Juselius (2006) 
recommended treating inflation as an I(1) variable, despite the debate in the literature.  
Given the uncertainty about the stationarity of the model variables and whether each is 
weakly exogenous, both the VECM and the ARDL models were used and their results 
compared in order to help identify any lack of robustness. Firstly, the interaction between the 
inflation expectations of price setters and financial analysts was modelled using a VECM 
(model 5 in column 2 of Table 4.7). The Johansen cointegration technique indicated that there 
is one cointegrating relationship, and LR tests concluded that  is weakly exogenous (row 
2). Therefore, only  responded to disequilibrium between the two variables in the 
previous period. The results of the cointegrating equation (the long-run relationship) for 
model 5 (reported in the 4th row) are questionable. This may be the consequence of the fact 
that the VECM suffers from omitted variable bias through the omission of past inflation, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 105 
which according to the exploratory data analysis, plays such a substantial role in explaining 
the inflation expectations of price setters.  
Table 4.7: Weak exogeneity and VECM results 
Model Model 5 Model 6 
Variables  
 
 
 
 
LR test stat  =0:   ℷ = 0.094 
=0:    ℷ = 13.152 
 = 0:    ℷ = 0.608 
 = 0:    ℷ = 0.036 
= 0:  ℷ = 15.776 
 =0:  ℷ =2.478 
 =0: ℷ =4.448 
 =0:  imposed 
Weakly exog 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 (imposed) 
 
   
 
Cointegrating Eq. 
PS(-1) 
FA(-1) 
Past Infl(-1) 
C 
D(PS) 
1.000 
-1.747*** 
NA 
3.493*** 
D(PS) 
1.000 
-0.648*** 
-0.531*** 
-0.367 
Speed of adjustment 
D(PS) 
D(FA) 
D(Past infl) 
 
-0.425*** 
Set to 0.000 
NA 
 
-0.690*** 
Set to 0.000 
Set to 0.000 
Short-run coefficients 
D(PS(-1)) 
D(FA(-1)) 
D(Past Inflation(-1)) 
D(PS(-2)) 
D(FA(-2)) 
 
0.012 
-0.041 
NA 
-0.123 
-0.221 
 
0.218 
0.221 
-0.004 
Model diagnostics 
Observations 
ϰ JB 
LM stat AC(2) 
ϰ stat W,HS 
Q stat PORTMANTEAU(2) 
 
37 
 
0.496 
0.781 
0.804 
0.533 
 
38 
 
0.951 
0.442 
0.534 
0.488 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Values reported in 
the final horizontal section of the table are the p-values of the diagnostic tests.  
Model 5 was then re-estimated in the ARDL-ECM form (column 2 of Table 4.9). Given the 
result from the VECM that  is weakly exogeneous in this model, the ARDL form is well 
justified in this case. In order to estimate the ARDL in its error correction form, which is 
necessary to isolate the speed of adjustment parameter, the long-run equation was estimated 
first (row 2). The coefficient on  is far more reasonable than the coefficient in the 
cointegrating equation of the VECM, despite the fact that past inflation is still not included in 
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the model. The full ECM-ARDL was then employed, where the speed of adjustment 
coefficient, representing information stickiness, was estimated to be 0.311. This estimate 
differs quite substantially from that of the VECM, which raises concern about its robustness. 
The second model used to estimate information stickiness was model 6, which is an extension 
of model 5 in that past inflation was included, prompted by the findings of the exploratory 
data analysis. A single cointegrating relationship was again identified by the Johanssen 
technique, but this time both  and  were classified as weakly exogenous, leaving past 
inflation as the dependent variable. This is not sensible because past inflation is 
predetermined, but in order to check that it was not, the forward-looking nature of inflation 
that was causing the result, past inflation was lagged progressively further into the past, and 
the relationship was retested. It was only after a lag of 6 or 7 quarters that  and started 
to react to changes in past inflation, which is not reasonable.  
Therefore, past inflation was modelled as weakly exogenous and then the other two variables 
were again tested for weak exogeneity, conditional on the weak exogeneity of past inflation. 
In this case,  is weakly exogenous and  is identified as the dependent variable. The 
results for the VECM, estimated under this assumption, are reported in column 3 of 
Table 4.7. The long-run coefficients on  and -  reflect that both these variables play a 
sizeable and significant role in determining  in the long run, and the estimated speed at 
which the inflation expectations of the prices setters was updated is 0.690.  
Döpke et al. (2008) estimated information stickiness for France, Germany, the UK and Italy, 
and found that information stickiness for Italy was between 0.5 and 0.6, while those of the 
other three countries ranged between 0.15 and 0.3. They argued that the level and uncertainty 
of inflation in Italy was much higher than in the other three and that it was therefore 
reasonable to expect inflation expectations to be less anchored. In order to explore this claim, 
OECD inflation data for the period studied by Döpke et al. (2008) was analysed ( 4.8). The 
mean for inflation in Italy is indeed about 50% higher than that of the other three countries in 
the study, although the standard deviation is not higher for the period. However, what are not 
observable from this data are the institutional features of the central banks in each of these 
countries and the level of credibility they have built over time. It is reasonable to suggest that 
in a country where the risks of inflation are greater, it is rational for the general public to pay 
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more attention to developments in inflation and therefore to adjust their inflation expectations 
more rapidly. This reasoning is clearly in line with the higher estimate of information 
stickiness that was found for South Africa. The mean and standard deviation of inflation (for 
the sample period used to estimate South African information stickiness) are both clearly 
much higher than for the other four countries.  
Table 4.8: Comparison of inflation characteristics in France, Germany, UK, 
Italy and South Africa 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
France 1.701 0.621 
Germany 2.094 1.420 
UK 1.990 1.235 
Italy  3.245 1.320 
South Africa 5.495 3.694 
Source: OECD (2011) 
Note: The data sample periods for France, Germany, the UK and Italy is 1991Q4-2004Q4 (in line with the 
Döpke et al. (2008) study), whereas the data for South Africa is for the period 2000Q3-2010Q4. This was done 
in order to use the same data period as that used to estimate the information stickiness for each country.  
Model 6 was then represented in the ARDL-ECM form, the results of which are reported in 
row 3 of Table 4.9. The results of this ARDL model are close to that of the VECM, with the 
speed of adjustment coefficient 0.679, compared with 0.690 from the VECM, and the long-
run coefficient on past inflation was estimated to be only 0.044 higher. However the 
coefficient on  did drop by 0.125, which changed the relative importance of  and -  
in the long run .  
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Table 4.9: ARDL models 
Model Model 5 Model 6 
Variables  
 
 
 
 
Long run Eq 
C 
FA(-1) 
Past Infl(-1) 
(Dep: PS) 
0.671 
1.068*** 
NA 
(Dep: PS) 
- 
0.535*** 
0.575*** 
   
ECM-ARDL 
model 
EC term 
 
D(FA) 
D(Past infl) 
 
 
-0.311*** 
 
0.433*** 
NA 
 
 
-0.685*** 
 
0.544*** 
0.432*** 
Model diagnostics 
Observations 
ϰ JB 
F stat BG,AC 
F stat W,HS 
F stat LM,ARCH 
F stat(1) Ramsey Reset 
 
 
 
 
CUSUM test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUSUMSQ test 
 
39 
 
0.879 
0.244 
0.197 
0.633 
0.176 
 
 
39 
 
0.356 
0.860 
0.028 
0.675 
0.380 
 
Note: The first horizontal section of the table indicates which variables are included in each model; the second 
reports the coefficients in the long-run equation of the ARDL model, and the third reports the results in the final 
ECM-ARDL model. ***, ** and * indicate that these coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Values reported in the final horizontal section of the table are the p-values of the diagnostic tests.  
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A range of diagnostic tests are reported for these ARDL models. The only result which raises 
any concern is that there is heteroskedasticity in model 6. This will not bias the coefficients, 
but will affect the standard errors. The model was re-estimated in two ways to confirm the 
results are still robust. Firstly, HAC standard errors were used and all the coefficients were 
still significant at the 1% level. Secondly, an ARCH model35(see Appendix 4.3 for results) 
was estimated, and the results were very close to those of the ARDL model, confirming that 
the results of ARDL model 6 are robust.  
Modelling inflation expectations using a maximum of 40 survey-based observations is 
challenging. This difficulty was anticipated, and mentioned in the introduction to this chapter 
as the main reason that studies of this nature are limited. The VECM and ARDL models 
above offer reasonable estimates of South African information stickiness, supporting an 
estimate of between 0.65 and 0.70. Finally, agent-based models are used in the following 
section to approach an estimation of sticky information from the opposite direction and to test 
the robustness of these results.  
4.6.2. Agent-based models  
According to Tesfatsion (2006: 863, italics added), “The defining characteristic of ACE 
(agent-based computational economics) models is their constructive grounding in the 
interactions of agents, broadly defined to include economic, social, biological, and physical 
entities.”  Crucially for this study, agent-based models begin at the disaggregated level. Given 
some real-world data, initial conditions for the inflation expectations of the price setters, and 
algorithms to describe their decision-making process, the interaction of the agents yields the 
simulated aggregate economic outcome. The aim of using an agent-based model in this 
chapter was to assess whether the theory proposed to explain the formation of inflation 
expectations by the price setters is able produce an inflation series similar to that observed in 
reality.  
Matlab was used to simulate an inflation expectations series for the price setters in aggregate 
( , as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Beginning at the disaggregated level, 10 000 prices 
setters (i) were created. At time period t=1, each price setter sets his inflation expectations 
                                                 
35 The ARCH model is only reported in Table A4.3 in the appendix as the VECM and ARDL models are more appropriate 
for this study (as discussed in the text).  
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based on the decision rule described in the theoretical model. Each price setter has a 
probability (ℷ) of updating his inflation expectations to those of the financial analysts 
(observed real-world data for the inflation expectations of financial analysts) and a 
probability of (1-ℷ) of retaining his own inflation expectations (the initial conditions set)36. If 
the price setter does not update his expectations to those of the financial analysts, he also has 
a probability δ of adjusting his expectations in line with past inflation (observed real-world 
past inflation data), and a probability (1-δ) of retaining his own inflation expectations from 
the previous period. When a price setter updates his inflation expectations based on past 
inflation, it is assumed that he read the past inflation figures in a newspaper and updated his 
expectations based on this information.  
Once each price setter has made his decision in period 1, the average inflation expectation of 
the 10 000 price setters is calculated, and this becomes the first observation of the simulated 
 series. This is repeated for time periods t=1-40 and yields a simulated series of 
inflation expectations for the price setters in aggregate.  
Figure 4.2: The simulated model 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36  The inflation expectations of individual agents update separately, so the Matlab code keeps track of the inflation 
expectations of each price setter at each period. After the first time period, a decision by a price setter to retain his past 
inflation expectation means that a particular price setter retains the inflation expectation he had in the previous period.  
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The simulated series can then be compared with the observed series to help judge the extent 
to which the theory can model the actual inflation expectations of the price setters that are 
observed.  
The results of the VECM and ARDL models used to estimate information stickiness in 
section 5, were used as a benchmark for setting the values of ℷ and δ used in the decision-
making algorithm of the price setters. Values of 0.37 for ℷ and 0.70 for δ were selected as the 
starting points. The sensitivity of these two parameters were tested by varying the levels of 
each and then a range rather than a point was considered for each in order to test for 
heterogeneity.  
The results of this sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 4.10. In each row, the values of ℷ 
or δ are adjusted. Each row shows the results of the regression of a simulated series of on 
the actual observed  series. The values of ℷ and δ set are reported in columns 2 and 3. The 
estimated coefficient on the actual (true)  in column 4 and the R-squared of the regression 
in column 5 are then used to judge the degree to which the simulated series matches the true 
series.  
However, all the inflation expectations series are integrated of order 1, so there is a 
possibility that the regression results could be spurious. Therefore, the Engel-Granger test 
was used to establish whether the stimulated and actual inflation expectations series in each 
model are cointegrated. The results of this test for each of the models 1 to 10 are presented in 
column 6. Cointegration is found in all 10 models, confirming that the regression results are 
not spurious and allowing further comparison of the models. 
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Table 4.10: Agent-based model results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Models 1-3 test the level of lambda and 4-5 the heterogeneity of lambda. Models 6-8 test the level of 
gamma, and 9-10 the heterogeneity of gamma. Note that model 2 is inserted a second time (between models 7 
and 8) to ease comparison, but the model has not changed in any way.  
Model 2 tested the fit of the simulated series when ℷ was set at 0.37 and δ at 0.7037, and then 
the value of ℷ was adjusted upwards and downward in models 1 and 338. Both the coefficient 
and the R-squared values are very high, suggesting that the simulated series is very close to 
the real series. The move upward to 0.43 delivered a poorer fit, but the adjustment downward 
to 0.31 gave an ambiguous result. In summary, it appears that a value for ℷ of approximately 
0.31 to 0.35 is reasonable. Models 4 and 5 consider the impact of assuming that price setters 
have a narrow and then a wider range of ℷs (heterogeneity). Intuitively, this tests whether an 
assumption that the ℷs of the price setters within a range offers a superior description of their 
inflation expectations. There was no sign of improvement by adding heterogeneity. Next, the 
                                                 
37 ℷ is set at 0.37 as this is midway between the two estimates of the speed of adjustment in model 5, and δ is set at 0.70 as 
both speed of adjustment estimates for model 6 are close to 0.7.  
38 ℷ is adjusted 0.06 upward and downward in order to consider both the VECM and ARDL speed of adjustment estimates 
for model 5 in section 5.  
Model ℷ δ 
Coefficient 
(Actual PS) 
R-squared 
Test for 
cointegration 
 Testing lambda (level)    
1 0.31 0.70 0.915 0.934 Cointegrated 
2 0.37 0.70 0.911 0.937 Cointegrated 
3 0.43 0.70 0.907 0.934 Cointegrated 
 Testing lambda 
(heterogeneity) 
   
4 0.32-0.42 0.70 0.911 0.937 Cointegrated 
5 0.27-0.47 0.70 0.911 0.937 Cointegrated 
 Testing gamma (level)    
6 0.37 0.60 0.906 0.937 Cointegrated 
7 0.37 0.65 0.909 0.938 Cointegrated 
2* 0.37 0.70 0.911 0.937 Cointegrated 
8 0.37 0.75 0.913 0.936 Cointegrated 
 Testing gamma 
(heterogeneity) 
   
9 0.37 0.60-0.80 0.911 0.937 Cointegrated 
10 0.37 0.50-0.90 0.910 0.938 Cointegrated 
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initial level of δ was adjusted upwards and downwards in models 6 to 8. Notice that model 2, 
with the original benchmark values of ℷ and δ, is repeated in this section of the table to 
facilitate comparison. Lowering δ from 0.70 to 0.65 did not offer a clear improvement, but a 
further adjustment to 0.60 reduced the model‟s fit. The adjustment of δ upward produced an 
ambiguous result. In summary, the value of δ appears to be approximately between 0.65 and 
0.70. Finally, models 9 and 10 tested the impact of assuming that price setters have a range of 
different values for δ. Again, even when a high level of heterogeneity is assumed, the results 
were almost unchanged, so the simpler model that does not include this heterogeneity is 
favoured.  
In conclusion, the best estimates from the model are that ℷ is approximately 0.31 to 0.37 and 
δ approximately 0.65 to 0.7. These ranges include the original values selected from the 
VECM and ARDL models and are not wide. Therefore, the agent-based models offer further 
support for the earlier estimates of information stickiness. 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter explores the process by which South African price setters form inflation 
expectations. The aim is to understand this process better in order to communicate effectively 
with the general public as a group separate from financial analysts. Exploratory data analyses 
revealed that financial analysts adjust their inflation expectations quicker and more accurately 
than price setters. Then, survey data was applied to an epidemiological model (following the 
approach of Carroll (2001, 2003)) to model the dissemination of information about inflation 
through the South African economy and estimate information stickiness. Given the 
characteristics of the data and the nature of the research question, a combination of estimates 
of information stickiness from VECM and ARDL models were considered and an estimate of 
between 0.65 and 0.70 was accepted. Finally, agent-based models were adopted to approach 
the estimation of information stickiness from the disaggregated level upward and to test the 
robustness of the results. The agent-based models provided support for the earlier estimates.  
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Appendix 4.1: Single equation model for South Africa 
Table A4.1: Results for single equation models for South Africa 
(based on Carroll, 2001, 2003) 
Eq β0 β 1 β 2 β 3  DW 
Std 
Err 
Test 
p-value 
1  0.418*** 0.649***  0.919 1.727 0.450 β 1+ β 2=1 
(0.000) 
2 -0.317 0.473*** 0.368*** 0.293*** 0.949 1.935 0.374 β 1+ β 2=1 
(0.248) 
β 1+ β 2 +β 3=1 
(0.030) 
β 3=0 
(0.004) 
3  0.444*** 0.309*** 0.336*** 0.945 1.814 0.372  
Note: The results in this table correspond to equation 4.2 in the text. Columns 2-5 report the coefficient values 
for different versions of the equation and *** and ** indicate that these coefficients are significant at the 1% 
and 5% levels. Columns 6-8 report some diagnostics for each model, and column 9 reports the results of Wald 
tests (with the relevant p-values in brackets). 
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Appendix 4.2: ARDL models 
Table A4.2: ARDL models (2000-2008) 
Model Model 5 Model 6 
Variables  
 
 
 
 
Long run Eq 
C 
FA(-1) 
Past Infl(-1) 
(Dep: PS) 
0.273 
1.092*** 
NA 
(Dep: PS) 
NA 
0.603*** 
0.502*** 
   
ECM-ARDL model 
EC term 
 
D(FA) 
D(Past infl) 
 
 
-0.415*** 
 
0.453*** 
NA 
 
 
-0.640*** 
 
0.568*** 
0.429*** 
Model diagnostics 
Observations 
ϰ JB 
F stat BG,AC 
F stat W,HS 
F stat LM,ARCH 
F stat(1) Ramsey Reset 
 
 
 
 
CUSUM test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUSUMSQ test 
 
33 
 
0.928 
0.139 
0.314 
0.721 
0.147 
 
 
33 
 
0.443 
0.418 
0.318 
0.634 
0.276 
 
Note: The first horizontal section of the table indicates which variables are included in each model; the second 
reports the coefficients in the long-run equation of the ARDL model, and the third reports the results in the final 
ECM-ARDL model. ***, ** and * indicate that these coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Values reported in the final horizontal section of the table are the p-values of the diagnostic tests. 
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Appendix 4.3: ARCH model 
Table A4.3: ARCH model 
 Variables Coefficient Values 
Primary Equation D(FA) 
D(Past Infl) 
EC Term (-1) 
0.507*** 
0.445*** 
-0.695*** 
Variance Equation C 
GARCH (-1) 
0.014 
0.909*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that these coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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5. SUMMARY  
5.1. Introduction 
Monetary policy is implemented in a strategic setting, between agents who are responsive to 
one another‟s actions because they impact on one another‟s utility. This mainstream view 
emerged as a result of both developments in the academic literature and practical experience 
since the 1970s. Once the strategic nature of monetary policy was understood, central banks 
were encouraged to become substantially more transparent and to make policy decisions in a 
more predictable manner. Greater predictability enhances coordination between the central 
bank and the public, benefitting both sides. The central bank builds credibility and improves 
the effectiveness of monetary policy, while its audience makes better economic decisions 
given clearer information about monetary policy.   
Recognition of this strategic setting has influenced the modern approach to monetary policy. 
For monetary policy to be effective, it must affect interest rates at all horizons along the yield 
curve in order to influence the full range of economic decisions. Unfortunately, policy 
makers can only directly affect the short-term interest rate. However, the logic of the Fisher 
equation (that the nominal interest rate consists of the real interest rate plus inflation 
expectations) reveals that nominal interest rates can be influenced at longer horizons by 
managing inflation.  
The desire to improve monetary policy effectiveness by managing inflation expectations in 
this strategic setting has promoted the role of communication as a monetary policy tool. An 
extensive literature has resulted, but it has focused mainly on the interaction between central 
banks and the financial markets, with little research dedicated to communication with the 
general public. Although financial analysts do influence the inflation expectations of the rest 
of the private sector, there is potentially considerable scope to improve the central bank‟s 
communication by studying the characteristics of the general public and how they form their 
inflation expectations. This dissertation aims to extend the academic literature by studying 
the communication of the SARB with the general public, who are responsible for the majority 
of the price and wage decisions which determine the inflation rate in the South African 
economy. 
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The general public is presented as being rationally inattentive to central bank communication, 
especially when the economic environment is stable and the central bank is credible, as it is 
costly to gather and interpret information about inflation. Under these circumstances, the 
costs to a member of the general public of processing this information outweigh the benefits. 
However, as the economic environment deteriorates or the central bank loses credibility, the 
benefits for the general public of devoting more resources to this task increase.   
The SARB could benefit in a number of ways from improving its understanding of how its 
communication reaches the general public and impacts on its inflation expectations. This 
would allow the SARB to use communication more effectively to manage the inflation 
expectations of this vital group of price setters, and to build support for the institutional 
framework and prudent monetary policy in general. It was shown in Chapter 3 that under 
unstable economic conditions, the inflation expectations of the general public and financial 
analysts tend to diverge, so an evaluation of the inflation expectations of the financial 
markets is often not an accurate representation of those of the general public. It is precisely in 
these tumultuous periods that there is a great need for the SARB to manage the inflation 
expectations of these price setters in order to limit disruption to the economy. 
Communication, built on a foundation of credibility, is essential to the success of monetary 
policy under these circumstances.   
Another benefit of understanding the communication of the SARB with the general public is 
that it will facilitate better modelling of the microfoundations that underlie some 
macroeconomic relationships. Empirical estimates of the speed at which the general public 
updates its inflation expectations could enhance the modelling of the Phillips curve, which is 
essential to analyses of the impact of monetary policy on inflation and output.   
The communication of the SARB with the inattentive general public was studied in this 
dissertation by focusing on 3 elements of this interaction. The dissertation begins with an 
evaluation of the consistency of the SARB‟s communication (the degree to which its words 
matched its deeds), focusing on the SARB‟s monetary policy statements. Ehrmann and 
Fratzchser (2005) describe consistency of central bank communication as a necessary 
condition for greater predictability of monetary policy. However, even if the communication 
by the SARB is highly consistent, its impact is greatly reduced if its message does not reach 
the audience or is distorted en route. This concern motivated the second part of the 
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dissertation, which investigated the role of the media in transmitting and interpreting the 
SARB‟s communication for the general public. Finally, attention was focused on the manner 
in which the inattentive general public (the final recipients of the communication) form their 
inflation expectations. Epidemiological models were adopted to describe the process by 
which the inattentive general public form their inflation expectations, and to estimate the 
speed at which they update these expectations.  
Collectively, these three components of the study aimed to provide a more comprehensive 
description of the role and effectiveness of the SARB‟s communication with the general 
public in South Africa. The objective was to study the SARB‟s communication with this part 
of its audience as well as to provide the microfoundations for a new approach to modelling 
the Phillips curve, which could potentially describe the observed data more accurately and 
offer better guidance for monetary policy decisions.   
5.2. Loud and clear? Can we hear when the SARB speaks? 
In the area of monetary policy, it is the Reserve Bank that communicates deliberately with its 
various audiences. It was, therefore, logical to start this investigation with the quality of the 
SARB‟s original communication (the monetary policy statements). The South African 
literature has focused on evaluating the predictability of monetary policy (Ballim and 
Moolman, 2005; Aron and Muellbauer, 2006), and on the sensitivity of financial markets to 
macroeconomic surprises (Reid, 2009) as an indication of how well anchored their inflation 
expectations are. These studies have examined the response of the financial markets to the 
actions of the SARB, without isolating the contribution that the SARB‟s communication 
makes to monetary policy effectiveness. In constructing an index to capture the nature of the 
forward-looking communication in the SARB‟s monetary policy statements, this research 
extends the South African literature by concentrating specifically on the SARB‟s 
communication.     
The evaluation in Chapter 2 focused on the consistency of this communication since the 
adoption of inflation targeting. The term consistency was used in this context to describe the 
extent to which the SARB‟s actions matched its words, in the sense that communication 
about the likely future path of monetary policy was followed by compatible monetary policy 
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actions. Consistent communication is essential for building a reputation of credibility for the 
SARB. Credibility, in turn, improves monetary policy effectiveness and encourages support 
for monetary policy institutions as a whole.   
The international literature, which considers the „signal-to-noise ratio‟ of central bank 
communication, proved valuable in assessing the consistency of the SARB‟s communication. 
This literature can be divided into two strands: research into the extent to which a central 
bank „creates news‟ (has an impact on the financial markets), and research into the extent to 
which a central bank „reduces noise‟ (improves the predictability of its policy actions) 
(Blinder et al., 2008). In Chapter 2 the second strand was followed, which allowed the 
researchers to evaluate both the magnitude and direction of the communication.  
To facilitate a formal analysis of the informational content of the SARB‟s communications, a 
subjective numerical index (the policy inclination index) was constructed. Two informed 
analysts independently read the monetary policy statement released at the end of each 
monetary policy committee meeting, and allocated an index value between -2 and 2 to 
describe the inclination toward monetary easing or tightening of the forward-looking 
components of each statement.    
This index, capturing the communications of the SARB, was then compared with the SARB‟s 
actual monetary policy actions to judge the consistency of the communication. An 
exploratory data analysis provided a first indication that the SARB‟s communication was 
consistent. A visual inspection of the evolution of the policy rate and that of the index 
revealed that the two series have similar patterns, but that the actual policy rate clearly lags 
the index.  
Transition matrices, comparing the index in time t with the policy action in time t+1 were 
used to classify each policy decision as strongly consistent, mildly inconsistent or strongly 
inconsistent. The majority of these 60 monetary policy decisions in the sample period were 
classified as strongly consistent, whereas only 2 of the 60 policy decisions were classified as 
strongly inconsistent. One of the instances of strong inconsistency was further excluded 
because STATS SA acknowledged on 12 June 2003 that inflation figures had to be adjusted 
as they had previously been miscalculated.  
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The relationship between the rows and columns of the transition matrices were further 
evaluated using the Pearson test statistic, which tests for independence between the index 
values and subsequent interest rate decisions (i.e. communication and actions). The test 
consistently rejected the null hypothesis of independence, rendering implausible the argument 
that subsequent policy actions were independent from the SARB‟s prior communication over 
the sample period.  
In cases where decisions were identified by the transition matrix as potentially inconsistent, 
the context of the decision was examined by referring to media reports and various forms of 
intermeeting communication available on the SARB‟s website. An important distinction was 
made between inflation surprises, where the SARB‟s deeds did not match its prior words 
because the macroeconomic environment changed and policy makers justifiably responded 
by changing their policy; and policy confusion, where the SARB did not communicate 
clearly.  
Resulting from a total of sixty MPC meetings, twenty policy decisions were identified as 
inconsistent or unexpected. These were individually evaluated by referring to the Reuters 
Econometer forecasts39 and changes in the Bankers‟ Acceptance rates40 which reflect the 
extent to which analysts and the financial markets had correctly predicted the policy 
decisions. Using these criteria, 13 of the 20 decisions were judged not to have been 
considerable surprises in practice. The seven remaining instances of potential policy 
confusion were examined in their contexts by referring to media reports and intermeeting 
communications from the SARB. Three of these were classified as inflation surprises, leaving 
four occasions that were classified as instances of policy confusion. These results suggested 
that the SARB had communicated with considerable consistency. 
The exploratory data analysis was followed by a formal regression analysis. OLS regressions 
of the index on the future changes of the policy rate (repo rate) showed that the index does 
indeed convey information about future changes in the repo rate. Coefficients capturing the 
extent to which the index (communication) corresponds with future policy actions at horizons 
                                                 
39 Reuters conducts a survey each month in which they ask a group of professional economists to forecast a range of 
macroeconomic variables. One of these variables is the policy instrument of the SARB, the repo rate. 
40  The Bankers‟ Acceptance rate is an overnight interest rate. A sudden, large change in this rate following the 
announcement of the policy decision is likely to reveal that the financial markets had not anticipated the decision.  
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of 2 to 6 months were all positive and significant, and the R-squared of the regressions ranges 
between 0.328 and 0.351. An index value of 2 (representing an imminent policy change) was 
associated with an average of 50 basis points after 2 months and 100 basis points after 4 
months. The MPC typically meets every second month, and the most common magnitude of 
the repo rate adjustments is 50 basis points; therefore, these regression results again 
suggested that communications of imminent changes in monetary policy were consistent. 
Substituting dummy variables for a continuous index variable in the regressions also revealed 
that the relationship between the index values was ordinal, not cardinal. Index values of -2, 0 
or 2 were significant, showing that these values conveyed more reliable information than -1 
or 1. The signs of the coefficients for -2 and 2 were as expected, but 0 had a negative 
coefficient, revealing a bias towards using hawkish language.   
This, together with the discrete nature of the outcome variable, „the change in the repo rate‟, 
prompted the use of an ordered probit model to test the robustness of the OLS results. To 
evaluate the predictive ability of the models, type I and II errors were identified. In none of 
the scenarios (when interest rates were increased, decreased, or held constant) were type I 
errors larger than 35% and type II errors larger than 32%, suggesting that the predictive 
ability of the model was reasonable. 
In conclusion, the index was scrutinised in a number of ways, and all these confirmed that the 
communication of the SARB about the likely future path of monetary policy contained 
informational content. The communication of the SARB, which is complex in practice, was 
reduced in this study to a single-figure index. Even this informed simplification of the formal 
communication confirmed that the SARB‟s MPC had succeeded in signalling its likely future 
policy actions with consistency since the advent of inflation targeting. However, in order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the SARB‟s communication, it is necessary to examine both the 
message that the SARB is sending and the message its audience is receiving, which are not 
necessarily equivalent. 
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5.3. Talking to the inattentive public: How the media translates the Reserve 
Bank‟s communications 
For communication to be successful, the message sent must both reach the audience and be 
perceived as trustworthy. Chapter 3 explores the role of the print media in transmitting the 
SARB‟s communication to the general public. Although the SARB uses a range of 
communication tools, including monetary policy statements, monetary policy forums, the 
Monetary Policy Reviews and Quarterly Bulletins designed for different audiences, it is 
argued that very few members of the general public choose to pay attention to this 
communication. Engaging with the SARB‟s communications is costly for the general public 
in terms of time and the specialised skills required to interpret and evaluate them. It is 
therefore rational for the public to be inattentive. They minimise their costs by typically 
turning to the media, which is expected to filter and interpret the communication. The media 
decides what information is important (what news to put on the agenda) and then interprets 
and summarises this information so that it is accessible to non-specialists.   
It follows that the SARB has limited control over the final message that reaches the general 
public. The message they ultimately receive is the result of the strategic interaction between 
the central bank, the media, professional economists often quoted in the media and the 
general public. For the SARB to optimise its use of communication, it needs to analyse the 
incentives facing each of these agents and to build relationships with them.   
The SARB aims to persuade the general public (the price setters) to change their behaviour. It 
faces both incentives to provide accurate information in order to build credibility, and 
incentives to distort information, in response political pressure, for example. However, the 
SARB has limited control over the news report.  
This news report can be viewed as the commodity provided by the media, which is created 
under the influence of supply and demand pressures. The media is driven by the profit motive 
to consider the demands of its target audience, but it is also influenced by factors such as 
pressure from advertisers on the supply side. According to the agenda-setting literature, 
introduced in Chapter 3, the „media does matter‟ in that exposure to the media influences the 
opinions and behaviour of its audience.  
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If the media matters, then professional economists who are extensively quoted in the media 
also have the potential to influence the inflation expectations of the general public. They are 
viewed as specialists with the skills required to interpret the central bank‟s information, but 
are regarded as independent from the central bank and are therefore more likely to provide an 
unbiased assessment. However, the literature suggests that professional economists also face 
various incentives. They face the incentive to forecast accurately in order to build a 
reputation, but they may also face the incentive to strategically bias their forecasts in a way 
that serves their own self interest, for example to gain publicity. News reports are the 
observed outcomes, influenced by the incentives of each of the strategic agents.  
In order to enable systematic analysis of the media‟s reporting on monetary policy actions, 
reports in the week following each MPC meeting are examined in Chapter 3. Two indices 
were created to characterise the quantity and quality of news coverage that each of the 
monetary policy statements received. The quantitative index extent of coverage (COV) 
captures the size and location (prominence) of each article, and the qualitative index 
assessment (ASMT) indicates whether the policy decision was assessed by the media as 
appropriate given the economic environment.   
The exercise of reading critically through the media reports in order to construct the index 
allowed the researchers to make some preliminary observations. They noticed that on average 
the economic arguments in the media reports were of a poor quality. The articles tended to 
have a patchwork character, often containing many quotes by private sector economists, 
which remained undigested even when the quotes contradicted on another. On average, media 
reports viewed increases in the interest rates negatively and interest rate decreases positively, 
showing little critical assessment of the appropriateness of the decision given the economic 
environment.  
Following these initial observations, frequency tables were used to analyse the information 
contained in the two series of index values. The actual decisions of the SARB were compared 
with the indices ASMT and COV. This exploratory data analysis revealed that over the 
period under review, most interest rate cuts were assessed favourably, decisions to hold the 
rate constant received a neutral or slightly positive assessment and decisions to raise the 
policy rate were mostly judged unfavourably. It was concluded that the assessment index 
reflects the popularity of the decision rather than its appropriateness given the economic 
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context. With respect to extent of media coverage, policy rate changes (either upwards or 
downwards) were granted more coverage than unchanged policy rate decisions, irrespective 
of the appropriateness of the decision. Neither of these initial observations reflected critical 
assessment of the MPC‟s decisions by the media.   
Regression analysis was then employed to explore the factors that correlated with COV and 
ASMT. Ordered probit models were adopted and a number of factors were considered, 
capturing the macroeconomic conditions, nature of policy decisions and intermeeting 
communications from the SARB. The regression results again reflected an absence of critical 
assessment by the media, which contrasted with findings by Berger et al. (2006) for the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The regressions showed that changes in the repo rate were 
likely to receive greater coverage than decisions to hold the rate constant. The assessment of 
policy decisions appeared to be affected mainly by the direction of the policy decision. 
Besides the fact that rises in the repo rate were accepted more readily when the Federal 
Reserve Bank was also tightening monetary policy, the assessments by the media showed 
little or no response to variables reflecting the macroeconomic context of the decision or 
intermeeting communications from the SARB.  
Chapter 3 concludes that even if the SARB succeeds in crafting good quality messages, it still 
faces the challenge of finding a way to contribute to the level of economic evaluation that the 
general public is receiving. This is going to involve monitoring the incentives facing the 
various role players in the communication process and building relationships with them.   
5.4. Inflation expectations of the inattentive general public 
Chapter 4 deals with the ultimate recipients of the SARB‟s communication, the inattentive 
general public. It investigates the characteristics of the South African general public and how 
they process inflation information in order to form their own inflation expectations. The 
chapter uses the behavioural economics concept rational inattention as a way to better 
capture this process of inflation expectations formation.   
It was assumed that the general public is inattentive to monetary policy and that this is a 
rational decision, especially under conditions of macroeconomic stability and central bank 
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credibility. Price setters have access to the inflation forecasts of the financial analysts via the 
media, and under stable conditions the benefits of searching for information beyond this do 
not justify the costs. Conversely, when the economic environment begins to put pressure on 
the general public, they are likely to judge the benefits of seeking more information as having 
risen relative to the costs.   
A visual inspection of the inflation expectations of the financial analysts and the price setters 
since 2000 revealed that the expectations of the general public were not always accurately 
represented by those of the financial analysts. During the mid-2005 to mid-2008 period of 
macroeconomic stability, the inflation expectations of these two groups were similar, but 
during times of instability, such as 2002/2003 and 2007 onwards, the inflation expectations of 
the price setters diverged from those of the financial analysts. Political opposition to the 
SARB‟s policies also tended to increase during these periods of economic instability, further 
sensitising the general public. Therefore, there is a need to understand more about how the 
price setters form their inflation expectations. 
Exploring the manner in which financial analysts and price setters form their expectations 
naturally leads a researcher to consider the standard rational expectations tradition of 
modelling. In Chapter 4, rational inattention is presented as a deviation from the standard 
assumption that agents make decisions under full information. It recognises that gathering 
and processing information is costly for the general public. In practice, monetary models are 
already being modified to better fit the observed data by incorporating uncertainty and 
learning. The standard model of the Phillips curve at present is the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve, which explicitly models microfoundations and commonly incorporates sticky prices 
(Calvo, 1983) to introduce rigidity. However, Mankiw (2001) argues that these extensions of 
the NKPC do not address the underlying weaknesses of the NKPC, especially its inability to 
capture the fact that monetary policy mainly impacts on real output in the short run, but 
prices in the long run.   
In response, Mankiw and Reis (2001) suggest using inattentiveness to model a Sticky 
Information Phillips Curve (SIPC), which they argue is able to produce more reasonable 
impulse response functions. They assume that information about inflation disseminates 
through the economy in a sticky fashion (the spread of information about inflation 
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expectations through the economy is not instantaneous), but they do not formally model the 
microfoundations.  
Carrol (2002, 2003) suggests adopting epidemiological models to model the 
microfoundations of the SIPC. Following the work of Carroll (2001, 2003), an 
epidemiological model was adopted in Chapter 3 of this dissertation to describe the spread of 
inflation information across South Africa in the same manner that the spread of a contagious 
disease is modelled. It is proposed that the inattentive public update their inflation 
expectations periodically, based on their exposure to relevant newspaper reports. In 
aggregate, the spread of inflation information through the economy is sluggish, based on the 
probability that members of the inattentive public are exposed to information and update their 
expectations. This sluggish spread of inflation information is referred to as sticky 
information.  
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to improve our understanding of the inflationary process 
and to estimate this information stickiness for South Africa. This could provide the 
microfoundations for a new approach to modelling the South African Phillips Curve, inform 
policy decisions and enhance the SARB‟s ability to communicate with the price setters.   
In order to explore the degree to which the proposed epidemiological model could represent 
the expectations formation process of the price setters, inflation data from STATS SA and the 
inflation expectations survey data of the BER were employed. The inflation expectations 
surveys began only in 2000 with the adoption of inflation targeting in South Africa; therefore, 
the dataset is limited to 40 quarterly observations. The fact that the empirical analysis relies 
on a short sample of survey-based data and that the stationarity of inflation data has long 
been debated in the literature provides an indication of the challenges that this kind of 
research faces and why it has largely been neglected. A range of formal stationarity tests were 
conducted, and unsurprisingly, the results were mixed. As a result, the econometric 
techniques selected to estimate a range for information stickiness have features which 
account for this uncertainty. 
Prior to the formal estimation of information stickiness, an exploratory data analysis was used 
to judge whether information about inflation disseminates from the economy to the inflation 
expectations of the financial analysts and then to those of the price setters. A visual 
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inspection showed that the inflation expectations of both groups had similar patterns to that of 
actual inflation and that adjustments in inflation occur first, followed by those of the financial 
analysts and then those of the price setters. A contemporaneous pairwise correlation matrix 
showed that the inflation expectations of the financial analysts correlated more closely 
(0.684) with inflation than those of the price setters do (0.400) and that there was a strong 
correlation between the inflation expectations of financial analysts and price setters (0.774). 
In addition, it was found that the inflation expectations of financial analysts Granger-cause 
those of the price setters, but that the opposite is not true, suggesting that the inflation 
expectations of the financial analysts provide information about the likely future adjustments 
in those of the price setters. Finally, estimates of the root mean squared error (RMSE) for the 
financial analysts were substantially lower than those of the price setters. In conclusion, this 
exploratory data analysis revealed that the financial analysts adjust their inflation 
expectations quicker and more accurately than other price setters do.  
None of these data analyses cast doubt upon the suitability of the epidemiological models 
proposed, so formal analysis to estimate information stickiness was conducted next. Another 
pairwise correlation matrix suggested that past inflation is important in the formation of the 
inflation expectations of the two groups, so it was included in the formal regression analysis.  
In the regression analysis, both VECM and ARDL models were used, as they each offer 
different advantages. This allowed the estimation of a robust range for information stickiness 
by taking advantage of the strengths of each type of model. Both models allow the estimation 
of long-run and short-run characteristics, but the ARDL model offers some important 
advantages. It allows one to estimate regressions without pretesting the data series for order 
of integration. Data series can be included regardless of whether they are integrated of the 
order of 0, 1 or 2, and they do not have to be integrated of the same order. In addition, the 
model also performs well in small samples such as this one. However, the ARDL model is a 
single-equation model, assuming by construction that all the dependant variables are weakly 
exogenous, and it is therefore open to Sims‟ (1980) „incredible restrictions‟ criticism. On the 
other hand, the VECM does require pretesting, but it also explicitly tests for weak exogeneity 
rather than assuming it. 
A VECM which includes only the inflation expectations of the financial analysts and price 
setters was estimated first, but the results of its cointegrating equation were questionable. 
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Both the short sample and the possibility of omitted variable bias (due to the omission of past 
inflation) were offered as potential reasons for the poor results. When the same series were 
regressed using an ARDL model, the results were more reasonable, as expected, but the 
estimate of information stickiness was substantially different from that of the VECM, so the 
results were not yet robust. VECM and ARDL models with both the inflation expectations 
series and past inflation were estimated next, and their results were very similar and sensible. 
Information stickiness was estimated as 0.679 by the VECM and 0.690 by the ARDL-ECM. 
This estimate was much higher than the estimate by Carrol (2002, 2003) for the USA, but it 
was argued that it is logical that inflation expectations would adjust more quickly in countries 
where inflation itself is higher and less stable, as the benefit for price setters of monitoring 
inflation is higher. This is in line with the higher estimate of inflation stickiness (0.5-0.6) 
found for Italy (Döpke et al. (2008)). 
Finally, agent-based models were adopted to test the robustness of the regression results by 
considering the problem from the disaggregated level upward. A series for the aggregate 
inflation expectations of the price setters was simulated, beginning with some real-world 
data, initial conditions for the inflation expectations of the price setters, and an alogarithm to 
describe their decision-making process.  
This simulated series was then compared with the actual series to assess the extent to which 
the model was able to mimic the true process. Both the estimated coefficient and R-squared 
values were consistently greater than 0.900, suggesting that the agent-based models were able 
to simulate a series that closely resembled the observed one. In addition, the ranges of values 
for ℷ and δ that delivered the best results included those estimated by the VECM and ARDL 
models, which provided a further indication that these estimates were robust.  
5.5. Conclusion 
Blinder et al. (2008) referred to a lack of consensus about what constitutes optimal central 
bank communication. This may be a result of the fact that an optimal communication policy 
is conditional on the particular economic and political environment within a country and that 
this will therefore differ across countries. This dissertation represents  an effort to explore 
aspects of the SARB‟s use of communication, with a specific focus on its communication 
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with the general public. Old tools were extended and new ones developed to offer fresh 
insights in order to enhance the evaluation of the South African economy and improve the 
design of policy tools. The main findings of this dissertation reveal that although the SARB 
has communicated consistently over the inflation targeting period, the media has reported 
uncritically on monetary policy, limiting the impact of the SARB‟s communication on the 
inflation expectations of the general public. Epidemiological models were used to represent 
the process by which price setters form their inflation expectations and to find a range of 
between 0.65 and 0.70 for information stickiness. The modelling of some of the 
macroeconomic relationships such as the Phillips curve could be enhanced through an 
improved understanding of these microfoundations, especially because they explicitly 
incorporate the inflation expectations of the price setters, which have received relatively 
limited attention.  
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